Sarvey v. Butler Cnty.
| Decision Date | 24 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1467.,14–1467. |
| Citation | 806 F.3d 153 |
| Parties | Sandra J. BABCOCK; James T. Kenaan, Jr.: Bradley J. Sarvey; Dale R. Lipan; Shawn J. Kelly; Samantha Pistorius; Anthony Blumling; Randal K. Cypher; Chad Neigh; Tory A. Coyle; Joseph Hanchosky; Darren M. Knox; Todd Walker; Michael Emery; Kevin Pollack; Ray Slater; Michael J. Shuler; Travis Maculski; Len Thornley; Jason Pry; Robert D. Seatonl Bruce W. Fair; Lisa Vasey; Michael A. Graham; Joan Muir; Matthew L. Edgar; Christopher A. Foringer; David L. Nading; James W. Wganer; Evan R. Long; Justin F. Kriley; Kelly J. Bundy; Richard Zentz, Jr.; Shaun A. Smith; Randy S. Russell; Ryan Rekich; David C. Summerville; Desmond Foringer; Aaron C. Slobada; Kristopher M. Steighner; Misty D. Hogan; David K. Winters; Beau Sneddon; Brandon Cousins; Francis Walters; Lisa Marie Zaludek; Corey Richard Helfrich; Lance Neigh; Marlene Stine; Quintin Grey; Travis Trimbur; William Hile, Jr.; John Stojka; Christpher Haskins; Dawn Maier; Mark Bowan; Matthew Wagner; Mark Gutshall; Patrick Carlson; Michael Texter; Michael Hasychak; Michael Dorondo; David Christie; Mark Bishop, Christopher Reeves; Mark Grossman; Ryan McCandless; Spencer Crouse; Mark Allen Bodkin; Rebecca Ritzert; Roger Fedokovitz; Jeffrey Bailey; Scott Lewis, Individually an on behalf of all those similarly situated, Appellants v. BUTLER COUNTY; John Does. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Justin L. Swidler, Esq., [Argued], Swartz Swidler, Cherry Hill, NJ for Appellant.
Marie M. Jones, Esq., [Argued], Michael R. Lettrich, Esq., Jones Passodelis, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.
This putative class action was initiated by Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, Pennsylvania. Babcock claims that Butler County failed to properly compensate her and those similarly situated for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–209 et seq.The FLSA requires an employee who works “a workweek longer than forty hours” to be paid at least one and one-half times the employee's regular rate for the work performed over forty hours. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
This appeal raises the issue of whether a portion of time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers' meal periods is compensable under the FLSA.1There is no provision of the FLSA that directly addresses this issue. Two tests have been suggested by other courts of appeal: one looks to whether the employee has been relieved from all duties during the mealtime; the other, more generally adopted, looks to the party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime belongs. The District Court noted that this Circuit has not yet established a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA. For the reasons set forth below, this Court will adopt the predominant benefit test and affirm the District Court.
Many of the relevant facts are not disputed. A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Butler County and the employees who work at the Butler County Prison provides that corrections officers work eight and one-quarter hour shifts that include a one hour meal period, of which forty-five minutes are paid and fifteen minutes are unpaid.2It is the lack of compensation for that fifteen minutes that is the subject of this action. During the meal period, the corrections officers may not leave the prison without permission from the warden or deputy warden, and they must remain in uniform, in close proximity to emergency response equipment, and on call to respond to emergencies. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of this meal period policy, the officers cannot run personal errands, sleep, breathe fresh air, or smoke cigarettes during mealtime, and if an emergency or unexpected situation arises, the officers must respond immediately in person, in uniform, and with appropriate response equipment. Plaintiffs allege that because of these restrictions, they should be compensated for the full hour.
Butler County filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the corrections officers' meal periods were not compensable work because the officers received the “predominant benefit” of the meal period.3The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs do not dispute the appropriateness of applying the predominant benefit test. Rather, they argue that their pleadings establish a plausible claim for relief under either the predominant benefit test or the relieved from all duties test.
The predominant benefit tests asks “whether the officer is primarily engaged in work-related duties during meal periods.”4The majority of the courts of appeals have adopted this test. See, e.g., Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. Corp.,121 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1997); Roy v. Cty. of Lexington,141 F.3d 533, 544–45 (4th Cir.1998); Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb.,154 F.3d 259, 264–65 (5th Cir.1998); Hill v. United States,751 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1984); Alexander v. City of Chicago,994 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir.1993); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep't,6 F.3d 531, 534 (8th Cir.1993); Armitage v. City of Emporia,982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir.1992); Avery v. City of Talladega,24 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir.1994). Plaintiffs cite only two cases that purportedly apply the relieved from all duties test: Kohlheim v. Glynn County5and Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.6The court in neither case, however, actually applied that test. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit in Kohlheim applied its version of the predominant benefit test. 915 F.2d at 1477(“The firefighters are subject to real limitations on their freedom during mealtime which inure to the benefit of the county; accordingly, the three mealtime periods are compensable under FLSA regulations for overtime purposes.”). In Busk, the Ninth Circuit identified the two tests but explained that “[t]he distinction between the ‘completely relieved from duty’ and ‘predominant benefit’ standards d[id] not matter for th[at] case, which turn[ed] on whether the activities at issue [we]re compensable ‘work.’ ” 713 F.3d at 531 n. 4. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Buskand focused the analysis on “work” as defined by the Portal–to–Portal Act. 135 S.Ct. 513. In any event, the predominant benefit test is uncontroversial in the case before us—neither party disputes that it is the appropriate standard. Accordingly, we join our sister Circuits in adopting the predominant benefit test.
29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a).7Instead, courts have assessed the totality of the circumstances to determine, on a case-by-case basis, to whom the benefit of the meal period inures. Most courts derive this approach from Supreme Court precedent holding that “[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case.” Armour & Co. v. Wantock,323 U.S. 126, 133, 65 S.Ct. 165, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944), superseded on other grounds,Portal–to–Portal Act of 1947, Pub.L. No. 8049, 61 Stat. 84, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262.
Thus, the predominant benefit test is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry. For some courts, whether the employee is free to leave the premises is of particular importance. Others emphasize the number of interruptions to which the employees are subject. As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “the essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”Kohlheim,915 F.2d at 1477.
Here, although Plaintiffs face a number of restrictions during their meal period, the District Court correctly found that, on balance, these restrictions did not predominantly benefit the employer. In comparison to the cadre of case law addressing mealtime compensability in the law enforcement context, the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint do not suffice. For example, the corrections officers here could request authorization to leave the prison for their meal period and could eat lunch away from their desks. In Alexander v. City of Chicago,in contrast, police officers were required to receive permission to take a meal period and were not permitted to read “nondepartmental publications.”8
Another factor to consider is the existence of the CBA. We find helpful the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Leahy v. City of Chicago,a case initiated by Chicago police officers seeking overtime pay.9The Seventh Circuit, like in the case before us, had before it a CBA between the employees and the employer. In that case, the City of Chicago faced an action brought by Chicago police officers seeking overtime pay. In affirming the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the CBA sufficiently protected the officers' right to overtime compensation. In this case, although the CBA is silent on the compensability of the fifteen-minute period, it provides corrections officers with the benefit of a partially-compensated mealtime and mandatory overtime pay if the mealtime is interrupted by work. As the Seventh Circuit stated, “[t]he FLSA requires no more.”10The CBA, then, assumes “that generally an officer is not working during a meal period, but provides for appropriate compensation when an officer actually does work during the meal.”11
The Dissent argues that we have “disregard[ed] ...
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