Grand Jury Proceedings, In re

Decision Date31 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-6155,85-6155
Citation797 F.2d 1377
Parties1986-2 Trade Cases 67,203 In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Jay Topkis, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, Jeffrey Slade, Meister, Leventhal & Slade, New York City, A.J. Jolly, Jolly & Blau, Newport, Ky., Lawrence S. Bader, argued, New York City, for appellant.

Hays Gorey, Jr., Vicki Plaut, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Anti-Trust Div., Washington, D.C. John J. Powers, III, Andrea Limmer, argued, Gary S. Humble, for appellee.

Before JONES, WELLFORD and NELSON, Circuit Judges.

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment against them. They assert that this prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clause because the conspiracy charged in the indictment is allegedly part of a conspiracy for which they have earlier been tried. The court below concluded that separate conspiracies exist. We agree and affirm.

On June 14, 1984, a federal grand jury sitting in Covington, Kentucky, indicted Lord Electric Company (Lord Electric), two of its executives, Peter Matthews and Donald McCabe, and Wente Construction Company (Wente Construction) for conspiring to rig bids on the electrical work for Unit II of the Spurlock Generating Station (Spurlock), a coal-fired electrical power plant in Maysville, Kentucky. The indictment charged a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (1982), and two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 (1982). Wente Construction pled guilty; McCabe is awaiting trial. Only Lord Electric and Matthews are involved in this appeal.

The indictment alleged, and testimony before the grand jury tended to show, the following facts. In the week before the May 9, 1978 bid date on the Spurlock project, Matthews telephoned Robert Vandivender, then the director of a six-state regional division of The Howard P. Foley Company (the Foley Company) based in Richmond, Virginia. Vandivender was preparing to bid on Spurlock in a joint venture with Wente Construction. Matthews asked him to "support" Lord Electric's bid on the project, a euphemism that means to submit a higher bid than Lord Electric to insure that Lord Electric would get the contract. Vandivender agreed, in part because he believed Lord Electric had supported his division of the Foley Company in a 1976 project in Virginia called Union Camp. Vandivender said he would have to get consent from Wente Construction, however, and he spoke with Elton Arment, then president of Wente Construction. Arment then telephoned Matthews and the two agreed that in exchange for Wente Construction's "support," Lord Electric would pay Wente $50,000 to cover Wente's costs incurred in preparing the bid. This payment was agreed to allegedly because, unlike the Foley Company, Wente Construction had had no previous "favor" from Lord Electric. The $50,000 was later paid through two false invoices sent by Wente Construction to McCabe at Lord Electric.

After reaching this agreement with Arment, Matthews phoned Vandivender and gave him the figure that the Foley/Wente joint venture should bid. Vandivender testified that he had independent control of his regional division of the Foley Company and therefore he did not consult with his superiors when he decided to consent to Matthews' request. Lord Electric was awarded the contract on a bid of $9,176,000; the Foley Company and Wente Construction had originally been prepared to bid $7,840,000.

Lord Electric and Matthews moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. One basis of the motion was that this alleged conspiracy is linked to another alleged conspiracy involving bid-rigging on three nuclear power plants in the states of Washington and Indiana, of which the defendants had previously been tried and acquitted. Alternatively, they argued that the government's evidence shows that the Spurlock agreement was part of a larger "superconspiracy" to rig bids on electric projects across the country by the five largest electrical contractors in the nation, and, having already been tried for part of that superconspiracy, they cannot be indicted for another part. The motion was submitted on a voluminous documentary record to a magistrate who ruled that (1) the defendants had made a non-frivolous showing on their first theory, but that the Government had sufficiently rebutted it, and (2) the defendants had not made a non-frivolous showing on the superconspiracy theory, but, even if they had, it was rebutted. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings except that it ruled that a non-frivolous showing had been made on the second theory as well, entitling the defendants to an immediate review of the rejection of both theories. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).

The defendants also appeal the court's refusal to grant access to certain transcripts from other grand juries, which they claim would be material in presenting their superconspiracy argument. Finally, the defendants argue that the magistrate erred in not granting them an evidentiary hearing on their motion to dismiss.

I

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Thus if the conspiracy charged in this case and the conspiracy of which the defendants were indicted and acquitted in another case were both part of a single agreement, this indictment is barred and must be dismissed. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 S.Ct. 99, 102, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942). The burden is on the defendant to show that a single conspiracy exists, but, because the government typically has better access to evidence, that burden is satisfied if the defendants advance a non-frivolous or prima facie showing of a single conspiracy. United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir.1981). The burden then shifts to the government to show separate conspiracies by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In conspiracy prosecutions, the multiple/single conspiracy issue is determined by applying a "totality of the circumstances" test rather than the more limited "same evidence" test normally applied to double jeopardy reviews of substantive offenses. Id. at 577; United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.1983). This test requires the trial court

to consider the elements of: 1) time; 2) persons acting as co-conspirators; 3) the statutory offenses charged in the indictments; 4) the overt acts charged by the government or any other description of the offenses charged which indicates the nature and scope of the activity which the government sought to punish in each case; and 5) places where the events alleged as part of the conspiracy took place.

Sinito, 723 F.2d at 1256. The ultimate question is whether the evidence shows one agreement or more than one agreement. The finding of fact by the lower court that the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that multiple conspiracies existed can be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Jabara, 644 F.2d 577. The reviewing court is bound to accept this finding unless it "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1958)).

A. Theory I: Spurlock and the WPPSS Conspiracy

In 1983 defendants Lord Electric and Matthews were indicted, along with five other companies and their representatives, of conspiring to rig bids on three nuclear power plants in Washington and Indiana. The plants were the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) 1 & 4, WPPSS 3 & 5, both in Washington, and Marble Hill in Indiana. According to the indictment in that case, the conspirators allocated the WPPSS 1 & 4 project to a joint venture of the Foley Company and Wismer & Becker Contracting Engineers on a bid price of $122 million. The bidding occurred on May 9, 1978, the same day as the Spurlock bidding. The Foley Company was represented in this conspiracy by its national president, Bancroft T. Foley, Jr.; Vandivender and the Richmond office of the Foley Company were not involved. WPPSS 3 & 5 was allegedly assigned to Fischbach and Moore, Inc., on a $151 million bid; the bidding took place in December 1978 and again in August 1979. L.K. Comstock and Company was originally to have joined Fischbach and Moore on this project but withdrew. The Marble Hill project was allegedly given to a joint venture of Lord Electric and Commonwealth Electric Company, but it was not until a third round of bidding (necessitated by job specification changes) that Lord/Commonwealth had the lowest bid and obtained the contract. The bidding occurred between June 1978 and January 1979; the award price was $98 million.

The agreement to divide these projects among the six companies allegedly arose at meetings among company executives in April and May of 1978 in Palm Springs and Long Beach, California. Matthews was present at each meeting. Testimony at trial, which was held in Montana, indicated that the rigging of the two WPPSS projects was specifically discussed at these meetings, but only one participant could recall that Marble Hill was mentioned and he could recall no agreement about it. There was no evidence that Spurlock was mentioned at the meetings. Testimony also showed that, as a result of Lord Electric's support of the Foley Company/Wismer & Becker bid on WPPSS 1 & 4, the Foley Company would owe Lord Electric an unspecified "favor." It was the government's theory in the Montana case that Marble Hill was the "favor" or quid pro quo for WPPSS 1 & 4.

In the present case, the defendants contend under their first theory that Spurlock was the quid pro quo for WPPSS 1 & 4. If this were true it would establish that the bid-riggings of both projects were the products of one...

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