78 Hawai'i 33, State v. Mageo

Decision Date17 February 1995
Docket NumberNo. 16655,16655
Citation889 P.2d 1092
Parties78 Hawai'i 33 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Romeo Fagauai MAGEO, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Generally, any regulation of, condition on, or restriction on the use or operation of a vehicle on a public way, the violation of which results in a statutorily imposed penalty, would constitute a "traffic offense" expressly excepted from the operation of Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48. A charge of driving without no-fault insurance in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-104 (Special Pamphlet 1987 and Supp.1992) is such a traffic offense.

2. The exclusion of traffic cases from the trial timetable set out in HRPP Rule 48 leaves undisturbed the inherent power of the court to dismiss "traffic offense" cases for want of prosecution. The district court's dismissal of citations issued for the violation of HRS § 431:10C-104 because of over two years' unexplained delay in prosecuting the case from the issuance of penal summonses, was a valid exercise of its inherent power.

3. To determine whether this inherent power is properly exercised requires a balancing of the State's interest against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court system.

James H.S. Choi, Deputy Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

Christopher R. Evans, on the brief, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.

Before BURNS, C.J., and WATANABE and ACOBA, JJ.

ACOBA, Judge.

The State of Hawai'i (State) appeals from a district court order entered on October 30, 1992, dismissing two charges against Defendant-Appellant Romeo Fagauai Mageo (Defendant) for driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-104 (Special Pamphlet 1987 and Supp.1992). The district court apparently held that Defendant had not been served with penal summonses in a timely manner, referring to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 9, or, in the alternative, that HRPP Rule 48 applied to Defendant, who had not been brought to trial within six months, as required under that rule.

We agree with the State that HRPP Rule 48 did not apply to Defendant because the offenses involved here are "traffic offenses" expressly excepted from the operation of HRPP Rule 48. However, we believe that the district court had inherent power to dismiss the traffic offenses for want of prosecution. The State having offered no explanation for the over two-year delay in serving Defendant with the penal summonses, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in the exercise of its inherent power, and therefore, affirm the order granting the motion to dismiss.

We glean the following matters from the sparse record before us. Defendant was cited for driving without no-fault insurance on July 12, 1989, October 9, 1989, and March 8, 1991. Neither the citations nor their contents is in the record. Evidently, Defendant did not report to court in response to the citations because penal summonses were issued for him on August 1, 1989, November 1, 1989, and April 5, 1991, for the respective citations. There is no record of the penal summonses being served, or pursuant to HRPP Rule 9(c), of the summonses being returned unserved, cancelled, and reissued for service. 1

However, all of the penal summonses were "reinstated" 2 on February 5, 1992. Prior to reinstatement of the penal summonses, there was no case activity of record for two and one-half years on the first citation, and for two and one-fourth years on the second citation.

On February 21, 1992, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all three citations. On October 5, 1992, Defendant filed a written motion to dismiss the first two citations only. 3 The motion primarily maintained that (1) the State had failed to commence trial within six months of the penal summonses' issuance, in violation of HRPP Rule 48, and that (2) Defendant's right to a speedy trial under the United States and Hawai'i constitutions had been denied.

The hearing on the motion to dismiss took place on October 30, 1992. At the hearing, the court took no evidence but questioned Defendant from the bench. Defendant's unsworn response to the court indicated he had been in Hawai'i since 1989 and had not left the State. 4 Neither party objected then, or on appeal, to this procedure. 5

The district court then granted the motion on essentially two grounds: 6 (1) the penal summonses had not been timely served, in violation of HRPP Rule 9(c)(3)(ii), which states that summonses must be served "without unnecessary delay," and alternatively, (2) the "traffic offenses" exception to the HRPP Rule 48 requirement that Defendant's trial be commenced within six months of being charged was inapplicable, because he was potentially subject to punishment for a petty misdemeanor as opposed to a "violation." 7

The court did not render a decision on Defendant's speedy trial claim.

I.

We examine the district court's reliance on HRPP Rule 48 first.

