78 Hawai'i 351, Heatherly v. Hilton Hawaiian Village Joint Venture
| Decision Date | 26 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 16929,16929 |
| Citation | 893 P.2d 779 |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
| Parties | 78 Hawai'i 351, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1165 Richard HEATHERLY, Byron Hiyane, Robert Kong, Burt Kubota, Raymundo Lived, Phillip Losalio, Godfrey Maeshiro, Dennis Nakashima, Howard Taka, Lawrence Takara, Howard Yamane, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated; and Anthony Rutledge, as designated agent on behalf of designating persons and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILTON HAWAIIAN VILLAGE JOINT VENTURE, dba Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel; WKH, Inc., dba Kahala Hilton Hotel; Pleasant Travel Services, Inc., dba Kona Hilton; Kyo-Ya Company, Ltd. Hotel Division, dba Moana/Surfrider Hotels, Princess Kaiulani Hotel, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Sheraton Waikiki Hotel, and Sheraton Maui Hotel; Ohbayashi Hawaii Corp., dba Sheraton Kauai Hotel; Jowa Hawaii, Inc., dba The Ilikai; and Azabu U.S.A., Inc., dba Hyatt Regency Waikiki; Council of Hawai'i Hotels; and William C. Crawford, in his capacity as Executive Director of Council of Hawaii Hotels; Defendants-Appellees. |
T. Anthony Gill of Gill & Zukeran, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Richard M. Rand (Robert S. Katz with him on the brief; of Torkildson, Katz, Jossem, Fonseca, Jaffe, Moore & Hetherington), Honolulu, for defendants-appellees.
Before MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON and NAKAYAMA, JJ., and HEELY, Circuit Court Judge, in place of RAMIL, J., recused.
The plaintiffs-appellants (the Bellhelp) are all bellhops of various hotels located throughout Hawai'i, with the exception of Anthony Rutledge (Rutledge), who is the Financial Secretary/Treasurer of Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees, Local 5 (Local 5). The defendants-appellees (the Hotels) are hotels, or companies that own the hotels, which employ the Bellhelp.
The Bellhelp appeal from the first circuit court judgment, filed February 16, 1993, granting the Hotels' motion for summary judgment or in the alternative for partial summary judgment. The circuit court determined that porterage fees transmitted to the Bellhelp constitute wages within the meaning of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 387-1 (1985 & Supp.1992); 1 therefore, these amounts can be used to satisfy the Hotels' obligation under HRS § 387-2 (Supp.1992) 2 to pay minimum wages.
On appeal, the Bellhelp claim that the circuit court erred in (1) determining that porterage fees are wages under HRS § 387-1 and (2) granting summary judgment where a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the term "gratuities of any kind," as used in HRS § 387-1, includes porterage fees.
For reasons set forth below, we vacate the circuit court's judgment.
The Hotels, through their bargaining representative, the Council of Hawaii Hotels, and Local 5 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (Master Agreement), which establishes the wage rates for the Bellhelp. According to the Bellhelp's Opening Brief, the Bellhelp's total income derives from three sources: (1) an hourly wage pursuant to the Master Agreement; (2) tips from hotel guests; and (3) "porterage," a third category that is the subject of dispute in this case.
The Bellhelp brought this action on June 15, 1992 seeking recovery of unpaid minimum wages pursuant to HRS § 387-12(b) (1985). 3 It is undisputed that between the settlement of the Master Agreement, in 1990, and April 1, 1992, the Bellhelp's wages, as set forth in the Master Agreement, exceeded both the federal and Hawai'i minimum wage. On April 1, 1992, however, the Hawai'i minimum wage was raised from $3.85 to $4.75 per hour and, effective January 1, 1993, the minimum wage was raised to $5.25 per hour. HRS § 387-2. In their complaint, the Bellhelp asserted that as of April 1, 1992 the Hotels have not adjusted the Bellhelp's wages to satisfy the Hawai'i minimum wage requirement.
