Salazar-Limon v. City of Hous.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-20237,15-20237
• Citation: 826 F.3d 272
• Parties: Ricardo Salazar–Limon, Individually and as Next Friend of EFS, Plaintiff–Appellant v. City of Houston; Chris C. Thompson, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

826 F.3d 272

Ricardo Salazar–Limon, Individually and as Next Friend of EFS, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.City of Houston; Chris C. Thompson, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 15-20237

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed June 15, 2016

Revised June 16, 2016

Sean M. Palavan, Talabi & Associates, P.C., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Robert William Higgason, Suzanne Reddell Chauvin, Esq., City of Houston, Legal Department, John B. Wallace, J. Wallace Legal, Houston, TX, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY

, Circuit Judge:

Ricardo Salazar–Limon (“Salazar”) appeals the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims, which alleged that Officer Chris C. Thompson of the Houston Police Department (“HPD”), in Houston, Texas, applied excessive and unreasonable deadly force during his arrest, causing Salazar to be partially paralyzed. Salazar also asserted a claim, under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), against the City of Houston based on the same conduct and injuries. The district court granted qualified immunity to Officer Thompson in his individual capacity (finding that Salazar's constitutional rights had not been violated during the arrest) and also denied Salazar's claims under Monell. Salazar appealed. We AFFIRM.

I.

In reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment, we “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” See Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009)

.

On October 29, 2010, around midnight, Salazar was driving on Houston's Southwest Freeway. Three other men were in his truck. Salazar had drunk at least four or five beers in the previous two hours—and had the remainder of the 12–pack with him in the truck.

Officer Thompson observed Salazar's truck weaving between lanes and speeding in excess of the posted limit. In response, Officer Thompson turned on his lights and sirens, and Salazar pulled over on the right shoulder of the elevated overpass, next to a low retaining wall. About two feet separated the freeway wall from the passenger side of Salazar's truck. Officer Thompson parked his patrol car about four feet behind Salazar's truck. Before getting out of the patrol car, Officer Thompson ran a search on Salazar's license plate to see if the truck was stolen; it was not.

Officer Thompson approached the driver's window of Salazar's truck and asked Salazar for his license and proof of insurance. Lacking a U.S. license, Salazar complied by giving Officer Thompson his Mexican driver's license. Officer Thompson returned to his patrol car and checked the driver's license, which showed Salazar had no open warrants or charges pending against him. Officer Thompson then returned to the driver's window of Salazar's truck, asking Salazar to step out. Salazar complied, walked to the back of his truck, and stood next to Officer Thompson in the space between the back of the truck and the front of the patrol car.

Officer Thompson and Salazar dispute certain details of what happened next, but it is undisputed that: 1) Officer Thompson tried to handcuff Salazar; 2) Salazar resisted; 3) a brief struggle ensued (in which neither party was injured);¹ and 4) after the brief struggle, Salazar pulled away, turned his back to Officer Thompson, and walked away along the retaining wall and the passenger side of his truck.

At this point, Officer Thompson pulled out his handgun and ordered Salazar to stop. Salazar did not immediately comply and took “one or two” more steps. Officer Thompson testified he then saw Salazar turn left and reach toward his waistband, which was covered by an untucked shirt that hung below his waist.² Further, Officer Thompson testified that he perceived the combination of Salazar's actions to be consistent with a suspect retrieving a weapon from his waistband. Officer Thompson fired a single shot, hitting Salazar in the right lower back.

Upon inspection, Officer Thompson determined that Salazar was not armed. Salazar survived, but the gunshot wound

left him partially paralyzed.

Salazar was charged with, and pleaded nolo contendere to, resisting arrest and driving while intoxicated.

In Texas state court, Salazar sued Officer Thompson, the City of Houston, and various HPD officials, alleging constitutional and state-law violations. The defendants timely removed the case. Salazar dismissed his claims against all of the HPD officers, except Officer Thompson. Officer Thompson moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The City of Houston moved for summary judgment, asserting Salazar's failure to sufficiently plead Monell

liability as a matter of law.

Addressing Salazar's Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Thompson, the district court determined that “Salazar [ ] pointed to no summary judgment evidence contradicting Thompson's testimony that he shot because, when Salazar reached for his waistband and turned toward him, he believed that Salazar had a gun and would shoot.” Salazar–Limon v. City of Houston , 97 F.Supp.3d 898, 909 (S.D. Tex. 2015)

. The district court thus concluded that Officer Thompson's use of deadly force was not excessive under the circumstances and that Salazar's constitutional rights were not violated, and accordingly granted qualified immunity to Officer Thompson, dismissing the claims against him. See

id .

Turning to Salazar's Monell

claims against the City of Houston, the district court granted the City of Houston's summary judgment motion based on the insufficiency of Salazar's claims as a matter of law. Specifically, the district court denied Salazar's Monell claims because the “constitutional violation of a municipal official is a prerequisite to municipal liability,” and Salazar “ha[d] not raised a factual dispute material to determining whether [his] constitutional rights were violated.” Id. at 910 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout an underlying [constitutional] violation,” the district court held, “the § 1983 claims against the municipality fail.” Id.

Salazar appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in granting Officer Thompson and the City of Houston's motions because genuinely disputed material facts precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, Salazar argues that the district court's grant of summary judgment was error and that the judgment should be reversed and remanded for trial against Officer Thompson and the City of Houston.³

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, also applying the same standards as the district court. See Newman v. Guedry , 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012)

. Summary judgment is only appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “On a motion for summary judgment, [we] must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009). “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III.

To establish a claim under § 1983

, “a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna , 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013)

, cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1935, 188 L.Ed.2d 960 (2014). Additionally, “[c]laims under § 1983 may be brought against persons in their individual or official capacity, or against a governmental entity.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty. , 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009).

A municipality and/or its policymakers may be held liable under § 1983

“when execution of a government's policy or custom ... by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury....” Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; see also

Peterson v. City of Fort Worth , 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (requiring plaintiffs asserting Monell -liability claims to show “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) [that was also] the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right”).

A.

First, we turn to Salazar's claims against Officer Thompson. Salazar contends that the district court erred by resolving disputed issues of material fact, and on that basis, by granting Officer Thompson qualified immunity, holding that Officer Thompson did not use excessive or unreasonable force in Salazar's arrest.

Because Officer Thompson was sued in his individual capacity, he asserted the defense of qualified immunity. See Goodman , 571 F.3d at 395

; Salazar–Limon , 97 F.Supp.3d at 900. When evaluating a qualified immunity defense, we conduct a “well-known” two-prong inquiry. Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty. , 246 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2001). “In order to overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right, and then must show that ‘the right was clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case.’ ” Thompson v. Mercer , 762 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ).

Thus, “[a]t summary judgment, it is the plaintiff's burden to rebut a claim of qualified immunity once the defendant has properly raised it in good faith.” Cole v. Carson , 802 F.3d 752, 757 (5th Cir. 2015)

. And, “[t]his is a demanding standard .” Vincent v. City of Sulphur , 805...