L.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.

• Decision Date: 06 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14-4640,14-4640
• Citation: 836 F.3d 235
• Parties: L.R., Parent and Natural Guardian of N.R., a minor v. School District of Philadelphia; School Reform Commission of the School District of Philadelphia; James A. Rocco, III, Esq., as Administrator CTA of the Estate of Reginald M. Littlejohn, Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

836 F.3d 235

L.R., Parent and Natural Guardian of N.R., a minor

v.School District of Philadelphia; School Reform Commission of the School District of Philadelphia; James A. Rocco, III, Esq., as Administrator CTA of the Estate of Reginald M. Littlejohn, Appellants

No. 14-4640

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued February 11, 2016

Filed: September 6, 2016

Kerri E. Chewning, Archer & Greiner, P.C., One Centennial Square, 33 East Euclid Avenue, Haddonfield, NJ 08033, Jeffrey M. Scott [ARGUED], Archer & Greiner, P.C., 1650 Market Street, One Liberty Place, 32nd Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for Appellants

Charles L. Becker [ARGUED], Dominic C. Guerrini, Thomas R. Kline, Tracie L. Palmer, David C. Williams, Kline & Specter, P.C., 1525 Locust Street, 19th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102, Counsel for Appellee

Before: FUENTES,^* KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

OPINION

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Teachers not only educate our children, but also provide them with sources of care and comfort outside the home. Recognizing that the threat of civil liability might discourage teachers and other public servants from taking on such significant roles, courts have developed a doctrine of qualified immunity that, in many instances, shields them from civil lawsuits. But there are exceptions and this is one of those cases.

In January 2013, a teacher in the Philadelphia School District allowed a kindergarten student to leave his classroom with an adult who failed to identify herself. The adult sexually assaulted the child later that day. In the early hours of the next morning, a sanitation worker found the child in a playground after hearing her cries. The child's parent sued the teacher, who claims he is immune from suit.

We hold that the parent's allegations sufficiently state a constitutional violation of the young child's clearly established right to be free from exposure by her teacher to an obvious danger. In short, we conclude that it is shocking to the conscience that a kindergarten teacher would allow a child in his care to leave his classroom with a complete stranger. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's denial of qualified immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, the allegations are taken from the complaint and are assumed true for purposes of this appeal. On an ordinary school day in January 2013, Christina Regusters entered W.C. Bryant Elementary School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where Jane was enrolled as a kindergarten student.¹ Regusters proceeded directly to Jane's classroom, where she encountered Defendant Reginald Littlejohn, Jane's teacher. Per Philadelphia School District policy,² Littlejohn asked Regusters to produce identification and verification that Jane had permission to leave school. Regusters failed to do so. Despite this failure, Littlejohn allowed Jane to leave his classroom with Regusters. Later that day, Regusters sexually assaulted Jane off school premises, causing her significant physical and emotional injuries.

B. Procedural Background

Jane's parent and natural guardian, L.R., filed this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Reginald Littlejohn in his individual capacity, the School District of Philadelphia, and the School Reform Commission of the School District of Philadelphia (collectively, the “Defendants”). L.R. alleges that Littlejohn deprived Jane of her Fourteenth Amendment rights under a state-created danger theory. Specifically, L.R. alleges that by releasing her daughter to an unidentified adult, Littlejohn created the danger that resulted in Jane's physical and emotional harm. Defendants moved to dismiss under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the complaint does not allege a constitutional violation and, even if it did, Littlejohn is entitled to qualified immunity.³

The District Court denied Defendants' motion. It explained that “ordinary common sense and experience dictate that there is an inherent risk of harm in releasing a five-year-old [child] to an adult stranger who has failed to produce identification and authorization for release despite being asked to do so.”⁴ For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.⁵

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Under this doctrine, “a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”⁶ “This is so because qualified immunity ... is both a defense to liability and a limited entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.”⁷ Here, the disputed issues are whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Thus, appellate review is appropriate. Our review is plenary.⁸

III. DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of qualified immunity is to shield public officials “from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”⁹ This immunity can be overcome, however, when public officials violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware.¹⁰ In the words of the Supreme Court, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”¹¹

To resolve a claim of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the official's conduct.¹² “[W]hether a particular complaint sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.”¹³ Thus the sufficiency of L.R.'s pleading is both “inextricably intertwined with” and “directly implicated by” Littlejohn's qualified immunity defense.¹⁴

A. Substantive Due Process Claim under the State–Created Danger Theory

The threshold question in any § 1983 lawsuit is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. L.R.'s claim invokes the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which “protects individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”¹⁵ In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,¹⁶ the Supreme Court explained that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”¹⁷ Rather, the purpose of the Clause is “to protect the people from the State , not to ensure that the State protect[s] [the people] from each other.”¹⁸ Applying this principle, the Court held that state social workers did not deprive four-year-old Joshua DeShaney of substantive due process when they failed to remove him from a physically abusive household, despite their ongoing knowledge of suspected abuse by his father.¹⁹ The Court held that, “[a]s a general matter ... a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”²⁰ It suggested, however, that the result may have been different had the State played a role in creating or enhancing the danger to which Joshua was exposed.²¹

Building off that concept, we and other circuits have adopted a “state-created danger” exception to the general rule that the Due Process Clause imposes no duty on states to protect their citizens from private harm.²² In Bright v. Westmoreland County,²³ we clarified the elements necessary to successfully plead a state-created danger claim:

1. the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

2. a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;

3. a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and

4. a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.²⁴

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that L.R. has sufficiently alleged all four of these elements and has therefore sufficiently pled a substantive due process violation.

i. Affirmative Use of Authority Creating or Increasing Danger

We begin with the fourth element, as it is typically the most contested. This element asks whether the state's conduct created or increased the risk of danger to the plaintiff. As we noted in Bright, “[i]t is misuse of state authority, rather than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.”²⁵

This element is often contested because of the inherent difficulty in drawing a line between an affirmative act and a failure to act.²⁶ Often times there is no clear line to draw; virtually any action may be characterized as a failure to take some alternative action.²⁷ For example, Defendants attempt to reframe Littlejohn's alleged actions as inactions, or failures. They argue that Littlejohn's failure to follow School District policy, failure to obtain proper identification from Regusters, and failure to obtain verification from Regusters that Jane had been permitted to leave school are not affirmative acts. This strategy is unavailing.

Rather than approach this inquiry as a choice between an act and an omission, we find it useful to first evaluate the setting or the “status quo” of...