83 Hawai'i 13, State v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 10 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 19147,19147
• Citation: 924 P.2d 181
• Parties: 83 Hawai'i 13 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Henry A. DIXON, aka Henry Lee Flazer, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 181

924 P.2d 181

83 Hawai'i 13

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Henry A. DIXON, aka Henry Lee Flazer, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19147.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Sept. 10, 1996.

James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jonathan J. Ezer, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.

MOON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) appeals from the circuit court's July 5, 1995 findings of fact (FOF), conclusions of law (COL) and order granting defendant-appellee Henry A. Dixon's (Dixon), aka Henry Lee Flazer, motion to suppress evidence retrieved by the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) during the execution of a valid arrest warrant. The prosecution argues that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it concluded that the HPD officers' entry into Dixon's hotel room was illegal. The prosecution maintains that entry was lawful because: (1) employing a ruse to effect a voluntary and nonviolent opening of the hotel room door did not implicate or violate Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 803-11 (1993); and (2) Dixon's constitutional protections were not impaired.

As discussed below, we agree with the proposition that entrance gained by the use of a ruse to execute a valid warrant is permissible as long as force is not involved. We also agree that Dixon's constitutional protections were not impaired by the use of a ruse because the purposes of the "knock and announce" rule, which are to: (1) reduce the potential of violence to both occupants and police resulting from an unannounced entry; (2) prevent unnecessary property damage; and (3) protect the occupant's right of privacy, were not frustrated. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order suppressing the evidence.

I. BACKGROUND

At the hearing on Dixon's motion to suppress evidence, the prosecution and Dixon agreed that the police report of HPD Officer Philip V. Camero constituted the undisputed facts of the case. The court accepted the parties' stipulation and received the four- page report into evidence. The following are the facts as stated in the report.

On January 28, 1992, Parole Officer Collin Fukunaga informed HPD Officer Stuart Yano that Dixon had violated the conditions of his parole and that a parole revocation warrant had been issued for Dixon's arrest. Officer Yano relayed this information to Officer Camero, who obtained a "mug" photo of Dixon and learned that Dixon's aliases were "Henry Lee Flazer" or "Henry Lee Frazer."

On January 31, 1992, at 1:00 a.m., the police received information that Dixon might be staying at a hotel in the airport area and that he was planning to leave the island sometime that day. HPD Officer Thomas Toyozaki made telephonic inquiries and, at 2:45 a.m., determined that a man matching Dixon's physical description was registered at the Plaza Hotel under the name of Henry Lee Flazer.

Shortly thereafter, seven HPD officers arrived at the Plaza Hotel. At approximately 3:40 a.m., Officers Toyozaki, Yano, and Camero positioned themselves at either side of the door to room No. 1104. Officer Camero was in civilian clothes, wearing his shoulder holster, and displaying a police badge on a chain hung around his neck. Through the peephole in the hotel room door, Officer Camero observed that there was a light on inside the room, and he could also hear voices coming from within the room.

Brian DeMusis, a Plaza Hotel security guard, was positioned directly in front of the hotel room door. DeMusis knocked on the door, and, when a female voice asked "Who is it?," DeMusis responded that he was the hotel's security guard. The female asked "What do you want?," and DeMusis replied that he was there to check on the air conditioning. Officer Camero heard the door being unlocked from the inside, and, as the door swung open, he saw a black male, whom he recognized from the police photograph to be Dixon, standing in the hallway behind the female.

Officers Yano and Camero entered the room simultaneously, announcing "in an assertive tone of voice" that they were the police and ordering Dixon to get down. "As Officer Yano and [Officer Camero] spoke [they] moved directly towards him." Officer Camero pushed Dixon onto one of the beds in the room and Officer Yano handcuffed him. Once Dixon was handcuffed, Officer Camero noticed a clear plastic ziplock bag, containing a white powdery substance resembling cocaine, on the bed where Dixon had been handcuffed. Five more transparent bags containing white powder were observed on the nightstand. Officer Camero also noticed a large amount of currency and a photo I.D. of Dixon, held together with a rubber band, lying on the floor between the two beds. On the second bed was a black brief case with a numbered combination lock and a grey colored scanner with no antenna. ¹

On November 15, 1994, Dixon was indicted for Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1241(1)(a)(i) (1993), Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Second Degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1242(1)(b)(i) (1993), and Unlawful Use of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993).

