Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Civ. No. 95-CV-253-B.

• Decision Date: 08 August 1996
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 95-CV-253-B.
• Citation: 937 F. Supp. 957
• Parties: James BENJAMIN, Jr., M.D., Plaintiff, v. The AROOSTOOK MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

937 F. Supp. 957

James BENJAMIN, Jr., M.D., Plaintiff, v. The AROOSTOOK MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 95-CV-253-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

August 8, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Benjamin Jr., Ann Arbor, MI, pro se.

Christopher D. Nyhan, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Portland, ME, George C. Schelling, Gross, Minsky, Mogul & Singal, P.A., Bangor, ME, for Defendants.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRODY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Dr. James Benjamin sues his former employer The Aroostook Medical Center, Inc. ("TAMC" or "the hospital"), a nonprofit hospital located in northern Maine, numerous doctors and other staff members employed at TAMC. Dr. Benjamin filed a five-count Amended Complaint alleging, among other things, violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14, 15, 24, 26, racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and malicious abuse of report. Dr. Benjamin proceeds pro se.

Defendants have filed numerous motions in response, including a Motion to Bifurcate, several Motions in Limine and a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court addresses only the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it is dispositive. For the reasons that follow the Court grants that Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Dr. Benjamin is a physician of African-American descent, licensed to practice medicine in California, Connecticut, Maine and Minnesota. He maintains a specialty in internal medicine, and is certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine as having a "Specialty of Internal Medicine." Dr. Benjamin previously enjoyed various staff privileges at TAMC, and the loss of those privileges resulting from alleged discriminatory behavior form the basis of this suit. At the time of his termination Dr. Benjamin was the sole African-American physician at TAMC.

TAMC, a nonprofit hospital located in Presque Isle, allegedly maintains "a dominant position within the health care services market in the Presque Isle, Maine area." (Compl., ¶ V.) Neighboring hospitals in Caribou and Houlton are said to be inconvenient to Presque Isle residents. TAMC maintains a staff of approximately forty-five physicians, and only permits physicians with proper privileges to treat patients in its facilities. TAMC receives both state and federal funds for its operations, as well as various tax benefits due to its status as a charitable organization.

In February of 1992, Dr. Benjamin applied for staff privileges at TAMC. He was neither awarded, nor denied full privileges. Rather the hospital granted him a "provisional appointment," with the intention of reviewing the competency and proficiency of his work before making a decision as to permanent hospital privileges. Dr. Benjamin, however, maintains that his qualifications merited full staff privileges at the time of his original application, and that Caucasian applicants with comparable qualifications were awarded six month trial periods, while his lasted only about six weeks. (Compl. at ¶ XXXVIII.)

Dr. Benjamin claims that discrimination ultimately led to the termination of his clinical privileges in January of 1994. In September of 1993, TAMC first asked Dr. Benjamin to voluntarily resign his hospital privileges. Dr. Benjamin, however, refused. He remained at the hospital, but was allegedly subjected to continual discriminatory treatment by the TAMC staff. Dr. Benjamin claims TAMC discriminated against him in relation to medication orders, assigned nursing responsibilities, and personnel evaluations. In November, 1993, for example, the hospital allegedly failed to honor several discharge orders, and also allegedly unjustly refused to admit and treat one of his patients. TAMC also allegedly reassigned several of Dr. Benjamin's patients to other physicians. As Dr. Benjamin continued to admit patients, the hospital continued to reassign them. Later he was ordered to stop admitting new patients entirely, and ultimately had his privileges suspended upon the recommendation of TAMC's Medical Staff Executive Committee. According to Dr. Benjamin, TAMC never substantiated the grounds for his suspension or his later termination.

This alleged discrimination by TAMC staff members, Dr. Benjamin contends, did not end with the termination of his privileges at TAMC. When Dr. Benjamin applied for a job with the Cary Medical Center in Caribou, Maine, Cary required certain letters of reference and files from TAMC as part of the application process. TAMC refused both requests. Additionally, TAMC filed reports with the National Practitioner Data Bank and Maine State Board of Licensure in Medicine that allegedly unjustly criticized Dr. Benjamin's performance at TAMC. Dr. Benjamin challenges the veracity of these reports, and alleges that TAMC knew this information to be false.

II. Summary Judgment

A. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact, when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus it is axiomatic that summary judgment must be denied when disputes remain as to consequential facts — facts upon which the outcome may rely. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Menard v. First Sec. Servs. Corp., 848 F.2d 281, 285 (1st Cir.1988). Facts may be drawn from "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine, for summary judgment purposes, if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A material fact is one which has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law." Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995).

Summary judgment is also appropriate when the nonmoving party fails to put forth sufficient evidence to establish an element essential to its claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When the moving party demonstrates "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of a fact that is both material, as well as genuine. Id. Thus the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegations, but must adduce specific, provable facts demonstrating that there is a triable issue." Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 191 (1st Cir.1989). In the absence of such evidence, the moving party will prevail. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54.

B. Plaintiff's Evidence

Before analyzing the various counts below, the Court first addresses a fatal defect which permeates Plaintiff's entire response: a lack of proper evidence and substantiation. Plaintiff's response, and pleadings generally, almost wholly lack citation to necessary evidentiary sources. Dr. Benjamin cites little to no relevant affidavit testimony, other than several references to his own affidavit, no pertinent deposition testimony, or any answers to interrogatories substantiating his claims.¹ Consequently his claims represent no more than bare assertions insufficient to survive summary judgment. J. Geils Band Employee Ben. Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 USLW 3001 (Jun. 19, 1996) (No. 95-2050) ("Neither `conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation," nor `brash conjecture' coupled with earnest hope that something concrete will materialize, is sufficient to block summary judgment.") (internal citations omitted); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.1990) ("Neither wishful thinking nor `mere promises to produce admissible evidence at trial,' nor conclusory responses unsupported by evidence, will serve to defeat a properly focused Rule 56 motion.") (internal citations omitted).

While his twenty-one page Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment contains six references to his accompanying exhibits, these documents are of little evidentiary value, both in substance and form. For example, Dr. Benjamin's first exhibit, his own affidavit, is filled with unsubstantiated and hearsay-type evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, and is thus excluded for the purposes of summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir.1993). Dr. Benjamin's other exhibits include: references to the Court's docket sheet aimed at establishing the timeliness of his pleadings, and letters from an insurance carrier informing certain health care providers that Dr. Benjamin is not currently under suspension from Medicare Services, and that prior information to the contrary was inaccurate. While these materials are more likely admissible they nonetheless do not provide evidence relevant to the issues they are presented to support. Dr. Benjamin also includes various documents with his Complaint which are in large part legally irrelevant, including TAMC memoranda from various doctors stating they would no longer allow Dr. Benjamin to attend to their patients, letters of reference in support of Dr. Benjamin, as well as the memorandum announcing the termination of Dr. Benjamin's staff privileges at TAMC.

When matched against the substantive elements of his legal claims, Dr. Benjamin's evidence is plainly insufficient to bear out these claims. On this ground alone summary judgment must be granted, for Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plainly imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to make a "showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case...." Celotex, 477...