Currence v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World

Decision Date28 May 1913
PartiesCURRENCE v. SOVEREIGN CAMP WOODMEN OF THE WORLD.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, York County; Thos. S. Sease, Judge.

Action by B. J. Currence, as administrator, against the Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

A copy of the answer referred to in the opinion is as follows:

"The defendant answering the complaint of the plaintiff respectfully shows to the court:
"(1) The defendant denies each and every allegation in plaintiff's said complaint contained not hereinafter specifically admitted.
"(2) This defendant admits it is a fraternal beneficiary association incorporated under the laws of the state of Nebraska, and duly authorized to transact business in South Carolina as such, and during all the times mentioned in the complaint was doing business in South Carolina acting under the authority of the statute law of this state. The defendant also admits that it has subordinate lodges or camps and that it has such in South Carolina, one of which is and was known as 'Black Jack Camp No. 247,' of which W. M. Joy became a member in August, 1907; but this defendant alleges that membership in said order and the suspension of members from said order and the restoration of members to said order, and the beneficiary certificates issued to the members of the order, and whether the same shall be of force and effect or not, are all governed and controlled by the constitution, laws, and by-laws of the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, as well as by the statute laws of the state of South Carolina relating to fraternal beneficiary associations.
"(3) Further answering, this defendant shows to the court That while plaintiff's intestate was accepted as a member of the defendant corporation through initiation in one of its subordinate camps on the 27th of August, 1907, and on said date a beneficiary certificate was issued to plaintiff's intestate, yet the defendant alleges that plaintiff's intestate was suspended on the 1st day of May, 1911, for not paying his monthly assessment, which said suspension was authorized and required under section 109 of the constitution and by-laws of the defendant corporation, which said section reads as follows: "Sec. 109. (a) Every member of this order shall pay to the clerk of his camp each month one assessment payment, as required in section 56, which shall be credited to and known as "Sovereign Camp Fund," and he shall also pay such camp dues as may be required by the by-laws of his camp. He shall pay any additional assessments for the Sovereign Camp fund and camp dues, or either, which may be legally called. (b) If he fails to make any such payments on or before the first day of the month following, he shall stand suspended, and during such suspension his beneficiary certificate shall be void.'

"(4) That section 115 of the constitution and by-laws of the defendant corporation contains the following provisions: Sec. 115. (a) Should a suspended member pay all arrearages and dues to the clerk of his camp within ten days from the date of his suspension, and if in good health and not addicted to the excessive use of intoxicants or narcotics, he shall be restored to membership and his beneficiary certificate again become valid. (b) After the expiration of ten days and within three months from the date of suspension of a suspended member to reinstate he must pay to the clerk of his camp all arrearages and dues and deliver to him a written statement and warranty signed by himself and witnessed that he is in good health and not addicted to the excessive use of intoxicants or narcotics as a condition precedent to reinstatement, and waiving all rights thereto if such written statement and warranty be untrue. (c) Any attempted reinstatement shall not be effective for that purpose unless the member be in fact in good health at the time, and if any of the representations or statements made by the said applicant are untrue, then said payments shall not cause his reinstatement nor operate as a waiver of the above conditions.'

"(5) That on the 4th of July, 1911, one Robert Saye Riddle, the clerk of subordinate camp No. 247, of which W. M. Joy had been a member, attempted to reinstate the said W. M. Joy into membership in said corporation by remitting to said defendant corporation the sum of $3, the same being some two months after his suspension, and the said W. M. Joy not having given the clerk of said camp a written statement and warranty signed by himself and witnessed that he was in good health and so on, and the defendant here alleges that at the time of the attempted reinstatement, on the 4th day of July, 1911, the said W. M. Joy was sick of typhoid fever, dying of said dread disease on the 21st...

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