Sjurset v. Button

Decision Date04 December 2015
Docket NumberNo. 13–35851.,13–35851.
Citation810 F.3d 609
Parties Stephen SJURSET, personally and as next friend for N.S. and T.B., Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Charles BUTTON, Stayton City Police Department, in his individual and official capacity; Michael Meeks, Stayton City Police Department, in his individual and official capacity; Scott Mumey, Stayton City Police Department, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants–Appellants, and Mary Anne Miller, in her individual capacity; Dyan Bradley, in her individual capacity; City of Stayton, a municipal entity, Defendants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Edward S. McGlone III, Lake Oswego, OR, for DefendantsAppellants.

Mikel Ross Miller, Bend, OR, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Before: FERDINAND F. FERNANDEZ, RONALD LEE GILMAN,* and CARLOS T. BEA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GILMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

In February 2010, three police officers from the Stayton City Police Department (the Stayton officers), acting at the direction of officials from the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS), entered the home of Stephen Sjurset and assisted in removing his two young children from the residence without a court order. Sjurset subsequently filed an action on behalf of himself and his children against the Stayton officers, four DHS officials, and the City of Stayton pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that DHS and the Stayton officers took custody of his children without reasonable cause to believe that the children were in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, thus violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association and the children's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

At the summary-judgment stage of the case, the district court dismissed Sjurset's claims against the City of Stayton and the two DHS officials who were not involved in the decision to remove the children. It rejected claims by the Stayton officers and the two remaining DHS officials that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Only the Stayton officers appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the decision of the district court with regard to the Stayton officers and REMAND the case to the district court for entry of judgment in their favor.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background

On February 18, 2010, officials at DHS received a phone call from a medical doctor's office reporting that Jessica Borchers—the significant other of Stephen Sjurset—had tested positive that day for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and marijuana. Borchers, who was pregnant at the time, lived in Stayton, Oregon with Sjurset and her two- and five-year-old children, N.S. and T.B. Sjurset is N.S.'s father and T.B.'s legal guardian.

The incident was not the first of its kind. In 2007, Borchers also tested positive for using methamphetamine while pregnant with her second child, N.S. As a result of that prior incident, both Borchers and Sjurset were convicted of endangering the welfare of a minor under Or.Rev.Stat. § 163.575. T.B. was placed in temporary foster care until Borchers successfully completed a drug-treatment program.

Acting on the newly registered complaint, DHS immediately initiated an investigation. DHS case worker Caryn Moller–Mata attempted to meet with Borchers and Sjurset to verify the health and safety of the two children. She first contacted Borchers on Friday, February 19, 2010. Borchers said that she was out of town and that Sjurset was taking care of the children. Moller–Mata then made several attempts to contact Sjurset, but received no response. At the end of the day, when she was unable to locate or meet with either parent, Moller–Mata called the Stayton City Police Department and requested that it dispatch officers to Sjurset's house over the weekend to conduct an in-person welfare check on N.S. and T.B.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, February 20, officers Button, Meeks, and Mumey arrived outside Sjurset's house. Officer Button requested to speak with Borchers and to see the children, but Sjurset refused to let the officers inside the house without a warrant. When Borchers appeared at the door, however, she said that the officers could view the children through the front window.

Unsure of what to do next, the Stayton officers contacted DHS for further guidance. DHS dispatched an on-duty social worker, Mary Anne Miller, to the scene. On the way to Sjurset's house, Miller phoned Moller–Mata and the two discussed Sjurset's and Borchers's prior child-endangerment convictions and their refusals to cooperate with the ongoing DHS investigation. Importantly, because these events transpired on a Saturday evening, DHS officials could not obtain a court order authorizing the children's removal until the following Monday morning, which was at least 36 hours away. Miller then contacted her supervisor, Dyan Bradley, to evaluate the situation. They discussed Borchers's recent positive drug test, Sjurset's and Borchers's refusal to cooperate, their prior convictions, and the risk of leaving the children in the care of the couple for another 36 hours. In light of these concerns, Miller and Bradley made an on-the-spot decision to take the children into protective custody without a court order.

All the parties are in agreement that the Stayton officers did not participate in the decision by Miller and Bradley to take protective custody of the children. The parties further agree that Miller and Bradley made the protective-custody determination prior to the Stayton officers' entry into the house. Finally, the record indicates that the Stayton officers did not make their own independent judgments as to whether there was probable cause to enter the home and remove the children without a warrant.

In accordance with DHS's determination, the Stayton officers entered the house alongside Miller and removed N.S. and T.B. The district court's opinion notes that DHS "concede[d] that there was no visual evidence of drug use in the area of the house that the officials occupied while the children were removed." No other part of the house was searched. N.S. and T.B. were placed into temporary foster care and, following a "shelter hearing" two days later, DHS obtained custody.

B. Procedural background

Sjurset brought an action on behalf of himself and his children against the City of Stayton, the DHS officials, and the Stayton officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the parties had (1) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association and (2) violated the children's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by removing the children in the absence of a court order or evidence of imminent danger of serious bodily harm. He also alleged that DHS officials Moller–Mata and Maria Randall had presented false information at the shelter hearing, in violation of his substantive- and procedural-due-process rights. Id.

All the defendants moved for summary judgment on Sjurset's § 1983 claims, arguing that their actions did not violate Sjurset's or his children's constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both the City of Stayton and the two DHS officials who testified at the shelter hearing. But it denied qualified immunity to Miller, Bradley, and the Stayton officers. Relevant to this appeal, the court rejected the Stayton officers' argument for the following reasons:

Once the Stayton Defendants entered the home, they apparently saw no physical evidence suggesting that the children were in imminent danger. Further, no defendant suggests that Borchers was in any way under the influence of substances, or that there was evidence of the existence of drug paraphernalia. Although the Stayton Defendants argue that they did not take action until Miller arrived on the scene and announced she had taken custody of the children, the Court is not convinced that reliance on Miller was reasonable as a matter of law, give [sic] the apparent absence of exigent circumstances or visible signs of imminent danger to NS and TB. Thus, plaintiffs have successfully raised a question of fact as to whether the Stayton Defendants violated [the plaintiffs'] clearly established rights by removing the children from the home, and summary judgment in favor of the officers is therefore inappropriate.

The Stayton officers timely filed this appeal. They argue that the district court erred in denying them qualified immunity because (1) the officers violated no clearly established right of the plaintiffs when they carried out DHS's instructions to enter the home and remove the children; (2) police officers are entitled to act in good faith on the instructions of other law-enforcement officers, including child-welfare officials, even if the basis for those instructions is mistaken or erroneous; and (3) the Stayton officers were not incompetent in believing that they were legally authorized to act in reliance on DHS's determination.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review

"A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ), cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. Albino, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 403, 190 L.Ed.2d 307 (2014). In applying this standard, we "view[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Burke v. Cnty. of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir.2009). "A district court's decision denying summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is reviewed de novo. " Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir.2009). We thus review the evidence presented in the light most favorable to Sjurset, the nonmoving party, to determine whether the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to the Stayton officers.

B. The law of qualified immunity

Qualified immunity "protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar...

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