80 Hawai'i 297, State v. Kwak, 17929

• Decision Date: 21 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 17929,17929
• Parties: 80 Hawai'i 297 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence Taehyo KWAK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1112

909 P.2d 1112

80 Hawai'i 297

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence Taehyo KWAK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17929.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Dec. 21, 1995.

Alexa D.M. Fujise, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee State of Hawai'i on the motion and reply.

Keith M. Kiuchi of Kiuchi Nakamoto & Ahu, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant Lawrence Taehyo Kwak on the answer.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.

LEVINSON, Justice.

On motion for reconsideration, filed on September 11, 1995, of our opinion in State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai'i 291, 909 P.2d 1106 (1995) [hereinafter, Kwak I ], vacating the defendant-appellant Lawrence Taehyo Kwak's convictions of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and crossing longitudinal traffic markings and remanding for an order granting his motion for judgment of acquittal, the plaintiff-appellee State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) urges that Kwak I "misapprehended the law regarding proof of venue in criminal cases tried in district court." Having failed to achieve infallibility, despite our best efforts, we confess in this instance that our analytical arrow in Kwak I missed the bull's-eye and make the following remedial observation: "If someone made a mistake he [Darrow] would drawl, 'Hell, that's why they make erasers.' " I. Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense (1941), reprinted in D. Shrager and E. Frost, The Quotable Lawyer 99 (1986). ¹

In its motion for reconsideration, the prosecution contends that: (1) "venue," as described in Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 18 (1993), is not the same "venue" that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 701-114(1)(d) (1993), which--according to the prosecution--simply requires the prosecution to prove that a given offense occurred within the circuit in which the matter is tried; (2) the language of HRS §§ 4-1(3)(A) and (B) (1993), delineating the district boundary separating the districts of Honolulu and 'Ewa on the island of O'ahu, is clear, unambiguous, and capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned; (3) this court, through its rulemaking power, has the authority to clarify the divisional boundaries set forth in Schedule A annexed to HRPP 18; and, (4) in any event, the trial testimony of Honolulu Police Officer Christine Thomas established that the offenses of which Kwak was convicted were committed, at least in part, within the Honolulu Division where he was tried.

Notwithstanding that we do not agree with all of the prosecution's contentions, but for the reasons stated below, we vacate those portions of Kwak I inconsistent with this opinion and hold (1) that the boundary separating the districts of Honolulu and 'Ewa, as described in HRS § 4-1(3) and Schedule A, is not inherently ambiguous, but, rather, can be proved through testimony of reputation in the community and is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, (2) that, in the face of Kwak's oral motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency as to venue, made after the prosecution rested its case-in-chief, the district court committed an abuse of discretion in allowing the prosecution to reopen its case in order to receive four certified State tax maps into evidence for the purpose of allowing the prosecution to remedy the evidentiary defect, (3) that the district court's error was harmless because it could have taken judicial notice of the tax maps, and (4) that the district court's finding that venue properly lay in the Honolulu district was supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, we grant the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and affirm both the district court's order denying Kwak's motion for a judgment of acquittal and its consequent judgment of conviction as to the charged offenses. Moreover, in order to avoid needless conflicts over venue in future criminal cases tried in the district courts, we have amended HRPP 18, by order filed on December 20, 1995, and effective immediately, to provide, inter alia, that, when trials are "to be had in the district court, venue is within the judicial circuit established by statute " (amended language emphasized). ² Thus, after December 20, 1995, venue in any criminal matter tried in the district courts of this state will properly lie in any district within the judicial circuit in which the district court is located or to which venue is lawfully transferred.

