Martin v. Kelley
| Decision Date | 08 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-3907,84-3907 |
| Citation | 803 F.2d 236 |
| Parties | William E. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sgt. Earl KELLEY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
William E. Martin Lucasville, Ohio, Pro Se.
Allen P. Adler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.
Before KEITH and MERRITT, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant William E. Martin appeals from a decision of the district court dismissing his pro se civil rights complaint. Appellant's complaint raises First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment due process challenges concerning the censorship of incoming prisoner mail. Appellant argues that the applicable mail censorship regulation for incoming mail,
Ohio Admin.Code Sec. 5120-9-17, is unconstitutional on its face. For the reasons which follow, we agree with the appellant, reverse the order of the district court, and remand this case for further proceedings.
Appellant is a prisoner at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio (SOCF). He alleges that on October 23, 1981, the assistant mail supervisor, defendant Sgt. Kelley, "intercepted" a letter written to appellant on Ku Klux Klan letterhead signed by one John Kahne. Appellant states that he was denied an opportunity to read the letter, and was forced by Sgt. Kelley to return the letter to the sender. Defendant Kelley had concluded that the letterhead was "inflammatory," as was the text of the letter, and should therefore be withheld from the inmate and returned to the author. Kelley believed the text to be inflammatory because the letter mentioned the possibility of having a Ku Klux Klan meeting at the prison. Appellant asserts that his request to forward the letterhead to the Publication Screening Committee for review before it was returned to the sender was denied by Kelley. The letter was photocopied and placed in appellant's mail file. The appellant further alleges that he returned the letter to the wrong person, having not read the letter and believing another Ku Klux Klan member had authored the letter. Appellant asserts that it is the general practice at SOCF to seize letters without notifying the inmate or author, and without returning the letters to the author.
On December 30, 1981, appellant filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, naming Sgt. Kelley as the sole defendant. He was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The complaint alleged that the act of interference, and the refusal to submit the letterhead to the Publication Screening Committee, violated the mail censorship regulations and the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 The complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on January 18, 1982 which was then referred to a magistrate. The magistrate recommended, on April 19, 1982, that appellant's claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim under the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). On May 13, 1982, District Judge Spiegel rejected the magistrate's reliance on Parratt, concluding that appellant had adequately stated a claim under the First Amendment. However, the court held that appellant had failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
After a series of other motions were filed, appellant was permitted to file an amended complaint on March 29, 1983. The amended complaint and a motion to substitute parties named two other defendants: Ronald Marshall, the Superintendent of SOCF, and Richard Seiter, the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. This complaint realleged appellant's claim that interference with his letter, and the refusal to submit the letterhead to the Publication Screening Committee, violated his First Amendment rights and the mail censorship regulations. The complaint also alleged that photocopying the letter, without cause, violated the First Amendment and section 5120-9-17 of the Ohio Admin.Code. He also alleged that he was denied due process when his letter was censored and photocopied, and that section 5120-9-17 was unconstitutional in that it did not provide adequate procedural safeguards for censoring mail. Appellant again requested declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
On June 21, 1983, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the issues raised in appellant's first complaint.
On November 3, 1983, the magistrate recommended that summary judgment for defendant Kelley be granted, reasoning that a single act of censorship cannot constitute a First Amendment violation in the absence of proof of damages, principally relying on the case Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973, 96 S.Ct. 1476, 47 L.Ed.2d 743 (1976). The magistrate also ruled that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the prison's routine practice of seizing mail. On February 1, 1984, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations, and granted summary judgment on all issues for all of the defendants. However, the district court subsequently vacated this order on March 15, 1984 after recognizing that the new issues raised in the amended complaint had not been addressed by the magistrate. The case, in its entirety, was again referred to the magistrate.
In a final report issued September 13, 1984, the magistrate recommended that summary judgment be granted as to all the defendants on each of the claims. The magistrate adhered to his original reasoning regarding the issues raised in the initial complaint. He further reasoned that the single instance of photocopying mail, in violation of section 5120-9-17(G)(6), 2 did not amount to a constitutional violation. Further, the magistrate ruled that section 5120-9-17 was not procedurally inadequate under the standards set forth in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), because the appellant had been notified of the rejection and another provision of the Ohio Admin.Code, section 5120-9-31, provided inmates with adequate process. Finding no constitutional violations, the magistrate did not recommend any form of relief.
The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations, on October 16, 1984, stating that the appellant's claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This appeal was filed on November 2, 1984.
On appeal, the appellant does not challenge the district court's disposition of his claims relating to the "interception" of the letter on Ku Klux Klan letterhead, 3 or the
photocopying of that letter; therefore, we will not review them. Rather, the appellant only argues on appeal that Ohio Admin.Code Sec. 5120-9-17 is unconstitutional on its face under the standards set forth in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974).
The district court's October 16, 1984 order specifies that the appellant's complaint was dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the defendants had requested, and the magistrate had recommended, however, that summary judgment be granted pursuant to Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 Since the district court adopted the magistrate's report concluding that the recommendations were correct, the district court in effect held that Ohio Admin.Code Sec. 5120-9-17 was not unconstitutional because another provision supplied adequate procedural safeguards. This conclusion is the equivalent of a grant of summary judgment rather than a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in that it clearly reached the merits of appellant's claim and looked beyond appellant's complaint. Therefore, we will review the district court's order under summary judgment standards; and, since there are no issues of material fact in dispute regarding the contents of the regulation being challenged, we will reach the merits of appellant's claim.
This case, like the controlling prisoner mail censorship case Procunier v. Martinez, concerns the constitutionality of a regulation which was promulgated by the director of the State Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. The regulation being challenged, Ohio Admin.Code Sec. 5120-9-17, provides in relevant part (A) There shall be no censorship, copying or reading of first class mail in the form of letters addressed to an inmate, except as provided in paragraph (G) of this rule, nor shall there be any limitation upon the number of first class letters that an inmate may receive nor the number of persons with whom an inmate may correspond.
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(G) Mail to or from an inmate may be opened and read, provided that the managing officer or his designee has a reasonable belief that the written contents of mail other than legal mail, present a clear and present danger to institutional security, and such action has been approved by the director or his designee, pursuant to a request by the managing officer.
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(4) Approval of the director or his designee to open and read and copy such mail shall extend only to the managing officer or his designees.
(5) If, after reading such mail, the managing officer or his designee determines that it does not constitute a clear and present danger to institutional security, it shall be promptly forwarded to the inmate addressee. Otherwise, the mail shall be returned to the sender or held as evidence for a criminal prosecution or disciplinary proceeding.
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Therefore, once it has been decided that a prisoner's mail may be opened and read, 5 the managing officer or his designee has the authority to decide if an item of mail constitutes a "clear and present danger to institutional security;" if the letter does constitute such a danger, it is to be returned to the sender or...
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