United States v. Pettit

• Decision Date: 13 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–4043.,14–4043.
• Citation: 785 F.3d 1374
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael E. PETTIT, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

785 F.3d 1374

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Michael E. PETTIT, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14–4043.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 13, 2015.

Daphne A. Oberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Kathryn N. Nester, Federal Public Defender, and Scott Keith Wilson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant–Appellant.

Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Carlie Christensen, Acting United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, KELLY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

In 2013, Defendant–Appellant Michael E. Pettit was indicted on one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), after police discovered 2.5 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a vehicle he was driving. Mr. Pettit filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied following an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Pettit, No. 2:13CR00286, 2013 WL 5494664 (D.Utah Oct. 2, 2013). A jury found Mr. Pettit guilty, and he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised release.

On appeal, Mr. Pettit asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police improperly extended a lawful traffic stop based on factors failing to give rise to objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Background

On the afternoon of April 17, 2013, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Thomas Simpson, observed Mr. Pettit drive across the fog line multiple times. He was traveling approximately 45 miles per hour and had just passed through a “snow burst” on mountainous terrain. The snow had subsided, and the roads were dry.

The trooper stopped Mr. Pettit at 3:32 p.m. and approached the vehicle. Mr. Pettit stated that he was “not from around here” and that the snow burst had “scared the hell out” of him. I R. 22, II R. 82–83. The trooper explained he had stopped Mr. Pettit because he had crossed the fog line and asked for his license and registration. Mr. Pettit stated that he was not the owner of the vehicle, and he handed over the registration but not his driver's license. The trooper asked who the owner of the car was, and Mr. Pettit gave the first name of the woman listed on the registration, Annette. During this exchange, Mr. Pettit's lower body was “kind of moving nervously.” I R. 23.

The trooper asked Mr. Pettit for details about his travel plans, including where he was coming from and where he was going. Mr. Pettit explained that he had flown to California to pick up his friend's car and drive it back to Kansas. The trooper then asked Mr. Pettit if he had any luggage, since he did not see any bags in the passenger compartment. The trooper believed it was abnormal for a person driving across the country to have no bags, snacks, or garbage next to him in the car. II R. 84. Mr. Pettit indicated that he had a bag in the trunk, along with luggage belonging to his friend. He then said to the trooper, “[Y]ou make me kind of nervous.” Id. at 86. The trooper asked for permission to look in the trunk, and Mr. Pettit agreed.

Mr. Pettit pulled the release for the trunk, and the trooper asked Mr. Pettit to stay seated and requested his driver's license a second time. Mr. Pettit repeated that the trooper was making him nervous. Id. at 92. The trooper testified that “[m]ost people don't tell me they are nervous, but he told me twice within 25 seconds.” I R. 32. Mr. Pettit began flipping through his wallet to produce his driver's license. The trooper noticed that Mr. Pettit passed over a California license before removing a Missouri license. As Mr. Pettit handed over the Missouri license, the trooper noticed that “[h]is whole arm shook very nervously, which is different than the general public.” II R. 85. According to the trooper, he has had extensive experience with motorists and, while many people display small jitters when pulled over, generally “their whole arm is not shaking nervously.” Id. at 86. On Mr. Pettit's Missouri license, the label “Nondriver” was clearly printed. Id. at 87.

The trooper then confirmed that he had Mr. Pettit's consent to check the bags in the trunk, and he spent about one minute conducting a “pat search” and looking for anything “that the driver would be nervous about after he told me he was nervous”—such as weapons, drugs, or bodies. Id. at 88. He did not find any contraband during this cursory inspection, and he returned to his patrol car to run a driver's license check for Missouri and California while he filled out a citation. Dispatch indicated that both of Mr. Pettit's licenses were suspended. However, everything else was normal; the vehicle had not been reported stolen, and it was properly registered and insured.

After processing a citation and completing some paperwork, the trooper returned to the vehicle at 3:43 p.m. At this time, the trooper did not return Mr. Pettit's driver's license or hand him a citation. Instead, he questioned Mr. Pettit further. First, he asked how well Mr. Pettit knew the owner of the car, to which Mr. Pettit replied that he had known her for around three-and-a-half years. He asked whether Mr. Pettit was aware that his Missouri and California licenses were suspended, and Mr. Pettit said that he was not. He asked for additional details about Mr. Pettit's travel plans, and Mr. Pettit stated that he offered to help pick up his friend's car because she had to fly out to help her father deal with a health issue. Mr. Pettit did not know why his friend had initially driven her car to California. The trooper testified that he “found it very suspicious that a friend of three years had called him to go pick up a car and Mr. Pettit never knew why she was down there to begin with.” Id. at 94.

The trooper then asked Mr. Pettit for consent to search the entire car, which Mr. Pettit provided. When the trooper asked Mr. Pettit whether his friend had paid for him to fly out to California to pick up the car, Mr. Pettit responded that “they did.” Id. at 96. During the trooper's search, he radioed dispatch to request a criminal records check, which revealed that Mr. Pettit had multiple arrests for felonies and other drug offenses. The trooper then discovered $2,000 in a suitcase containing male clothing in the trunk. Mr. Pettit said the cash was from his “old man.” Id. at 97. According to the trooper, large amounts of cash can suggest the transportation of contraband such as narcotics. Id. at 97–98.

While the trooper continued his search, two canine officers arrived on the scene to assist. At 3:58 p.m., fifteen minutes after the trooper completed Mr. Pettit's original traffic citation, a drug detection dog began sniffing the outside of the vehicle and immediately alerted to the scent of drugs. A further search revealed over 2.5 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a spare tire in the trunk.

Discussion

On appeal, Mr. Pettit argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drug evidence because the trooper unconstitutionally extended his detention based on “hunches and unjustified generalizations.” Aplt. Br. 6–7. He argues that the district court applied a “truncated form of totality review.” Id. at 7. Rather than addressing the “disconnected nature of the trooper's generalizations,” the court added up the trooper's stated factors “numerically” to find reasonable suspicion. Id. He contends that, viewing the factors properly and in totality, the court should have found that the extended detention was not warranted.

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 927 (10th Cir.2009). We defer to all reasonable inferences made by law enforcement officers in light of their knowledge and professional experience distinguishing between innocent and suspicious actions. United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.2009) ; United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir.1998).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV ; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment's provisions against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ; United States v. Laughrin, 438 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir.2006).

It is well-established that, during a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a driver's license and registration, run requisite computer checks, and issue citations or warnings. United States v. Pena–Montes, 589 F.3d 1048, 1059–60 (10th Cir.2009) ; United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir.2004). An officer may also inquire about the driver's travel plans, United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir.2001), and ask about matters unrelated to the stop, Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005). Generally, an officer may also request consent to search a driver's luggage. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

However, a lawful traffic stop may not extend beyond the time reasonably required to effectuate its purpose. Rodriguez v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). Continued detention is lawful only if the encounter becomes...