I. DISCUSSION

HRS § 701-114(1)(d) imposes on the prosecution the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt regarding "[f]acts establishing venue." Kwak I, 80 Hawai'i at 294, 909 P.2d at 1109; State v. Puaoi, 78 Hawai'i 185, 189, 891 P.2d 272, 276 (1995); State v. Black, 66 Haw. 530, 531, 668 P.2d 32, 33-34 (1983). Until December 20, 1995, while "prosecution shall be had in the circuit in which the offense or any part of it was committed[,]" venue has lain only in the division of the district court, "as set out in Schedule A annexed to [the HRPP], in which the offense or any part of it was committed, or if no court is in operation in said division, in the district court designated to serve that division within the same circuit." HRPP 18. Cf. District Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 3(b), supra note 2. Schedule A annexed to HRPP 18 enumerates the divisions in which cases from the various districts are to be tried. The enumerated districts are the same as those identified in HRS § 4-1.

A. In Kwak I, This Court Did Not Misapprehend The Statutes And Court Rule Governing The Establishment Of Proper Venue.

The prosecution's contention that the legislature has "considered the ... geographic boundaries of the [d]istrict [c]ourts[,] which were coextensive with those of their respective [c]ircuit [c]ourts, to be synonymous with venue" ignores the plain language of HRS §§ 701-114(1)(c) and (d), HRPP 18, and the historical distinction between jurisdiction and venue. The prosecution correctly argues that there is but one district court for each judicial circuit, see HRS § 604-1 (1993), ³ and that any district court has jurisdiction over the trial of any offense committed within its circuit. See HRS § 604-11.5 (1993). ⁴ But the fact that each district court possesses circuit-wide jurisdiction does not resolve the issue, because jurisdiction and venue are not synonymous.

"Jurisdiction" refers to "the power of the court to decide a matter in controversy and presupposes the existence of a duly constituted court with control over the subject matter and the parties." Black's Law Dictionary 853 (6th ed. 1990); see also Kim Poo Kum v. Sugiyama, 33 Haw. 545, 555 (1935) ("jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate a case upon the merits and dispose of it as justice may require"). By contrast, "[v]enue does not refer to jurisdiction at all"; rather, it designates "[t]he particular ... geographical area[ ] in which a court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case." Black's Law Dictionary at 1557; see also HRPP 18. Thus, "[t]he requirements of jurisdiction are grounded in the state's inherent judicial power[,] while requirements of venue are grounded in convenience to litigants." Alamida v. Wilson, 53 Haw. 398, 400, 495 P.2d 585, 588 (1972).

HRS §§ 701-114(1)(c) and (d) impose on the prosecution both the burden of proving "facts establishing jurisdiction" and the burden of proving "facts establishing venue" beyond a reasonable doubt in every criminal case. "The words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction of the words as to their general or popular use or meaning." HRS § 1-14 (1993). Accordingly, "[i]t is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that unless it appears by the context or otherwise in the statute a different sense was intended, words are to be given their ordinarily accepted meaning." Hirasa v. Burtner, 68 Haw. 22, 25, 702 P.2d 772, 775 (1985) (citations omitted). Were we to accept the prosecution's suggestion that the terms "jurisdiction" and "venue" are synonymous for purposes of construing HRS §§ 701-114(1)(c) and (d), then one subsection or the other would be superfluous or surplusage. Nothing in the language, context, or underlying history of the statute implies such a legislative intent, and we decline to infer one. See State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 351-52, 845 P.2d 547, 551-52, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 849 P.2d 81 (1993) ("[C]ourts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and ... no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute." (Citation omitted.)) We therefore ascribe the "most known and usual signification" to the term "venue," as employed in HRS § 701-114(1)(d).

B. Although The Legislature Has Authorized The District Courts To Determine Where Sessions Will Be Conducted, It Has Not Empowered Them To Define District Boundaries.

HRS § 604-1 grants the district courts the authority to determine where sessions are to be held within their respective circuits, but it does not grant them the authority to determine district boundary lines. See supra note 3. HRS § 604-7.3 (1993) establishes that venue in criminal cases, over which the district courts have jurisdiction, involving offenses committed in one circuit may be changed to the district court of another circuit. ⁵ Correlatively, HRS § 604- 11.5 (1993) confirms that district courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases "transferred to them for trial by change of venue from some other district court." See supra note 4.

However, HRS chapter 604 (1993) is silent as to where venue lies in the first...