On July 6, 1992, the Hotels filed their answer; then, on November 9, 1992, the Hotels filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative for partial summary judgment. The Hotels asserted that they were entitled, as a matter of law, to count both the contractual hourly wages and the porterage to meet the minimum wage requirements of HRS chapter 387. In their memorandum opposing the Hotels' motion, the Bellhelp claimed that pursuant to the Master Agreement, porterage could not be counted as wages because porterage fees are "not [the] employers' money to award or allocate or pay" under HRS § 387-1. See also HRS § 387-2 ().
By order entered on January 28, 1993, the circuit court granted the Hotels' motion for summary judgment or in the alternative for partial summary judgment. In this order, the circuit court stated: "The Court finds that the service charges are wages under H.R.S. § 387-1 and therefore can be used by Defendants in their entirety to satisfy their obligation to pay the minimum wage established by H.R.S. § 387-2." The circuit court's judgment was entered on February 16, 1993.
On March 15, 1993, the Bellhelp timely filed their notice of appeal.
On appeal, an order of summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard applied by the circuit courts. Summary judgment is proper where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 76 Hawai'i 277, 287, 875 P.2d 894, 904 (1994). In other words, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pacific Int'l Services Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Hawai'i 209, 213, 873 P.2d 88, 92 (1994); Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) (1990).
The essence of the Bellhelp's argument is that, by contract, porterage fees cannot be considered wages paid by the Hotels because these monies represent a form of dual compensation, like gratuities, that are owned exclusively by the Bellhelp. The Bellhelp contend that because the Master Agreement § 38.5(A)(1) provides that "porterage ... shall be considered the exclusive property of the bargaining unit employees and are payable only to the appropriate bargaining unit employees," the porterage fees never belonged to the Hotels. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, because the Hotels never owned the porterage fees, they could not "pay" these monies to the Bellhelp as wages in exchange for labor and services rendered under HRS § 387-2.
The Hotels respond that under the terms of the Master Agreement porterage is neither a tip nor a gratuity; therefore, these funds need not be excluded when determining whether the Bellhelp have been paid minimum wages as required by law. In support of their argument, the Hotels note that the Master Agreement defines porterage as "any service charge or pre-negotiated payment by a guest of [sic] a customer for service rendered." 4
Before we consider the parties' apparently divergent interpretations of the Master Agreement, we must construe HRS §§ 387-1 and 387-2 to determine whether these provisions permit the parties to designate a particular source of income--e.g., "porterage"--as "wages" or "gratuities." "[P]arties may not do by contract what is prohibited by statute." Lerwill v. Inflight Servs., Inc., 379 F.Supp. 690, 696 (N.D.Cal.1974), aff'd, Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.1978).
The circuit court's finding that porterage fees constitute wages under HRS § 387-1 is really a conclusion of law, and questions of statutory interpretation are reviewable de novo. Crosby v. State, 76 Hawai'i 332, 340, 876 P.2d 1300, 1308 (1994).
In Crosby, we summarized the applicable standards for statutory interpretation:
When construing a statute, our foremost obligation "is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature," which "is to be obtained primarily from language contained in the statute itself." Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 63, 868 P.2d 1193, 1210, reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994) (citations omitted). However,
we have rejected an approach to statutory construction which limits us to the words of a statute ... for when aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination.
Id. at 68, 868 P.2d at 1215 (Klein, J., dissenting) (citing Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 421, 653 P.2d 420, 424 (1982)).
Thus, the plain language rule of statutory construction,
does not preclude an examination of sources other than the language of the statute itself even when the language appears clear upon perfunctory review. Were this not the case, a court may be unable to adequately discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate and, thus, would be unable to determine if a literal construction would produce an absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the policies of the statute.
Survivors of Medeiros v. Maui Land & Pineapple Co., 66 Haw. 290, 297, 660 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983)[.]
Id. at 68-69, 868 P.2d at 1215-16 (Klein, J., dissenting).
Crosby, 76 Hawai'i at 340, 876 P.2d at 1308.
HRS § 387-1 initially defines "wage" as "legal tender of the United States ... and in addition thereto the reasonable cost ... to the employer of furnishing an employee with board, lodging, or other facilities if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished by such employer to the employer's employees." See Williams...
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