Brooks v. Jackson, 90CA0365

• Decision Date: 20 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90CA0365,90CA0365
• Parties: 19 Media L. Rep. 1127 Odell BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore W. JACKSON and Janice R. Jackson, Defendants-Appellants. . II
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 847

813 P.2d 847

19 Media L. Rep. 1127

Odell BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore W. JACKSON and Janice R. Jackson, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 90CA0365.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. II.

June 20, 1991.

Clifford L. Beem & Associates, P.C., Stuart D. Mann, Clifford L. Beem, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Olsen and Brown, John R. Olsen, Boulder, for defendants-appellants.

Opinion by Judge METZGER.

In this proceeding concerning prejudgment interest on a libel judgment, we affirm the trial court ruling that such interest was to be included in the judgment entered.

In October of 1985, a jury returned a verdict of $15,000 in favor of plaintiff, Odell Brooks, on his claim of libel per se against defendants, Theodore W. and Janice R. Jackson, and other defendants not party to this appeal. Although plaintiff had requested interest in his complaint, the judgment entered on the verdict did not include any amount therefor. The judgment was not appealed.

Thereafter, the judgment collection process commenced, and defendants paid, by way of wage garnishment, what they believed to be the full amount of the judgment. Accordingly, approximately five years after the judgment was entered, they moved for entry of satisfaction of judgment.

Plaintiff responded with a motion to correct judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(a), on the basis that the trial court had inadvertently failed to include the amount of prejudgment interest plaintiff was owed. Thus, he contended, defendants' motion should be denied.

After considering briefs and arguments of counsel, the trial court ruled that an action for libel per se is an action for personal injuries, thus qualifying for automatic prejudgment interest pursuant to § 13-21-101, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). Further, relying on Crosby v. Kroeger, 138 Colo. 55, 330 P.2d 958 (1958), it granted plaintiff's motion to correct the judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(a), and awarded interest to plaintiff from the date the action had accrued. Defendants appeal both rulings.

I.

Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in determining that defamation is a personal injury as contemplated by § 13-21-101, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). They argue that defamation is, "by its essence," a property injury. We disagree.

As early as 1898, our court noted:

"Torts may be divided into two general classes--the first, designated as 'property torts,' embracing all injuries and damages to property, real or personal; the second, known as 'personal torts,' including all injuries to the person, whether to reputation, feelings, or to the body. A tort which is not an injury to property is a personal tort."

Mumford v. Wright, 12 Colo.App. 214, 55 P. 744 (1898); see also Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 P. 614 (1894).

A communication is defamatory "if it tends so to harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community...." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1976). Indeed, the law of defamation developed for the protection of reputation. See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F.Supp. 1219 (D.Colo.1976). See also L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation §§ 1-4 (1978).

A person's reputation is uniquely personal, and actions which injure one's reputation can amount to a deprivation of a liberty, as opposed to a property, interest. Wheeler v. School District # 20, 188 Colo. 262, 535 P.2d 206 (1975). Thus, for example, defamatory remarks relating to the conduct of an individual's business, tantamount to defamation of his business and professional reputation, amounted to slander per se because injury to reputation is presumed. Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978).

Accordingly, we hold that defamation is a personal injury and not an injury to property. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that the automatic prejudgment interest provisions of § 13-21-101, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), pertaining to judgments entered for personal injury, apply. See Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo.App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977); see also American Insurance Co. v. Naylor, 103 Colo. 461, 87 P.2d 260 (1939).

II.

Defendants next assert that the trial court erred in applying C.R.C.P. 60(a) to award prejudgment interest to plaintiff. They argue that the passage of five years between entry of the judgment and the interest award was too long for that rule to be applicable. We find no error.

C.R.C.P. 60(a) provides:

"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own...