Barrios-Velazquez v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 28 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2170,BARRIOS-VELAZQUEZ,95-2170
• Citation: 84 F.3d 487
• Parties: Eliezer, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASOCIACION DE EMPLEADOS DEL ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants-Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 487

84 F.3d 487

Eliezer BARRIOS-VELAZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASOCIACION DE EMPLEADOS DEL ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-2170.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 28, 1996.

Decided May 24, 1996.

Francisco R. Gonzalez-Colon, with whom Francisco R. Gonzalez Law Firm, was on brief, Guaynabo, PR, for appellants.

Lino J. Saldana, Hato Rey, PR, with whom Carmen M. Dominguez, San Juan, PR, was on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

Appellants Eliezer Barrios-Velazquez ("Barrios"), Myrta Nieves-Vega ("Nieves") and Isidro Collazo ("Collazo"), in their personal capacity and as representatives of the "Comite de Delegados y Miembros Pro Sana Administracion de AEELA" ("SAAEELA") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), appeal the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of their complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico ("AEELA") and Isaac Neftali Rojas-Nater ("Rojas"), Roberto Aquino-Garcia ("Aquino") and Miguel Martinez-Williams ("Martinez"), in their personal and official capacities (collectively, "Defendants"). We affirm the decision of the district court.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as true and making all reasonable Although it does not affect the outcome, it would appear that the motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment since the district court plainly considered "matters outside the pleadings." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). ¹ Plaintiffs in fact argue in their brief that due to representations made to them by defendants' attorney, they postponed filing an opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, and they were therefore not afforded a "reasonable opportunity" to present Rule 56 material. See Br. for Appellants at 12. The answer to this argument, of course, is clear: even considering this Rule 56 material, see supra note 1, we conclude that plaintiffs demonstrated no genuine issue of material fact.

inferences in favor of plaintiff." Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 256 (1st Cir.1994); see Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of E. Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir.1992). "We must liberally construe [Plaintiffs'] complaint and affirm its dismissal only if [they] cannot prove any set of facts entitling [them] to relief." Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 255.

II. BACKGROUND

The instant case stems from a dispute over the circumstances under which a Quadrennial Assembly (the "Assembly") of the AEELA was held on July 8, 1995. The AEELA has approximately 180,000 members, all of whom are regular or former employees of the government of Puerto Rico. Of these members, 75% are required by law to participate in and be members of the AEELA, and are required to provide 3% of their salary to be administered by the AEELA. Only employees of public corporations and municipalities may participate in the AEELA.

Plaintiffs contend, and this court must assume, given our procedural posture, that Defendants have exercised control over the AEELA since 1987, and used this control to handpick delegates to the Assembly in question in order to maintain their control, and that of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), over the AEELA. We must further infer that Defendants impermissibly notified only those delegates who shared their political beliefs that the Assembly would be held, and refused to take the necessary measures to notify or confirm the membership of delegates who do not support the PDP. Furthermore, we infer that Defendants denied Plaintiff-Appellant Nieves a list of the certified delegates, thus hindering her candidacy for President of the AEELA's Board of Directors.

Plaintiffs charge that these actions amount to illegal political discrimination in violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the enabling law of the Commonwealth Employees Association, 3 L.P.R.A. § 862(b). They also contend, contrary to the district court opinion dismissing their claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, that the acts of Defendants are state action.

III. DISCUSSION

"Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory....' " Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 256 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 The district court addressed only the second showing, dismissing this action on the ground that Defendants did not act under color of state law when they scheduled the general assembly for July 8, 1995. We note in passing that at least two courts have already concluded that the AEELA is not an agency, department or instrumentality of the Government of Puerto Rico, suggesting that the AEELA's actions and those of its members cannot be labeled state action. Morales v. Chaves, No. 75-1087, slip op. at 2 (D.P.R. Dec. 9, 1975) (noting that while "[i]t is true that the Association was created by statute and only government employees may be members ... there all relation with the Commonwealth ceases"); Association of Employees of Puerto Rico v. Vasquez- Perez, 92 JTS 52, slip op. at 26 (P.R.1992) (official trans.) (stating, in the context of deciding whether the AEELA was subject to the Truth in Lending Act, that "although the Association is a highly regulated entity created by the government, whose objective is to implement the government policy of ... encouraging saving among public employees ... it cannot be considered as a government agency, department, instrumentality or public corporation"). While persuasive as to certain points, these cases do not represent binding authority for this court. As a result, like the district court before us, we conduct our own inquiry into the issue.

                U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2746-47, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)).   To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must make two showings:  the existence of a federal or statutory right;  and a deprivation of that right by a person acting under color of state law. 2  See id.;  Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1993)
                

Because section 1983 does not reach private actions, the key issue before us is whether the conduct at issue in this case may be " 'fairly attributable to the State,' " Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 94 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54); see Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n of Puerto Rico, 760 F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir.1985). The state action inquiry is " 'necessarily fact-bound.' " Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54). "In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2769-70, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982). "The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights 'fairly attributable to the State?' " Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54).

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the AEELA is an extension of the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and that the conduct at issue may be fairly attributed to the state on that basis as direct state action. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that even if the AEELA is a private organization, the actions that give rise to the instant case may still be fairly attributed to the state as indirect state action. Ultimately, a finding of either direct or indirect state action would suffice to sustain Plaintiffs' section 1983 action. See Rodriguez-Garcia, 904 F.2d at 95.

A. Direct State Action

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' actions may be fairly attributed to the state because, they claim, the AEELA is a public corporation and therefore, an "arm of the state." Although "[t]he Act which creates the Association does not define whether it is an agency, a department, an instrumentality or a public corporation," Vasquez-Perez, slip op. at 24, both federal and state courts have held that the AEELA is not a governmental agency, see Morales, slip op. at 2 (noting that "the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has, since 1932, consistently ruled that the Employees Association is not a part of the Government"); Vasquez-Perez, slip op. at 26.

Admittedly, technical labels are not dispositive. In Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 961, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed direct state action and technical labels, ruling that, despite a statutory disclaimer of agency status, the National Railroad Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak") was nonetheless a government entity. In deciding that Amtrak was a state actor when it refused to lease advertising space to an artist's display because it was "political," the Court stated that "it is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak's status as a government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 971. The Court, in dicta, indicated that the issue of state action and technical labels that it was addressing also had relevance to the states, stating that "it cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form [since] [o]n that thesis, Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896)] can be resurrected by the simple device of having the State of Louisiana operate segregated trains through a state-owned Amtrak." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 972 (citations...