810 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2004), 33S01-0406-CR-288, Cook v. State

Docket Nº33S01-0406-CR-288.
Citation810 N.E.2d 1064
Party NameSteven D. COOK, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
Case DateJune 30, 2004
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Page 1064

810 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2004)

Steven D. COOK, Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 33S01-0406-CR-288.

Supreme Court of Indiana

June 30, 2004.

Page 1065

Jeffrey A. Baldwin, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER FROM THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS, No. 33A01-0302-CR-00075.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

There is conflicting authority as to whether, prior to any trial date being set, delays caused by a defendant extend the one-year deadline for bringing a defendant to trial under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). We hold that they do.

Background

On December 11, 2001, Defendant Steven D. Cook was arrested and charged with Dealing in a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class A felony; Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance in an Amount Greater than Three Grams Within 1,000 Feet of School Property, a Class A felony; Dealing in a Schedule IV Controlled Substance, a Class C felony; and Maintaining a Common Nuisance, a Class D felony. An initial hearing was held on December 19, 2001. When Defendant had not been brought to trial by December 26, 2002, he moved to dismiss the information, alleging a violation of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), which requires the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year of the defendant being arrested or the charges being filed, whichever occurs later.

Relevant to Defendant's claim are these two facts:

(1) Between February 14, 2002, and June 28, 2002, Defendant made five motions to continue, and on three occasions between July 22, 2002, and September 20, 2002, the court postponed, the proceedings.

(2) No trial date had ever been set as of the time Defendant made his motion to dismiss on December 26, 2002.

The trial court denied his motion. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, attributing 105 days of delay to Defendant. Cook v. State, 799 N.E.2d 79, 83 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Neither court found the fact that no trial date had been set to be controlling. However, Judge Sullivan dissented from the opinion of the Court of Appeals on the ground that a request for a continuance should be charged against a defendant only if a trial date has already been set when that request is made. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting). We now grant transfer and affirm.

Discussion

The issue presented in this case is whether a defendant should be charged under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) with delays that result from actions of the defendant that occur before a trial date has been set. The rule states:

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar....

Ind.Crim. Rule 4(C). The rule places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for extensions of that time for various reasons.

Page 1066

Ritchison v. State, 708 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied, 726 N.E.2d 300 (Ind.1999). For instance, "[i]f a delay is caused by the defendant's own motion or action, the one-year time limit is extended accordingly." Frisbie v. State, 687 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (citation omitted), trans. denied, 698 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind.1998); see also Andrews v. State, 441 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ind.1982).

There is disagreement as to whether a defendant causes a delay of the trial date when the defendant's actions result in a postponement of the proceedings before a trial date is set. In State ex rel. O'Donnell v. Cass Superior Court, where the defendant agreed to a continuance sought by the State, we held that the defendant's charges should be dismissed because he was not brought to trial within one year of being charged. 468 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind.1984). In the opinion, we stated, "When a defendant has agreed to a continuance prior to the setting of any trial date, those days shall not be attributed to the defendant for the purposes of Ind.R.Cr.P. 4(C)." Id. Our rationale was apparently that until a trial date has been set, a defendant does not know whether the motion will delay the trial date. "A defendant in that situation can only assume that when a trial date is finally set it will conform to the limitations of the rule." Id. Justice DeBruler dissented, arguing, "When a party delays a task which must be completed before a trial can take place, that party can and often does delay the setting of the case for trial, and through that, the trial itself. That is the effect of a continuance of the cause by agreement of the parties." Id.

Subsequent cases purport to follow the O'Donnell majority. These decisions have held that any delay, regardless of who requested it, cannot be charged to the defendant unless a trial date had already been set. State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 406-08 (Ind.1997); Carr v. State, 790 N.E.2d...

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88 practice notes
  • 910 N.E.2d 862 (Ind.App. 2009), 20A05-0812-CR-729, McKnight v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • July 29, 2009
    ...one year of being charged or arrested is an affirmative one which rests with the State. Alter, 860 N.E.2d at 877 (citing Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004)). Indiana Criminal Rule 4 authorizes trial courts to exceed the deadlines when required to do so by congestion of the cour......
  • 883 N.E.2d 874 (Ind.App. 2008), 71A05-0612-CR-726, Pelley v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • April 8, 2008
    ...to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for extensions of that time for various reasons." Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004) (citing Ritchison v. State, 708 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) , reh'g denied, trans. denied). For instance, “[i]f a de......
  • 961 N.E.2d 69 (Ind.App. 2012), 49A02-1105-CR-446, Grigsby v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 4, 2012
    ...court's offer to set a trial date resulted in a delay, this court relied heavily upon our Supreme Court's decision in Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind.2004). We Our Supreme Court has indicated that " delays caused by action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendan......
  • 943 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.App. 2011), 66A03-1008-CR-476, State v. Patton
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 23, 2011
    ...to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for extensions of that time for various reasons." Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004). The one-year period is extended by any delay due to: (1) a defendant's motion for a continuance; (2) a delay caused by th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
88 cases
  • 910 N.E.2d 862 (Ind.App. 2009), 20A05-0812-CR-729, McKnight v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • July 29, 2009
    ...one year of being charged or arrested is an affirmative one which rests with the State. Alter, 860 N.E.2d at 877 (citing Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004)). Indiana Criminal Rule 4 authorizes trial courts to exceed the deadlines when required to do so by congestion of the cour......
  • 883 N.E.2d 874 (Ind.App. 2008), 71A05-0612-CR-726, Pelley v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • April 8, 2008
    ...to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for extensions of that time for various reasons." Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004) (citing Ritchison v. State, 708 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) , reh'g denied, trans. denied). For instance, “[i]f a de......
  • 961 N.E.2d 69 (Ind.App. 2012), 49A02-1105-CR-446, Grigsby v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 4, 2012
    ...court's offer to set a trial date resulted in a delay, this court relied heavily upon our Supreme Court's decision in Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind.2004). We Our Supreme Court has indicated that " delays caused by action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendan......
  • 943 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.App. 2011), 66A03-1008-CR-476, State v. Patton
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 23, 2011
    ...to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for extensions of that time for various reasons." Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004). The one-year period is extended by any delay due to: (1) a defendant's motion for a continuance; (2) a delay caused by th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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