Bailey v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 30 September 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:10–cv–689–MEF.
• Citation: 815 F.Supp.2d 1246
• Parties: James W. BAILEY, IV, Plaintiff, v. Andy HUGHES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

815 F.Supp.2d 1246

James W. BAILEY, IV, Plaintiff,
v.
Andy HUGHES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:10–cv–689–MEF.

United States District Court,M.D. Alabama,Southern Division.

Sept. 30, 2011.

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Allen Kenneth Mitchell, Allen K. Mitchell, Attorney at Law, Dothan, AL, Charles Neville Reese, Reese & Reese, Daleville, AL, for Plaintiff.

Fred Lee Clements, Jr., Webb & Eley, PC, Montgomery, AL, Gary Clayborn Sherrer, Sherrer Jones & Terry PC, Dothan, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff James W. Bailey (“Bailey”) filed this lawsuit in response to allegedly unconstitutional deprivations of rights while Bailey was in custody in the Houston County Jail. Currently pending in this case are three motions to dismiss:

Doc. # 32—Motion to Dismiss by Andy Hughes, Commander Reed;

Doc. # 34—Motion to Dismiss by Sgt. [sic] Buchman, Sgt. Jones, Sgt. Reynolds;

Doc. # 36—Motion to Dismiss by Corrections Officer Armstrong, Corrections Officer Chancey, Corrections Officer Harrison, Corrections Officer Laney;

The following defendants filed these motions pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Andy Hughes (“Hughes”) in his individual and official capacity as Houston County Sheriff; Keith Reed (“Reed”), in his individual and official capacity as Commander for Jail Operations at the Houston County Jail; Sergeants Cindy Buchmann (“Buchmann”), Beverly Reynolds (“Reynolds”), and Glenn Jones (“Jones”), in their individual and official capacities as Sergeants at the Houston County Jail; and Corrections Officers Joseph Armstrong (“Armstrong”), Adam Chancey (“Chancey”), Kenneth Laney (“Laney”), and John Harrison (“Harrison”) in their individual and official capacities as Corrections Officers at the Houston County Jail.

Defendants' motions to dismiss are now pending before this Court. These motions will be considered together, as the factual and legal basis for each motion is nearly identical. For the following reasons, each motion is due to be GRANTED and this case is due to be DISMISSED in its entirety, WITH PREJUDICE.

Additionally, defendants Hughes, Reed, Jones, and Reynolds have moved this Court to award reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). This motion is due to be GRANTED.

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I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), and 1343 (civil rights). The parties do not assert that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, and there is no dispute that venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Therefore, for the purposes of adjudging a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2008); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir.2007).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955. It is not sufficient that the pleadings merely leave “open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery.” Id. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation and alteration omitted).

A. Defendants Incorrectly Argue for a “Heightened” Pleading Standard

Defendants argue that plaintiffs bringing § 1983 claims in the Eleventh Circuit face an even higher burden than Twombly and Iqbal impose. Doc. # 35, at 8. Prior to Iqbal, the Eleventh Circuit required that § 1983 plaintiffs “allege with some specificity the facts which make out its claim” and noted that this “heightened pleading requirement” was particularly necessary “in cases involving qualified immunity.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998).

However, in Randall v. Scott, an Eleventh Circuit panel explicitly held that Iqbal had “effectively overturned” the Circuit's heightened pleading standard and that “[p]leadings for § 1983 cases involving defendants who are able to assert qualified immunity as a defense shall now be held to comply with the standards described in Iqbal.” 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir.2010).

The Court disagrees with defendants' assertion that the Randall court wrongly overturned prior Eleventh Circuit precedent. Defendants are correct that “Eleventh Circuit rules explicitly forbid a panel from over turning the decision of another panel” and that a Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point in order to overturn a prior Eleventh Circuit panel. (Doc. # 35 at 8, citing United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1997); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam)).

However, the Randall court decided that Iqbal was on point regarding the circuit's heightened pleading standard. Randall, 610 F.3d at 709. It is not this Court's place to second guess that decision.