On May 10, 1995, Dixon filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending that, because the HPD officers failed to follow the "knock and announce" procedures of HRS § 803-11 before entering the hotel room, their entry was unlawful and in violation of his right to privacy; thus, Dixon contends that all evidence obtained from the unlawful entry must be suppressed. HRS § 803-11 provides that:

Whenever it is necessary to enter a house to arrest an offender, and entrance is refused, the officer or person making the arrest may force an entrance by breaking doors or other barriers. But before breaking any door, the officer or person shall first demand entrance in a loud voice, and state that the officer or person is the bearer of a warrant of arrest; or if it is a case in which arrest is lawful without warrant, the officer or person shall substantially state that information in an audible voice.

At the hearing on Dixon's motion, the motions court orally granted the motion, stating:

The Court does believe that under 803-11 the reasonable inference and interpretation is that initially the police are required to knock and announce their presence, identifying themselves and the purpose for which they're there, and, in this case, to execute an arrest warrant. True this is not a search warrant but nevertheless, clearly, I think 803-11 does indicate that there has to be a knock-and-announcing before entry is made and that 803-11 then goes on to prescribe the procedures to be used if entry is refused but--but a knock-and-announce is--is required.

Also, this State Constitution has a provision that is not in the United States Constitution. That is the right to privacy. And I think under that provision as well the defendant is entitled to--or the police are required to knock and announce their presence in executing the warrant. And in this case, since there was no such knocking and announcing, the Court does believe that the H.P.D.'s entry into this hotel room was improper and illegal and, as such then, the motion to suppress is granted.

Subsequent to the filing of the court's FOF, COL and Order, the prosecution timely appealed, ² challenging the following COL:

2. Under Hawaii Revised Statute[s] Section 803-11 and the reasonable inferences therefrom, police are required to "knock and announce" who they are and their purpose for entering, prior to entry.

3. The Hawaii State Constitution provides for the Right to Privacy which is consistent with the "knock and announce" doctrine.

4. The Honolulu Police Department violated the procedures as set forth in Hawaii Revised Statute[s] [Section] 803-11[,] since they failed to knock and announce prior to entering.

5. The entry into room 1104 of the Plaza Hotel was illegal.

6. All items seized as a result of the illegal entry must be suppressed.

II. DISCUSSION

"A court's COL are reviewed under the right/wrong standard. Under the right/wrong standard, we examine the facts and answer the question without being required to give any weight to the trial court's answer to it." State v. Naeole, 80 Hawai'i 419, 422, 910 P.2d 732, 735 (1996) (quoting State v. Meyer, 78 Hawai'i 308, 311, 893 P.2d 159, 162 (1995)).

A. There was no "breaking" within the meaning of HRS § 803-11.

The issue in this case--whether use of a ruse, without force or threat of force, constitutes a "breaking" within the meaning of the "knock and announce" statute, HRS § 803-11, requiring HPD officers to announce their presence and purpose, and demand entry--is one of first impression in this jurisdiction.

"The starting point in statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself." State v. Garcia, 77 Hawai'i 461, 465, 887 P.2d 671, 675 (App.1995) (citing State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 351, 845 P.2d 547, 551 (1993)). By its plain language, HRS § 803-11 provides that an officer or other person making an arrest "may force an entrance by breaking doors or other barriers[,]", but requires that, "before breaking any door, the officer or person [making the arrest] shall first demand entrance in a loud clear voice, and state that the officer or person is the bearer of a warrant of arrest[.]" Implicit in the motions court's determination that the officers violated the statute by failing to knock and announce before entering the hotel room is the conclusion that entry through a door, voluntarily opened in response to a ruse, is tantamount to "forc[ing] an entrance by breaking doors[.]" HRS § 803-11.

The knock and announce statute, HRS § 803-11, appeared virtually verbatim in the 1869 Penal Code of the Hawaiian Kingdom, ³ and there is no legislative history from which we can discern the intended meaning of "force an...