Taylor v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1900
• Citation: 82 N.W. 326,110 Iowa 621
• Parties: JOHN C. TAYLOR v. PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

82 N.W. 326

110 Iowa 621

JOHN C. TAYLOR v. PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 10, 1900

Appeal from Mills District Court.--HON. N.W. MACY, Judge.

ACTION at law to recover on an accident insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. There was a trial to a jury which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Weaver & Giller and L. T. Genung for appellant.

Shirley Gilliland, A. E. Cook, and W. S. Lewis for appellee.

OPINION

SHERWIN, J.

This action was brought on a policy of accident insurance issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. The policy by its terms provides for liability for accidental injuries only, and contains an express provision "that it does not cover and the company will not be liable for, * * * intentional injuries inflicted by the insured." The petition alleges that while the plaintiff was engaged in his ordinary and usual duties as cashier of the Mills County Savings Bank, and while placing a book in the vault of said bank, it slipped from the shelf, came in contact with a loaded gun, which was thereby accidentally discharged, without fault or negligence on his part, and the contents thereof passed through the wrist joint of his left hand, making amputation thereof necessary. The defendant answered, denying accidental injury and alleging that the injury was self-inflicted, and that by reason thereof plaintiff violated the conditions of the contract of insurance.

The first assignment of error argued by appellant's counsel is the prejudicial effect upon the jury of a statement of plaintiff's attorney in opening the case, before the introduction of testimony. The statement referred to certain acts of the defendant's agents in procuring an affidavit from the plaintiff before this action was brought, and to an attempt to get him to go to Omaha for the purpose of settlement. This statement was objected to at the time it was made, the objection was sustained by the court, and counsel who made the statement told the court that it was not made for the purpose of showing an effort on the part of the defendant to compromise. The court was not asked to instruct the jury to disregard this opening statement of the attorney, nor did the court do so other than in a general way. The court did instruct the jury, however, in the following language: "In your jury room you should not refer to, discuss, or consider, in connection with this case, anything except the evidence received upon the trial. All extraneous matters and statements should be carefully discarded by you, and you should base your verdict solely and entirely upon the evidence." This instruction, it will be observed, clearly cautioned the jury against the influence of any statement not from the lips of a sworn witness. We do not wish to be understood as approving the remarks of counsel which were objected to, but we are of the opinion that no prejudice resulted therefrom.

The trial court instructed the jury, in substance, that the law presumed the injury which the plaintiff received to have been accidental, and that the burden was upon the defendant to prove that it was not accidental, but willfully self-inflicted. The law will presume that the injury was not self-inflicted. Carnes v. Association, 106 Iowa 281,...