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As such, Iqbal's plausibility standard, rather than the Eleventh Circuit's overturned heightened pleading standard, is applicable to this case.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bailey was an inmate with the Alabama Department of Corrections at all times relevant to this action. On or around August 13, 2008, Bailey was housed at the Houston County Jail. Doc. # 1 at 9–10, ¶ 1. Bailey was housed in a cell with two other inmates and Bailey's bed was on the floor in close proximity to the cell's toilet. Id. at 10, ¶ 2.

On the orders of Defendant Buchmann,¹ Defendant Armstrong and Corrections Officer Stephen Moon (“Moon”) arrived at Bailey's cell to conduct a search for contraband at around 10:50 PM. Before they began their search, Bailey asked Armstrong what time it was, and Moon responded along the lines of “Nighttime you dumb f* *k.” ² Id. Moon did not find any contraband in the cell, and the complaint indicates that Moon looked “disappointed.” Id. at 10, ¶ 3.

Upon completion of the search of the cell, Bailey and his cellmates were strip searched. The strip search included orders that Bailey and his fellow inmates “squat and cough in the presence of each other” and that Bailey “stand and spread his butt-cheeks in front of the other cellmates.” Id. at 10–11, ¶ 4. Bailey “reminded the officers that I have a lawsuit against you and I am not going to play with you,” and that “if they returned to my cell at any time, they need a sergeant / supervisor to come with them.” ³ Id. at 11, ¶ 4. Moon responded “Who do you think sent me down here?” Id. at 11, ¶ 5. Moon and Armstrong then left Bailey's cell. Id.

Ten minutes later, Moon and Armstrong returned with Corrections Officer Leary (“Leary”). Armstrong was “holding in his right hand a black knife.” Id. Leary asked Bailey to come out of his cell. Bailey refused and repeated his request for a supervisor so he could “report Correction Officer Moon's actions.” ⁴ Id. Leary again asked Bailey to come out to “talk about it,” id., and Bailey again refused. The officers left.

After another ten minutes, Armstrong, Moon, and Leary returned with Defendants Chancey, Laney, and Harrison, as well as Corrections Officers Culbreth (“Culbreth”), Jackson (“Jackson”), and Phillips (“Phillips”). Leary opened the door to Bailey's cell, and Bailey could see that one officer was recording the proceedings with a video camera. Armstrong was pointing an armed Taser at Bailey. Leary “asked” Bailey to get on his knees. Id. at 12, ¶ 7. Bailey did not. Bailey instead

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asked if there was a sergeant present, and was told that there was not. Id.

Leary then “advised” Bailey to get on his knees. Id. at 12, ¶ 8. Bailey did not. Bailey instead replied “As long as I'm in this cell, I'm restrained and I'm not coming out unless a sergeant [or] supervisor is present.” Id.

Leary then “advised” Bailey that if Bailey did not get on his knees, Leary would shoot Bailey with the TASER. Id. at 12–13, ¶ 9. Again, Bailey did not do as Leary asked. Instead, Bailey responded “I am in fear for my life and I am not coming out of this cell unless a sergeant is present.” Id. At this point, Bailey's complaint states that “Officer Leary looked back at Corrections Officer Moon, they both smiled and he shot BAILEY in the side.” ⁵ Id. at 13, ¶ 10. Bailey then pulled the Taser wires out, and ran out of his cell: “as Bailey ran away from the officers he turned around, with his hands up and was shot again in the leg. He went to the floor. As he went down, he was kneed in the back of the head. He was again being shocked and an officer started to also shock him in the back.” Id. at 13 –14, ¶ 11.

Bailey was left with a TASER barb in his thigh. About an hour after the events described above, Bailey was transported to Southeast Alabama Medical Center, where the barb was removed. Bailey was not given a tetanus shot, nor was the area where the barb entered bandaged or treated with antibiotics. Id. at 14, ¶ 12. Bailey has a scar as a result of this incident. Id. at 15, ¶ 15.

Upon his return to the Houston County Jail, Bailey told...