Belizaire v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 16 April 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–23327–CIV.
• Citation: 944 F.Supp.2d 1204
• Parties: Julina BELIZAIRE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gibson Belizaire, deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Miguel A. Exposito, in his official capacity, George Diaz, Police Officer Eric Guzman, and Police Officer Pierre Cazassus, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

944 F.Supp.2d 1204

Julina BELIZAIRE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gibson Belizaire, deceased, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF MIAMI, Miguel A. Exposito, in his official capacity, George Diaz, Police Officer Eric Guzman, and Police Officer Pierre Cazassus, Defendants.

Case No. 12–23327–CIV.

United States District Court,

S.D. Florida,

Miami Division.

April 16, 2013.

Jon A. Zepnick, Jon A. Zepnick PA, Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiff.

Henry Joseph Hunnefeld, Warren Bittner, Miami City Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, Oscar Edmund Marrero, Lourdes Espino Wydler, Marrero & Wydler, Coral Gables, FL, Jon Michael Kreger, Ronald Jay Cohen, Ronald J. Cohen, P.A., Miami Lakes, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT OFFICERS' MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING DEFENDANT EXPOSITO'S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY OF MIAMI'S MOTION TO DISMISS

FEDERICO A. MORENO, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Miguel A. Exposito's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. No. 24), filed on October 29, 2012, Defendant City of Miami'sMotion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (D.E. No. 29), filed on November 2, 2012. and Defendant Police Officers' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (D.E. No. 35), filed on November 26, 2012. Plaintiff Julina Belizaire, acting as the personal representative of the estate of her son Gibson Belizaire, initiated this suit claiming that the use of deadly force against her son was both tortious and in violation of Mr. Belizaire's Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants in turn filed three motions to dismiss all seven counts of Ms. Belizaire's complaint. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant Officers' motion to dismiss, grants Defendant Exposito's motion to dismiss, and grants in part Defendant City of Miami's motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court dismisses Counts IV, V, VI, and VII on qualified immunity grounds. In addition, the Court dismisses Count II as the theory of negligent retention under Florida law requires that a defendant commit a tortious act outside the scope of employment in order to trigger liability. The Court will resolve the challenges to Counts I and III at a later time.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 14, 2010, officers of the Miami Police Department answered a 911 call regarding an alleged domestic dispute. At approximately 12:50 p.m., the officers intercepted Gibson Belizaire in response to the call.¹ During this confrontation, Mr. Belizaire was “suspected of having fired a gun in the direction of [the] ... officers.” Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Mr. Belizaire then fled from the scene, retreating to a vacant lot behind an automobile repair shop at the corner of the intersection. He remained there for over an hour and a half.

At approximately 2:32 p.m., Miami Police Department officers, along with canine units and SWAT teams, established a perimeter around the repair shop and the vacant lot. These officers included Defendants George Diaz, Eric Guzman, and Pierre Cazassus. Cutting the suspect off from any avenues of escape, the police perimeter essentially backed Mr. Belizaire up against the exterior wall of the repair shop.

At no time during this standoff did the police request that Mr. Belizaire drop any weapons he had and surrender himself peacefully. Instead, the officers without warning fired approximately 130 rounds at Mr. Belizaire. Rounds fired by Officers Diaz, Guzman, and Cazassus struck Mr. Belizaire in the top of his head and the side of his temple, killing him.

Plaintiff Julina Belizaire, Gibson's mother and personal representative of his estate, has now filed this suit against former Chief of Police Miguel A. Exposito, the City of Miami, and Officers Diaz, Guzman, and Cazassus. In her second amended complaint, Ms. Belizaire asserts seven counts against Defendants, all stemming from the officers' use of deadly force against her son. Counts I and II consist of Florida tort law claims against the City of Miami for battery and negligent retention, respectively. Additionally, Ms. Belizaire alleges in Count III that the City of Miami has violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by adopting an unofficial policy condoning the use of excessive force by its police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a policy that subsequently led to Mr. Belizaire's death. Similarly, Ms. Belizaire maintains in Count IV that Exposito violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during his tenure as chief of police by both adopting an unofficial policy tolerating excessive force and failing to address a history of widespread abuse by his officers. Ms. Belizaire contends that Exposito's deliberate indifference to constitutional rights led to the use of excessive force against her son in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Ms. Belizaire asserts in Counts V, VI, and VII that Officers Diaz, Guzman, and Cazassus violated the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through their use of excessive and deadly force against her son.

Defendants have now filed three separate motions to dismiss Ms. Belizaire's second amended complaint. The City of Miami and Exposito have filed individual motions to dismiss Counts I through IV, primarily arguing that the Court should dismiss the counts for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Likewise, Officers Diaz, Guzman, and Cazassus have jointly filed a single motion to dismiss Counts V, VI, and VII for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Exposito and the officers therefore maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Because the officers' conduct lies at the heart of Ms. Belizaire's claims, the Court will address their motion to dismiss first. The Court will then proceed to the related § 1983 arguments associated with Exposito's motion to dismiss Count IV. Finally, the Court will discuss the City's challenges to the state law negligent retention claim in Count II.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 8, a plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations. Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.2010). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and such conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Though a proper complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). At a minimum, a plaintiff must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This standard is “not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In other words, the complaint must contain “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the required element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ ” Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Officers Diaz, Guzman, and Cazassus's Motion to Dismiss Counts V, VI, and VII

In their motion to dismiss, Officers Diaz, Guzman, and Cazassus contend that Ms. Belizaire has failed to state a claim of excessive and deadly force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Correspondingly, since Ms. Belizaire cannot allege a constitutional violation in Counts V, VI, and VII, they insist that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Alternatively, the officers assert that qualified immunity applies even if Ms. Belizaire has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation since her complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established right.

Under § 1983, “[a]ny person acting under color of state law who violates a constitutional right of another is liable for the injured party's losses.” See Rivas v. Figueroa, No. 11–23195–Civ–SCOLA, 2012 WL 1343949, at *2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55633, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Apr. 19, 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For civil rights actions brought pursuant to § 1983, the doctrine of qualified immunity “offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Since the purpose of the doctrine is to “allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without fear of personal liability,” Steen v. City of Pensacola, 809 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1348 (N.D.Fla.2011), qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002). Additionally, “it is important for a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit as possible.” Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir.2003).

In resolving the matter of qualified immunity, courts employ a...