Schumm v. State
| Decision Date | 21 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 02A03-0608-CV-388.,02A03-0608-CV-388. |
| Citation | 866 N.E.2d 781 |
| Parties | Joel M. SCHUMM, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Joel M. Schumm, Indianapolis, IN, Appellant Pro Se.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Matthew D. Fisher, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Following a jury trial, Joel M. Schumm appeals the determination that he operated a vehicle with improper taillights, a Class C infraction. On appeal, Schumm raises six issues, which we expand and restate as:
1. whether the trial court properly denied Schumm's motion for summary judgment;
2. whether the trial court properly denied Schumm's Batson challenge;
3. whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence relating to the United States Department of Transportation (the "DOT") regulations, and refusing to instruct the jury on these regulations;
4. whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Schumm's tendered instructions relating to the civil nature of the case;
5. whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence relating to the Fort Wayne Police Department's (the "FWPD") Standard Operating Procedures ("SOPs");
6. whether the trial court properly refused to allow Schumm to proceed pro se and with co-counsel; and
7. whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a deputy prosecutor to testify regarding discussions with Schumm.
We conclude that the trial court properly denied Schumm's motion for summary judgment, but that it improperly overruled his Batson challenge. Therefore, we must remand for a new trial. Because the remaining issues are likely to recur on remand, we will discuss them as well, although they are not necessary to our decision to reverse.
This appeal, which deals with a variety of legal issues, started inconspicuously enough when FWPD Officer Martim Groomes observed that Schumm's driver's side taillight was not functioning and initiated a traffic stop. Groomes cited Schumm for violating Indiana Code section 9-19-6-4, which indicates:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section:
(1) a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer; and
(2) any other vehicle that is drawn at the end of a train of vehicles;
must be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp mounted on the rear that when lighted as required in this chapter, emits a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear.
(b) Only the tail lamp on the rear-most vehicle of a train of vehicles is required to be seen from the distance specified.
(c) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, and any other vehicle drawn at the end of a train of vehicles, excluding a truck-tractor, that is:
(1) registered in Indiana; and
(2) manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1956;
must be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear that, when lighted, complies with this section.
(d) A tail lamp upon a vehicle shall be located at a height of not less than twenty (20) inches and not more than seventy-two (72) inches.
(e) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp must be placed and constructed so as to illuminate the rear registration plate with a white light and make the plate clearly legible from a distance of fifty (50) feet to the rear. A tail lamp or tail lamps, together with a separate lamp for illuminating the rear registration plate, must be wired so as to be lighted whenever the head lamps or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted.
A later section in the same chapter provides:
(a) This section does not apply to a person who owns or operates a vehicle or combination of vehicles that:
(1) contains parts and accessories; and
(2) is equipped;
as required under regulations of the United States Department of Transportation.
(b) A person who violates this chapter commits a Class C infraction.
When Officer Groomes initiated the traffic stop, he was on "OWI patrol," a program funded in an attempt to combat drunk driving. Officers assigned to OWI patrol are apparently required to either make one arrest per hour or issue one citation per hour.1 Officer Groomes testified that when working OWI patrol, he issues a citation to the driver of every vehicle that he stops for an infraction.
Schumm, who is an attorney, filed an appearance to represent himself and requested a jury trial. Before the trial, he deposed Officer Groomes. Based upon this deposition, Schumm filed a summary judgment motion, which the trial court denied after a hearing.
Also prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine, which the trial court granted. This motion in limine excluded the following evidence from Schumm's trial: 1) reference to the possible penalty for the infraction; 2) reference to any alleged bad acts done by the State's witnesses; 3) reference to the DOT regulations; and 4) reference to the FWPD SOPs.
During jury selection, Schumm raised a Batson challenge after the State used one of its peremptory strikes to remove the only African-American juror on the panel. The trial court denied this challenge, stating that Schumm was not an African-American, and therefore could not raise a Batson challenge.
On the day of trial, Cynthia Bedrick filed an appearance as co-counsel for Schumm. The trial court refused to allow Bedrick to serve as co-counsel, but allowed her to serve as Schumm's stand-by counsel.
During the trial, the State called Cory Spreen, a deputy prosecutor, as a rebuttal witness. Spreen testified that during the initial court calling for Schumm's case, Schumm approached him and said, "I'm an attorney from Indianapolis and I would like for this to go away." Tr. at 86. Prior to Spreen taking the stand, Schumm objected that Spreen's testimony would be irrelevant. The trial court overruled this objection.
Schumm tendered several jury instructions, which the trial court refused. The trial court refused: 1) to instruct the jury regarding Indiana Code section 9-19-6-24; 2) to give the pattern jury instruction regarding "Excuse from Statutory Violation"; 3) to instruct the jury that this was a civil case, and instead instructed the jury that this was a criminal case; and 4) to give the pattern jury instruction regarding damages.
The jury returned a verdict for the State, but did not return a verdict on damages, as the trial court had not instructed it to do so. The trial court imposed a fine of $100. Schumm now appeals the determination that he committed a Class C infraction and the $100 fine.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). However, we review a trial court's decision regarding a summary judgment motion de novo, construing all facts and making all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Bullock, 841 N.E.2d 238, 240 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. We will resolve any doubts regarding the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). We may affirm the trial court's decision regarding summary judgment upon any basis supported by the record. See Rodriguez v. Tech. Credit Union Corp., 824 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
When Schumm filed his motion for summary judgment, he designated only the deposition of Officer Groomes. In this deposition, Officer Groomes indicated that he had stopped Schumm because either his license plate light or taillight was out. Later in the deposition, the following exchange took place:
Schumm: Was the vehicle that I was driving equipped with parts and accessories as required under the DOT regulations?
Officer: Yes, but I didn't write you the citation under the Department of Regulation, United States Department of regulation codes.
Schumm: Is that a separate offense, or is that an exception to Section 4 of the statute?
Officer: I don't know. It looks like just something within the Indiana Code book that, I don't know the answer to that question.
The State did not designate any evidence in response to Schumm's motion for summary judgment. Schumm argues that the Officer's response, "Yes," unequivocally indicates his vehicle complied with the DOT regulations, and that therefore, no question of material fact remains as to his liability. We disagree.2 Initially, we note that Officer Groomes backtracked from his initial "Yes," leaving his response somewhat equivocal as to whether he actually believed that Schumm's vehicle complied with the DOT regulations. However, we do not have to decide whether Officer Groomes's response leaves a question of material fact, because our interpretation of the DOT regulations indicates that a vehicle must not merely have the required hardware in place, but that the hardware must be in working order. Therefore, Groomes's testimony that Schumm's taillight was not working conflicts with his testimony that Schumm's vehicle was in compliance with the DOT regulations, and a question of material fact remains.
The purpose of the DOT regulations is "to reduce traffic accidents ... by providing adequate illumination of the roadway, and by enhancing the conspicuity of motor vehicles on the public roads." 49 C.F.R. § 571.108(2). This purpose clearly indicates that vehicles should not only have lighting hardware installed, but also have lighting equipment that works.
The DOT regulations also indicate that "[t]he taillamps on each vehicle shall be activated when the headlamps are activated in a steady-burning state." 49 C.F.R. § 571.108(5.5.3). The common...
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