Mead v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 24 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1680.,14–1680.
• Citation: 794 F.3d 932
• Parties: Marvin Allen MEAD, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Director Charles PALMER, Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, Defendant Jason Smith, Superintendent of CCUSO Unit Cherokee Mental Health Institute; Mary Benson, Medical Nurse/Medical Tech of CCUSO Unit Cherokee Mental Health Institute, Defendants–Appellants Brad Wittrock, Director of Security Operations; Bob Stout, Religious Coordinator/Chaplin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

794 F.3d 932

Marvin Allen MEAD, Plaintiff–Appellee

v. Director Charles PALMER, Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, DefendantJason Smith, Superintendent of CCUSO Unit Cherokee Mental Health Institute; Mary Benson, Medical Nurse/Medical Tech of CCUSO Unit Cherokee Mental Health Institute, Defendants–AppellantsBrad Wittrock, Director of Security Operations; Bob Stout, Religious Coordinator/Chaplin, Defendants.

No. 14–1680.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 16, 2015.

Filed: July 24, 2015.

Pamela Ann Wingert, argued, Spirit Lake, IA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Gretchen Kraemer, AAG, argued, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants–Appellants.

Before BYE and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and SCHILTZ¹ , District Judge.

Opinion

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal, Director Jason Smith, M.D., and Nurse Mary Benson, both of Iowa's Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders (CCUSO) (collectively, “defendants”),² appeal the district court's order denying them qualified immunity from damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit brought by Marvin Mead, a patient civilly committed at the CCUSO. Mead claimed that he was denied essential dental care because the defendants required him to pay for partial dentures and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need by denying him the dentures.

After careful review of the record—and within the constraints of our appellate jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal—we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages on Mead's claim regarding the denial of partial dentures. See Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.2013) (de novo review); Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir.2013) (court has jurisdiction to review denial of qualified immunity only to extent that denial turns on issue of law). Accordingly, we reverse.

I. Background

Mead's amended § 1983 complaint alleged that the defendants “denied [him] adequate dental care” by depriving him of “extensive dental care that he is unable to afford” and were “deliberately indifferent to [his] need for dental care in violation of his constitutional rights.” He alleged that he had many teeth pulled while in custody, was unable to chew food properly, suffered from acid reflux, and had become diabetic. He sought injunctive relief and damages.

The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that Mead had sufficient funds to pay for a partial denture plate and failed to demonstrate a serious medical need because (1) he had not requested and did not want a soft diet, (2) he had not lost weight, (3) he had complained of discomfort but not pain, (4) he had stated that he was satisfied with his medical care, and (5) no dentist had concluded that Mead had a serious medical need for dentures. The defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity, not personally responsible for Mead's alleged damages, and immune from money damages. In an attached statement of facts, they alleged that Mead had $1,300 in his account and that buying a partial plate would cost approximately $1,200. The defendants' appendix included transcripts of the depositions of Mead and dentist Timothy DeStigter; Mead's dental records; and CCUSO documents, including Mead's account statement, nursing notes, and a health-services request from Mead.

The undisputed evidence shows the following. Mead testified that he suffered cuts on the top of his gums from chewing food which caused “discomfort” but “not really pain.” Mead could not eat apples, eating steak was a “chore” for him, and eating cold cereal cut his gums. He was on a normal diet and did not want a soft diet. He had gained about ten pounds since admission to CCUSO, and he felt that he consumed adequate calories. He ate “in a different way” and had to “adapt” how he chewed. He was satisfied with his medical care.

Dr. Timothy DeStigter, Mead's treating dentist, testified that substantial recent weight loss is symptomatic of serious medical need for dentures. According to Dr. DeStigter, if he had seen cuts on Mead's gums or had believed that Mead had a serious medical need for dentures, he would have made that notation in Mead's file; his records did not include either notation. Nursing notes indicate that Mead had been transported to Dr. DeStigter's office for a dental appointment in January 2012 after complaining of a broken tooth. During the appointment, Mead asked if he was a candidate for an upper partial plate, and Dr. DeStigter replied that Mead would need to have another couple of teeth pulled, and then Dr. DeStigter “would recommend Pt. Mead be fitted for an upper partial plate.” Following this appointment, Mead wrote in a health-services request that he needed a partial plate so that he could chew his food properly. Benson responded that “we do not pay for dentures” and directed Mead to take the issue to management. In September 2012, Mead had another dental appointment, during which two teeth were pulled.

In response to the defendants's summary-judgment motion, Mead argued that he required partial dentures to repair damage to his teeth that occurred while he was detained; without the dentures, he suffered discomfort and cuts on his gums; and though he had saved $1,300 in a “restricted” account that could be used for medical care, there was a $2,000 saving requirement for progressing towards release from CCUSO. Mead also argued that he had to be selective about his diet due to his diabetes, acid reflux, Hepatitis C, and high cholesterol and that the lack of teeth limited food choice. The defendants replied, as relevant, that the new policy required “demonstration of financial responsibility” and no longer required a specific amount of savings.

The district court denied summary judgment, concluding that Mead had established a genuine issue of material fact on whether he had a serious medical need for dentures in light of (1) his medical condition and inability to choose freely what to eat and (2) the fact that his weight gain might be unhealthy rather than a sign of good health. The court also found that Mead had established a genuine issue on whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent by refusing him partial dentures. The court then concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had admitted that they knew of their obligation to provide medical care that was not deliberately indifferent. The court found that Dr. Smith and Benson were appropriate defendants because Dr. Smith had developed the denture policy and Benson had carried it out; according to the court, because they were being sued in their individual capacities, they were not immune from money damages.

II. Discussion

On appeal, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because Mead neither demonstrated serious medical need nor deliberate indifference.

“We review de novo a denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.” Stoner, 735 F.3d at 802 (quotation and citation omitted). We note that “[t]he scope of our interlocutory review, however, is limited to the issue of qualified immunity, and we may not consider summary judgment on the merits of the case at this stage.” Id. (citations omitted). “We may review a district court's order denying qualified immunity to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir.2013) (quotations and citations omitted).

In determining whether the defendants should receive qualified immunity, this court evaluates

(1) whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable to [Mead], establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable official would have known that her actions were unlawful.

Keil v. Triveline, 661 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir.2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). We may “exercise [our] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

“[W]here a [civilly-committed] patient's Fourteenth Amendment claim is for constitutionally deficient medical care, we apply the deliberate indifference standard from the Eighth Amendment.” Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 339 (8th Cir.2014) (citing Senty–Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 889–90 (8th Cir.2006) ); see also Curtiss v. Benson, 583 Fed.Appx. 598 (8th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (same). To prove deliberate indifference, Mead must show that (1) he suffered from objectively serious medical needs, and (2) the defendants actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, those needs. See Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty., Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir.2014).

This court recently decided a substantially similar case involving the CCUSO and defendant Benson.See Curtiss, 583 Fed.Appx. at 598. In that case, a civilly-committed patient “who has had no teeth since shortly after his 2008 admission to CCUSO” filed suit against Benson and another nurse practitioner, “claim[ing] that he was denied dentures in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The district court denied qualified immunity to the nurse practitioners. Id. On appeal, we reversed, holding that the nurse practitioners were “entitled to qualified immunity as to [the civilly-committed patient's] claim for damages based on the denial of dentures.” Id. We found “no genuine issue of material fact on the question whether [the patient] can show a violation of his clearly established constitutional rights, that is, that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need” because no evidence existed in the record

suggesting that either defendant knew and ignored that Curtiss was in pain, much less severe pain, as a result of his lack of teeth. There also is nothing in the record to

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