Gevas v. McLaughlin

• Decision Date: 20 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–1057.,13–1057.
• Citation: 798 F.3d 475
• Parties: David C. GEVAS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Christopher McLAUGHLIN, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

798 F.3d 475

David C. GEVAS, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Christopher McLAUGHLIN, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 13–1057.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 4, 2015.

Decided Aug. 20, 2015.^*

Kenneth J. Vanko, Attorney, Clingen, Callow & Mclean, LLC, Lisle, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Christopher M.R. Turner, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

While David Gevas was imprisoned at the Henry Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a pro se complaint against three prison officials, alleging inter alia that they violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from the attack. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ That claim proceeded to a jury trial, at which Gevas was represented by appointed counsel. At the conclusion of Gevas's case in chief, however, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). We reverse. Were a jury to credit Gevas's testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate's threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. The district court therefore erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on that ground. We conclude further that neither of the alternative arguments advanced by the defendant officials would sustain the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The case will be returned to the district court for a second trial.

I.

The case that Gevas presented in support of his Eighth Amendment claim consisted entirely of his own testimony. As judgment was entered against Gevas pursuant to Rule 50(a), we are obliged to assume the truth of his testimony and otherwise construe the record in the light most favorable to him. E.g., Acevedo v. Canterbury, 457 F.3d 721, 722 (7th Cir.2006).

Gevas, who is serving a life sentence, was transferred to Hill from the Stateville Correctional Center on January 2, 2008. Upon completion of an orientation period, Gevas was assigned to a succession of different cells and cellmates in the general population of the prison. See R. 194 at 7.

Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him; and in March and April 2008, he filed grievances demanding that he not be celled with gang members. He was assigned to a new cell, with William Adkins, on May 17, 2008; but Adkins' mercurial and hostile temperament had Gevas “walking on egg shells.” R. 231 at 11. Gevas testified that Adkins “wanted me out of his cell” and threatened on a daily basis to stab him, saying that Gevas was “not too big to bleed” and “not too big to be beaten up.” R. 231 at 10–11. (We are told that Gevas has a stout physique.) According to Gevas, Adkins identified himself as a gang member and accused Gevas of snitching on a previous cellmate, John Taylor, who was also a gang member. Gevas testified that Adkins's behavior caused him to feel “very tormented, in fear for [his] life.” R. 231 at 14.

Gevas discussed the situation with three prison staff members. First he spoke with Wayne Steele, his prison counselor, on May 22, five days after Adkins had become his cellmate. Gevas told Steele that Adkins was threatening to stab him. He asked Steele to put the two of them on a “keep-separate” list and, in Gevas's words, “begged for [Steele] to move me.” R. 231 at 15. Gevas also handed Steele a letter (and sent an identical follow-up letter through the prison mail on May 26) saying that Adkins had accused him of snitching on his previous cellmate and “constantly talks about his gang and stabbing me and wants me out of his cell.” Plaintiff's Group Ex. 12. Second, the day after meeting with Steele, Gevas briefly saw Steve Wright, the acting warden of operations, as Wright was conducting one of his frequent walk-through inspections of the kitchen where Gevas was working as a cook. As there were other inmates present in the kitchen and Gevas had work to do, he spoke to Wright discretely. Gevas told Wright “as fast as [he] could” that Adkins had threatened Gevas (including Adkins's remark that he was “not too big to bleed”) and expressed concern that he not be stabbed. R. 231 at 33. Third, Gevas met with Christopher McLaughlin, an internal affairs officer, who visited Gevas's cell two days later, on May 25. Gevas had a 10- to 15–minute discussion with McLaughlin in which he again described Adkins's threats and he asked to be placed in protective custody. McLaughlin advised Gevas that because Hill is a medium-security prison, no protective custody was available. Three days prior to and one day after this meeting, Gevas also sent to McLaughlin (through the prison mail) the same letters that he sent to Steele. Plaintiff's Group Ex. 14. (Re-typed copies of these letters were admitted into evidence.) Gevas testified that none of the three officials responded to the concerns he had raised about Adkins. McLaughlin had told Gevas that he would summon Gevas to the internal affairs office for a follow-up discussion, but that did not occur either.

On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited details about a conversation that Gevas had with McLaughlin in late March regarding a prior cellmate, Taylor.² Gevas acknowledged that McLaughlin informed him on that occasion that he could “refuse housing” if he believed he was in jeopardy from his cellmate. We gather that an inmate refuses housing by declaring to a prison official that he will not comply with his cell assignment—in other words, that he will refuse to return to his designated cell. Gevas understood that if he did refuse housing, he would receive a disciplinary ticket for disobeying an order, be moved immediately to the prison's segregation unit (and thus separated from Adkins), and remain there for a period of 30 days (longer for subsequent offenses) while prison officials investigated his refusal. “That's punishment,” Gevas opined. R. 231 at 50. “I'm being punished for being threatened on top of it.” R. 231 at 50. Gevas acknowledged that, when an inmate receives a disciplinary ticket, “ultimately you get the chance to go to the adjustment committee, which is a group of staff that decide whether or not you had a good reason for refusing housing....” R. 231 at 51. But in his experience, the odds of convincing the adjustment committee to exonerate him of the disciplinary violation were not good. Gevas conceded that he rejected “the option of refusing housing and being separated from Mr. Adkins,” and instead “chose to stay in the cell with” him. R. 231 at 53–54. On re-direct, Gevas explained that he did not want to go to segregation because he believed that he would lose his job in the prison kitchen (which, per his earlier testimony, would mean that he would spend 23 hours per day in his cell rather than 16 to 18 hours) and would have to speak with his terminally-ill mother through a glass barrier when she visited the prison.

On May 29, four days after Gevas spoke with McLaughlin, Adkins stabbed Gevas four times in the neck with a pen as Gevas was tying his shoes and preparing to exit their cell for dinner. Adkins then commenced throwing items in the cell at Gevas, until a guard arrived and took Adkins into custody. Gevas was escorted to the prison's health care unit, where a nurse cleaned the puncture wounds

and gave him a tetanus shot. The wounds healed within two weeks, although Gevas testified that he experienced continuing anxiety as a result of the assault. Gevas testified that he also suffered an injury to his shoulder in the incident which caused him ongoing pain.

After Gevas rested his case, the defendant officials moved for judgment as a matter of law. They argued that they had responded reasonably to the reported threats by providing Gevas the opportunity to refuse housing and thereby avoid Adkins. In the alternative, they asked for qualified immunity because “there is no case law that says they have to give [Gevas] the way out of that cell that he wants; they [just] have to provide some way for him to get away from an inmate that is a danger. They provided that.” R. 231 at 60–61. Gevas's lawyer replied that refusing housing was not a reasonable option, because Gevas “would lose his job and all visitation with his family members” in segregation. R. 231 at 61.

The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials, see Rule 50(a), but not for the reasons they had argued. The court concluded that Gevas had not put forward sufficient evidence showing that the officials were subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm to him, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), and so could not prove that the officials violated the Eighth Amendment. R. 231 at 65–66. The court declined to additionally rest its decision on the officials' argument that their response to the danger—advising Gevas that he could refuse housing—was reasonable. The court pointed out that according to Gevas's testimony, refusing housing would expose him to punishment; and the court was not prepared to say that Gevas was required to do that in order to separate himself from Adkins. R. 231 at 67. Gevas's subsequent request for a new trial was denied.

II.

Gevas argues on appeal that he presented enough evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that the officials actually knew that he was in danger, and that the district court erred in finding otherwise when it granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants. Gevas further contends that the alternate grounds on which the officials defend the...