Ind v. Colo. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 11 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1168.,14–1168.
• Citation: 801 F.3d 1209
• Parties: Jacob IND, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

801 F.3d 1209

Jacob IND, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14–1168.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Sept. 11, 2015.

Jacob D. Massee, Assistant Attorney General (John W. Suthers, Attorney General, and Kristin A. Lockwood, Assistant Attorney General, with him on the briefs) Office of the Attorney General, State of Colorado, Denver, CO, for Defendant–Appellant.

Carrie A. Claiborne of Husch Blackwell LLP, Denver, CO (Sudee Mirsafian Wright and Barbara Grandjean of Husch Blackwell LLP, Denver, CO; and

Michael T. Raupp of Husch Blackwell LLP Kansas City, MO, with her on the briefs) for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

Appellee Jacob Ind has been incarcerated in Colorado state prisons since 1992. At the time he filed this lawsuit on March 13, 2009, he was in administrative segregation at the Colorado State Penitentiary (“CSP”) subject to a limit of two personal books imposed by the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”). Mr. Ind filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the book limit was a substantial burden on his sincerely-held religious beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1 et seq.¹

On June 27, 2011, Mr. Ind was transferred out of administrative segregation and into the general population, where he is now allowed 15 personal books. The CDOC moved to dismiss the case as moot. Although the magistrate judge recommended the motion be granted, the district court concluded Mr. Ind would likely be returned to segregation in the future and denied the motion. Following a bench trial, the court held CDOC's two-book policy violated Mr. Ind's rights under RLUIPA and directed that, in the event plaintiff returns to administrative segregation at CSP, CDOC would be enjoined from enforcing the policy against him. CDOC appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the case is moot. We hold that Mr. Ind's transfer from administrative segregation to the general population moots his claim, thereby depriving us of jurisdiction.

I

CSP is a Level V security correctional institution; it houses the most violent and dangerous offenders in what is known as “administrative segregation.” Aplt.App. at 961, 963. Administrative segregation is designed to be a temporary placement with the goal of “facilitat[ing] change in offender behavior and progress[ing] them back to a general population permanent facility.” Id. at 962.

Offenses that can lead to placement in administrative segregation include murder, rape, escape or attempted escape, inciting to riot, engaging in a riot, possession of dangerous contraband or security threat group activity such as recruiting for a gang.² Id. at 963–64. Offenders are only assigned to administrative segregation after they have had a due process hearing, although inmates can be placed in administrative segregation prior to the hearing on what is known as “removal from population status.” Id. at 964.

When Mr. Ind was in administrative segregation at CSP, there were four levels. Level 1 was reserved for offenders who acted out or compromised security in the facility. Ordinarily, however, when an offender was assigned to administrative segregation, he was placed at Level 2. After 90 days, he would be reviewed for progression to Level 3. After 90 days at Level 3, he would be reviewed again for progression either to Level 4A or 4B. After completing the program at Level 4, the offender progressed to a general population facility. In all, administrative segregation was intended to take a minimum of nine months to complete, although it could take longer depending on the severity of the offense and the inmate's behavior. Each level of administrative segregation at CSP had certain restrictions, including property restrictions. Pertinent to this dispute, Level 2 and 3 offenders were restricted to two personal books.

Mr. Ind was assigned to administrative segregation from September 1995 to April 2003, when he was transferred to the general population at Limon Correctional Facility (“Limon”). On September 17, 2007, he was removed from Limon to CSP on “removal from population” status and charged with violating the Code of Penal Discipline by (1) attempting to incite a riot and (2) verbal abuse.³ He was convicted of the charges at his disciplinary hearing, and subsequently was served with a notice of an administrative segregation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, he was assigned to administrative segregation at CSP.

Mr. Ind was held in administrative segregation at CSP until December 3, 2009, when he was transferred from CSP to Centennial Correctional Facility (“CCF”), a prison with both Level IV and Level V units where inmates are housed in either close custody or administrative segregation. There, he was subject to a limitation of five personal books. Id. at 99–114. On June 27, 2011, he was transferred from CCF back to Limon, a Level IV facility, where he is housed in the general population. He has remained at Limon since then.

Mr. Ind filed his original Complaint against CDOC, prison officials, and employees while he was still at CSP. After submitting several amended pleadings, he filed his final Amended Complaint on October 25, 2010. He primarily challenged the facility level policies at CSP, which he alleged interfered with the practice of his religion.⁴ Among his complaints, Mr. Ind contended that the policy limit of two personal books per inmate in administrative segregation-as opposed to a 15–book limit for inmates in the general population-was a substantial burden on his sincerely-held religious beliefs. He asserted claims for violation of federal and state constitutional rights as well as RLUIPA, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 198–200. Before trial, Mr. Ind dismissed four of his five claims. Ultimately the case proceeded to trial only against CDOC and only with respect to the two personal books limitation. Id. at 1272.

On January 20, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), contending Mr. Ind's transfer to Limon rendered his remaining claims moot because he was no longer subject to the restrictions giving rise to his suit. They also asserted the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The magistrate judge entered a recommendation that the motion be granted based on mootness. The district court declined to adopt the recommendation, however, finding there was a reasonable likelihood Mr. Ind would be returned to administrative segregation at some point in the future and therefore his claim was not moot. Id. at 330–39, 342. The court also rejected defendants' sovereign immunity claim. Id. at 341–42.

At the conclusion of a two-day bench trial, the district court entered Final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding that CSP's book policy, as applied to Mr. Ind, violated RLUIPA. Id. at 1272–1314. The court did not invalidate the policy as to all CSP inmates but stated, “[S]hould Plaintiff return to administrative segregation at CSP, Defendant is enjoined from enforcing against him its current book limitation policy, set forth in I/A 850–06.” Id. at 1315–16. The court also concluded that Mr. Ind was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. Id.

II

Before reaching the merits of this case, we must consider the jurisdictional question of mootness. The doctrine of mootness is grounded in Article III's limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases and controversies.” See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. At the start of litigation, a plaintiff must show standing under Article III by demonstrating: “(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged action; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. ” Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir.2011) (emphasis added) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) ).

“Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]his requirement exists at all stages of federal judicial proceedings, and it is therefore not enough that the dispute was alive when the suit was filed; the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome.”Id.

“In deciding whether a case is moot, the crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world. When it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective relief, a live controversy ceases to exist, and the case becomes moot.” Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir.2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Put another way, a case becomes moot “when a plaintiff no longer suffers ‘actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’ ” Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.2012) (quoting Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983) ). Because mootness is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. See Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 (10th Cir.2001).

But a court will not dismiss a case as moot if: “(1) secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit.” Riley v. INS,

310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). The second and third exceptions are at issue in ...