In response to the State's contention that HRPP Rule 48 specifically excludes traffic offenses from its scope, the court indicated that the "possibility of the jail sentence ... makes it ... a petty misdemeanor ... and ... not a traffic offense." But it has already been established that the severity of the penalty is not determinative of whether an act is to be considered a traffic offense under HRPP Rule 48. State v. Leatiota, 69 Haw. 253, 254, 739 P.2d 930, 930 (1987). For, "[t]he rule in question exempts ... all traffic offenses ... even though [the offense may be] a serious crime." Id. (Driving under the influence (DUI), HRS § 291-4(a)(1) (1985), is both a serious crime and a traffic offense.)

The question remains as to whether a violation of HRS § 431:10C-104 constitutes a "traffic offense." An "offense" generally refers to a felony or misdemeanor or a "violation of law for which a penalty is prescribed." Black's Law Dictionary 1081 (6th ed. 1990). Under the Hawai'i Penal Code (HPC), "offenses are classified into 'crimes' and 'violations' with 'crimes' further subdivided into felonies, misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors." Commentary to HRPP Rule 1, submitted 1975 at 2. As a result, any penalty applicable to Defendant would result in charging an "offense." For the first violation of HRS § 431:10C-104, Defendant would be subject to a fine of $1,000, HRS § 431:10C-117, (Supp.1990) (amended 1990 and 1993), making the offense a "violation" under the HPC. HRS § 701-107(5) (1985). For multiple violations of the statute, Defendant would be subject to up to 30 days' imprisonment, HRS § 431:10C-117(3)(A), making the offense a petty misdemeanor under the HPC. HRS § 701-107(4) (1985). HRS § 431:10C-117(2) itself, also confirms that "each violation [of HRS § 431:10C-104] shall be deemed [an] ... offense." (Emphasis added.)

"Traffic" pertains to the "passing to and fro of ... vehicles ... along a route of transportation, as along a street[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 1495 (6th ed. 1990). In that connection, it has been held that the violation of a statute which governs the operation of a motor vehicle constitutes a "traffic offense" under HRPP Rule 48. Leatiota, 69 Haw. at 254, 739 P.2d at 930. Thus, we may reasonably infer that, generally, any regulation of, condition on, or restriction on the use or operation of a vehicle on a public way, the violation of which results in a statutorily imposed penalty, would constitute a "traffic offense" under HRPP Rule 48. Cf. Leatiota, 69 Haw. at 253, 739 P.2d at 930 (DUI is a traffic offense); State v. Busby, 71 Haw. 408, 793 P.2d 1187 (1990) (license revocation for failure to submit to breath or blood test is a traffic offense).

HRS § 431:10C-104 clearly falls within the ambit of such a framework. It provides, subject to the penalties set forth in HRS § 431:10C-117, that "no person shall operate or use a motor vehicle upon any public street, road or highway ... unless such motor vehicle is insured ... under a no-fault policy." Therefore, under the statute, coverage under a no-fault insurance policy is, as the title of the section states, a "[c]ondition[ ] of operation ... of motor vehicles." HRS § 431:10C-104 (emphasis omitted). Because no-fault insurance coverage is a condition on the operation of a motor vehicle upon a public way enforceable by a statutory penalty, we hold that driving without no-fault insurance is a "traffic offense."

HRPP Rule 48 expressly exempts all "traffic offenses" from its operation: "Except in the case of traffic offenses, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not commenced within 6 months...." HRPP Rule 48(b).

Since HRPP Rule 48 excludes all traffic offenses from its scope, and driving without no-fault insurance constitutes a traffic offense, HRPP Rule 48 did not apply to Defendant's cases. Hence, the offenses here were not subject to dismissal pursuant to HRPP Rule 48.

But, HRPP Rule 48 "has been regarded as a restatement of the inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution[.]" State v. English, 61 Haw. 12, 23, 594 P.2d 1069, 1076 (1979). "The purpose of [HRPP] Rule 48 is to ensure an accused a speedy trial ... separate and distinct from his [or her] constitutional protection to a speedy trial." State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 268, 625 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1981) (footnote omitted). Its "purpose is also ... to relieve congestion in the trial court, to promptly process all cases ..., and to advance the efficiency of the criminal justice process." Id. We may deduce that similar considerations underlie a court's inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution, since HRPP Rule 48 is "a restatement of [that] inherent power[.]" English, 61 Haw. at 23, 594 P.2d at 1076. HRPP Rule...

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