84 Hawai'i 56, State v. Ontai
| Decision Date | 21 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 18145,18145 |
| Citation | 929 P.2d 69 |
| Parties | 84 Hawai'i 56, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 9171 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Francis K. ONTAI, Defendant-Appellee, and Wade S. Nagata, Defendant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
John D. Yamane, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.
Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.
Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) appeals from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting Defendant-Appellee Francis K. Ontai's motion to dismiss indictment with prejudice as to Count II. Count II of the indictment alleged that Ontai committed Unlawful Ownership or Operation of Business, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 842-2(3) and 842-3 (1993). 1
On appeal, the prosecution argues: (1) the circuit court applied an incorrect definition of "enterprise" when it dismissed the indictment against Ontai; and (2) the prosecution produced sufficient evidence to support the indictment. 2 We affirm the circuit court's order; however, we do so based on reasoning slightly different from that of the circuit court.
On August 17, 1993, Officer Bryan Hew of the Honolulu Police Department testified in proceedings before a grand jury as follows. Officer Hew was assigned as an undercover officer for the narcotics/vice division, gambling detail. He had received special training on the game of dice or craps. In this game, "[p]ersons gather around a crap table or dice table, wager on different betting schemes, on what they believe the outcome of the roll will be." On June 15, 1991, Officer Hew went to 94-075 Poailani Circle and saw approximately twenty people gathered around a dice table. Wade Nagata was standing at one side of the table acting in the capacity of "box man." A box man is "the person responsible for paying off and accepting the wagers on the no-pass, the field, or the over-under betting schemes." Ontai stood on the other side of the table, with a croupier stick in his hand, acting in the capacity of "stick man." A stick man is
Officer Hew placed numerous bets with Nagata for a total amount of $1100. While Nagata accepted the bets, Ontai controlled the tempo of the game. He made sure that Nagata's wagers were set and settled before he would pass the dice to the roller. He also solicited the counter wagers from the roller and aided Nagata by soliciting wagers for field and over-under schemes.
Based on Officer Hew's testimony, the grand jury indicted Ontai for Promoting Gambling in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1221(1)(c) (Supp.1991); 3 and Unlawful Ownership or Operation of Business, in violation of HRS §§ 842-2(3) and 842-3 (1993). 4 Thereafter, a grand jury Before trial, Ontai filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the indictment on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence presented to the grand jury to support a finding of probable cause. On January 18, 1994, a hearing was held on the motion and the court took the matter under advisement. On May 19, 1994, the circuit court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting Ontai's motion to dismiss with prejudice as to Count II. The court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
[84 Hawai'i 59] bench warrant was issued and Ontai was arrested.
1. That Francis Ontai was charged in Count II, Illegal Ownership of a Business, in violation of H.R.S. § 842-0002[sic], as a result of an investigation by an undercover officer, Bryan Hew.
2. The undercover officer testified to the Grand Jury that on one date June 15, 1991 he observed a dice game during which Defendant Ontai acted as a stick man and Defendant Wade Nagata acted as a box man, and that Hew placed bets of $1,100.00 with Defendant Nagata.
3. The Grand Jury transcript indicates that Ontai was acting as a stick man only on that date, and that there was no other evidence that there was any other gambling activity, except for that date.
1. Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that as a matter of law that HRS § 842-2(3) requires evidence of an enterprise. In the case of U.S. v. Turkett [sic], 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) which case interpreted the Federal version of § 842-2(3), the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that an "enterprise" was an entity "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit."
2. There is insufficient evidence to show that, based upon this one occasion, there was an entity which satisfied the test laid down in Turkett [sic], and the State has failed to provide enough evidence to the Grand Jury, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State and drawing very [sic: "every"] reasonable inference therefrom, to show all of the elements of the crime charged.
Thereafter, the prosecution timely appealed.
of "Enterprise"
"An appellate court may freely review conclusions of law and the applicable standard of review is the right/wrong standard." Dan v. State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 428, 879 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) (quoting Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 270, 832 P.2d 259, 262 (1992)).
The prosecution argues that the circuit court applied an incorrect definition of the term "enterprise" when it dismissed the indictment against Ontai. According to the prosecution, the court should have applied the statutory definition found in HRS § 842-1 5 rather than the definition found in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The prosecution argues that because the statutory definition is clear and unambiguous on its face, the circuit court should have applied the statute's plain meaning.
We have repeatedly held that in construing statutes:
the fundamental starting point is the language of the statute itself.... [W]here the language is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.... When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. Put differently, a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more different senses. In construing an ambiguous statute ... the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.
State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995) ().
In the present case, the language of HRS § 842-1 does provide a definition of "enterprise." The portion of the statutory definition relevant to this case is: "[A]ny ... group of individuals associated for a particular purpose although not a legal entity." However, this definition is not entirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, the definition does not specify how long the individuals must be associated. Reasonably well-informed people could interpret the word "enterprise" as referring only to a long-term association, or they could interpret the word as also referring to an association lasting for a single event. Thus, the word "enterprise" carries "doubleness of meaning." Second, the statutory definition does not specify the amount of structure the enterprise is required to possess. Reasonably well-informed people could interpret "enterprise" as requiring an organizational structure beyond the racketeering acts, or they could interpret the word as requiring only the structure necessary to commit the acts. Thus, the word "enterprise" carries "doubleness of meaning" in this respect as well. For these reasons, the statute is ambiguous and construction is warranted. 6
The legislative history of HRS § 842-2 provides some guidance. The original act passed by the legislature indicated that the statute was primarily directed against "organized crime":
The Legislature finds that organized crime with its increasing affluence and power resulting from the investment of large sums of illegally procured wealth poses a significant threat to the safety and welfare of the State of Hawaii and that such illicit capital, seeking the protection of the corporation and other business laws of the State, could finance organized crime under the authority of law by creating legal entities fully clothed with respectability and capable of holding legal title to property.
The purpose of this Act is to authorize the attorney general to bring actions to forfeit the charters of domestic corporations, to cancel registrations and licenses of foreign corporations, to enjoin the operations of unincorporated businesses when such entities are infiltrated by organized crime, and further, to prohibit the ownership or operation of business by certain persons; to provide penalties and provisions for forfeiture of property; to provide provisions of restraining orders, civil remedies, evidence, civil investigative demands, prohibited affirmative defense, and the inspection of tax records by chiefs of police.
1972 Haw. Sess. L. Act 71, § 1 at 280. The committee reports likewise indicate that HRS § 842-2 was directed against organized crime: "The purpose of this bill is to curtail organized criminal activity in Hawaii." Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 668-72, in 1972 House Journal, at 967; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 492-72, in 1972 Senate Journal, at 956; Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No....
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Case Notes
...court concluded that Plaintiff- Appellant State "failed to produce evidence of an enterprise[,]" citing State v. Ontai, 84 Hawaii 56, 929 P.2d 69 (1996). The State appealed. The ICA distinguished Ontai, which involved an alleged associated-in-fact enterprise; the ICA held that a limited lia......