Feder v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n

• Decision Date: 04 February 1899
• Citation: 78 N.W. 252,107 Iowa 538
• Parties: BERTHA FEDER et al., Appellants, v. THE IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASSOCIATION
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

78 N.W. 252

107 Iowa 538

BERTHA FEDER et al., Appellants, v. THE IOWA STATE TRAVELING MEN'S ASSOCIATION

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 4, 1899

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. W. A. SPURRIER, Judge.

ACTION at law on a certificate of membership. A jury was impaneled evidence was submitted, a verdict was returned for the defendant by direction of the court, and judgment was rendered in its favor. The plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Berryhill & Henry and George E. Hubbell for appellants.

Cummins Hewitt & Wright for appellee.

OPINION

ROBINSON, C. J.

The certificate in suit was issued to one Louis L. Feder, and entitled him to all the benefits accruing from membership in the defendant by virtue of its constitution and by-laws. When the certificate was issued, an article of the constitution of the defendant provided that "whenever the death of a member of this association in good standing shall occur from any accidental cause (except while such member shall be under the influence of intoxicating liquors or narcotics)" and proofs thereof should be made, the proceeds of an assessment of two dollars on each member of the association, not exceeding the sum of five thousand dollars, should be paid to the beneficiary named in the certificate, or to his heirs or legal representatives; provided, however, that if, at the time of such death, the amount of money in the treasury of the association not otherwise appropriated should exceed the sum of five thousand five hundred dollars, payment of five thousand dollars was to be made from the money in the treasury. On the 18th day of April, 1894, Feder died. At that time he was a member of the association in good standing, and this action is brought on the certificate, to recover the sum of five thousand dollars. The validity of the certificate is admitted, the death of Feder is not disputed, and notice and proofs of his death are shown. We are required to determine whether there was sufficient evidence tending to show that Feder's death resulted "from an accidental cause" to require the submission of the case to the jury.

The evidence tended to establish the following: The decedent, at the time of his death, was about twenty-six years of age, and had been in Denver, where his death occurred, about nine months. He was suffering from consumption, and went to Denver, and resided there, on account of his health. He was benefited by the change of climate and medical treatment he received, and his health had been considerably improved, and was constantly improving, at the time of his death. During the day of his death he had been as well as usual, and in the evening was with two of his brothers in their office. Preparatory to leaving it, the decedent went to a window to close the shutters. A chair stood in front of the window, and he stood on his toes, and reached over the chair towards the shutters, and, as he did so, blood began to flow from his mouth. He was placed on a lounge, and died within a few minutes. The cause of his death was hemorrhage from a ruptured artery, and the evidence would have authorized the conclusion that the rupture of the artery was not due to the disease from which he was suffering. There is no evidence that he fell, slipped, lost his balance, failed to catch the shutter when he reached for it, or that it moved at his touch more or less readily than he had expected it would move; in other words, there is no evidence whatever that anything was done or occurred which he had not foreseen and planned, excepting the rupture of the artery, and the consequences which resulted from it.

Did his death result "from an accidental cause"? Various definitions of the word "accident" are quoted by the appellants, and among them are the following: It is an "unexpected event, which happens as by chance, or which does not take place according to the usual course of things." Insurance Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43. "The equitable definition of the term 'accident' includes, not only inevitable casualties, and such as are caused by the act of God, but also those which arise from unforeseen occurrences, misfortunes, losses, and acts or omissions of other persons without fault, negligence, or misconduct on the part of the person injured." Bostwick v. Stiles, 35 Conn. 195. "An event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation"; and it may include an injury received in a common-law affray, without the fault of the person injured. Supreme Council Order of Chosen Friends v. Garrigus 104 Ind. 133 (3 N.E. 818). "An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and, therefore, not expected." Schneider v. Insurance Co., 24 Wis. 28. "An accident is the happening of an event without the aid...