Buchanan v. Little Rock School Dist. of Pulaski County, Ark., 95-3192

• Decision Date: 15 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-3192,95-3192
• Citation: 84 F.3d 1035
• Parties: Karen BUCHANAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS; Linda Poindexter, Patricia Gee, Judy Magness, Oma Jacovelli, T. Kevin O'Malley, John E. Riggs, IV, Individually and in their official capacities as the Board of Directors for the Little Rock School District; Henry Williams, Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent, Little Rock School District; Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1035

84 F.3d 1035

Karen BUCHANAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS;

Linda Poindexter, Patricia Gee, Judy Magness, Oma Jacovelli,

T. Kevin O'Malley, John E. Riggs, IV, Individually and in

their official capacities as the Board of Directors for the

Little Rock School District; Henry Williams, Individually

and in his official capacity as Superintendent, Little Rock

School District; Defendants-Appellants.

No. 95-3192.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 12, 1996.

Decided May 28, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied July 15, 1996.

Michael S. Moore, Little Rock, Arkansas, argued for appellants (Christopher J. Heller, on the brief).

Troy Anthony Price, Little Rock, Arkansas, argued for appellee.

Before BEAM and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE, ^* District Judge.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Karen Buchanan claims her due process rights were violated because she did not receive a hearing in connection with her reassignment from principal of a junior high school to an administrative post. The district court concluded as a matter of law that she had a property interest in her position as principal, and judgment was entered in her favor after a jury trial. The Little Rock School District of Pulaski County, Arkansas (the district), the members of its school board, and its superintendent appeal from the judgment. We reverse.

The facts are essentially undisputed. Buchanan was hired by the district as a teacher in 1985, promoted to assistant principal the following year, and then to principal in 1987. She received an individual contract for each school year. She served as the principal of a number of elementary schools within the district through the 1993-94 academic year and received favorable evaluations.

In April 1994, she signed a contract indicating she would be the principal at Garland Elementary School the following year. The superintendent, Dr. Henry Williams, recommended that she instead take over as principal at Henderson Junior High School, a magnet school troubled by poor student performance and discipline problems. The school board approved the recommendation, and a letter from a district administrator confirmed the transfer early in the summer.

After Buchanan started at Henderson friction developed quickly between her and some of the teachers. At the beginning of the 1994-95 school year, Buchanan reviewed with them the policy manual she had revised over the summer. Apparently a number of teachers were upset that they would no longer be able to use their preparation periods to run errands. Several teachers were angry because they had been moved to different classrooms without being consulted. There were several other unpopular policy changes, such as requiring teachers to record their grades as percentages. The school board received a number of complaints, which in turn were reported to Buchanan by Williams. The changes instituted by Buchanan were consistent with district rules, and Williams indicated that he supported her efforts to enforce district policies.

The situation did not improve over the next month, however, and Buchanan had a difficult time with unruly students and disgruntled faculty. Following an incident in which a girl was beaten by other students on a bus, Buchanan told Williams, "Get me out of here." She later changed her mind and said she wanted to stay at Henderson, and Williams provided increased security staff. The tension between Buchanan and the faculty continued. Williams told her that they perceived her as being arbitrary, authoritarian, and insensitive to their concerns. Some teachers were discussing a walkout.

After Williams met with some of the teachers, he told Buchanan to "make peace" with the faculty. Buchanan circulated a survey to pinpoint problems with the faculty, but only six of some seventy teachers responded. She received a list of complaints from teachers on September 16. Three days later she met with the faculty and received a second list of concerns, which was similar to the first. The meeting apparently failed to reduce the tension.

Matters came to a head on September 20, when at least seven teachers apparently participated in a "sickout" and failed to come to work. Williams visited Henderson that day and asked Buchanan to meet with him that evening. Fearing she would be removed from her position, Buchanan retained counsel, who attended the meeting with her.

At their meeting Williams told Buchanan that he had decided to recommend that she be reassigned to another position within the district and explained that his decision was "political." The school board unanimously approved the recommendation at a regular board meeting on September 22. The board minutes indicate she was "temporarily reassigned." Six other principals and assistant principals were also reassigned at the same time; one became an Acting Assistant Superintendent and another was made an Acting Assistant Vocational Director. The district did not inform Buchanan of any way in which she could air any complaints about the transfer, and Buchanan did not avail herself of the existing grievance procedure. ¹

Buchanan was reassigned to the Office of Student Assignment, where she was encouraged to apply for a new position not yet formally approved. The district planned to divide the responsibilities of the Desegregation Facilitator between the Associate Superintendent for Desegregation and the Director of Student Assignment. Buchanan apparently performed the functions of the latter role, assigning students to schools based on their needs and in accord with the district's extensive desegregation plan. She worked in that capacity for the remainder of the fall 1994 semester and was then assigned to be the acting principal at Garland Elementary School. Garland was the school that had been named on the contract she had signed in April for the school year.

Buchanan filed this action on October 26, 1994, a month after she was transferred from Henderson. The complaint alleged that appellants deprived her of a property interest in her position as principal at Henderson without a hearing and therefore violated her due process rights. ² Buchanan sought a preliminary injunction returning her to Henderson, which was denied in November 1994. She also sought compensatory damages and a permanent injunction that she be reinstated at Henderson and not removed without due process of law.

The matter was tried before a jury in June 1995. The district court had indicated before trial that it would rule she had a property interest in her position as a principal, and it issued a written order to that effect after trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Buchanan and found that she had suffered $50,000 in damages. Injunctive relief was not granted, however. The appellants now seek reversal of the judgment in Buchanan's favor, mainly on the ground that the district court erred in finding a property interest in her position as principal.

An employee has a property interest in employment under the due process clause if she has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to it. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 426, 130 L.Ed.2d 340 (1994). A property interest can be in the entire position or in a specific benefit, but "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. Thus, a claimant must demonstrate that there were "rules or mutually explicit understandings that support [her] claim of entitlement" to her position. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).

A protected property interest must be derived from a source independent of the Constitution, such as state law. Drake v. Scott, 823 F.2d 239, 240 n. 2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455, 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987). A contract may create a property interest. See Brockell v. Norton, 688 F.2d 588, 590-91 (8th Cir.1982). "[F]ederal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). Whether the district court's order finding a property interest in the status of principal is construed as a partial summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of law, review is de novo.

The appellants argue that neither Arkansas law nor Buchanan's employment contract created a property interest in a particular assignment. Buchanan's definition of her claimed property interest has been somewhat unclear. She originally sought injunctive relief reinstating her as principal at Henderson, but her appellate briefs focus more on her loss of a principal position for the last months of 1994. At all times, however, she has claimed at least a property interest in the status of a principal based on her contract. ³

Buchanan's contract for the 1994-95 year, dated April 28, 1994, was entitled a "Teacher's Contract" and stated: "[Buchanan] agrees to perform services as assigned by Superintendent or Principal." The next line read: "Primary responsibility" with "Elementary Principal" typed in the following blank.

On the day after Williams told Buchanan he was going to recommend her transfer from Henderson, the school district issued a memorandum authorizing revision of her April contract. Two changes were indicated. "Henderson Magnet" was entered on a line designated "site," and her salary was increased by $175 because junior high principals were entitled to a larger automobile allowance. ⁴

The district court concluded that Buchanan's contract created a legitimate...