Abrams v. New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA)

• Decision Date: 28 June 1974
• Citation: 358 N.Y.S.2d 842,78 Misc.2d 938
• Parties: Robert ABRAMS, Individually and Borough President of the Bronx and Member of the Board of Estimate, et al., Petitioners, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY (NYCTA) et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 842

358 N.Y.S.2d 842

78 Misc.2d 938

Robert ABRAMS, Individually and Borough President of the Bronx and Member of the Board of Estimate, et al Petitioners, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY (NYCTA) et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part I.

June 28, 1974.

David Schoenbrod, Richard M. Hall, New York City, and Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., for petitioners.

John G. de Roos, Gen. Counsel of N.Y.C.T.A., Brooklyn, Robert R. Prince, New York City, MTA, for respondents.

JACOB MARKOWITZ, Justice.

The stated purpose of this Article 78 proceeding is to compel respondents to comply with the laws controlling noise in the New York City subways. Toward that end, petitioners, as individuals and in various official and representative capacities seek an order directing the New York City Transit Authority and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, (hereinafter referred to as M.T.A.) and their members 'to turn over immediately to petitioner, Robert Abrams' the reports required by certain sections of the Public Authorities Law, and setting down the petition for hearing.

In opposition, respondents argue 1) that the order to show cause and petition are jurisdictionally defective, 2) that none of the Public Authorities Law sections referred to (sections 1213, 1265, 2500, and 2501) require that the reports under these sections be furnished to petitioner Abrams, either as an individual or as Borough President of the Bronx, 3) that the M.T.A. is not a proper party to this proceeding, since the New York City Transit Authority (and not the M.T.A.) runs the subways, 4) that petitioners have no standing to bring the proceeding, and 5) that the Transit Authority is making every effort to improve service, and the operating conditions of the subway, within the limited funds available to it, that the statutory duty to do so is solely in the Authority, and that courts will not interfere with the operation of public agencies in the areas confided to them by the Legislature.

The goal to abate subway noise levels, is, beyond cavil, meritorious. In the efforts to reach this objective, all those who ride the subways, and respondents, the State and City officials in charge, and the court, no doubt readily join petitioners. But before petitioners may, under the law, place themselves on a higher level than other citizens of the City, replace the Board of Estimate, and make demand for more than is otherwise publicly provided, indeed, before they may bring a proceeding to correct what they deem to be unsuitable conditions, they must point to damage peculiar to themselves or some illegal act on the part of respondents or to legislative sanctin to do so. Hence, when such a proceeding is brought, petitioners' right to bring the proceeding is the threshold determination to be made by the court.

The applicable rule was reiterated many years ago in Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 534, 106 N.E. 675, 679, in a quotation from Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N.Y. 318, 323:

'As a resident citizen, and a person liable to be taxed, he has no other rights than such as are common to all of the people of the community who own property; and we have decided upon full consideration that it requires some individual interest distinct from that which belongs to every inhabitant of the town or county, to give the party complaining a standing in court, where it is an alleged delinquency in the administration of public affairs which is called in question.'

In short, it is the law of this State that an individual or a group of individuals may not maintain an action against a public agency for an injunction, mandatory or otherwise, whether the proceeding is considered an equity action or an Article 78 proceeding (CPLR § 103(c)), unless he or they suffer a special injury different from that suffered by the public at large (Carnegie v. Ronan, 67 Misc.2d 301, 303, 323 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788). Moreover, an injunction will not be granted where the court would have to control and regulate a general course of official conduct and enforce performance of official duties generally. Jurisdiction has never been conferred on the courts to supervise the day to day acts within their jurisdiction of other departments...