U.S. v. Owens

• Decision Date: 15 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-5074,87-5074
• Citation: 848 F.2d 462
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charlene M. OWENS, a/k/a Charlie, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 462

848 F.2d 462

57 USLW 2026

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charlene M. OWENS, a/k/a Charlie, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-5074.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 3, 1988.

Decided June 7, 1988.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1988.

Robert L. Bloom (Bloom & Julian, P.A., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for defendant-appellant.

James Christopher Savage, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty. (Breckinridge L. Willcox, U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before WINTER, Chief Judge, and CHAPMAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge:

Charlene M. Owens appeals from her drug-related convictions in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. Secs. 846 and 841(a)(1) (West 1981), and 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2 (West 1969). We affirm. ¹

I.

In October 1985 the Baltimore City Police Department began an investigation into what the government characterized as the "Elfe/Canady" heroin-trafficking organization. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service subsequently joined the investigation after several arrests and drug seizures. On June 25, 1986, after an extensive investigation including a series of wire communication interceptions, several search warrants were issued by a federal magistrate. One of the warrants described the place to be searched as "3901 Edgewood Road, Apartment 336, Baltimore, Maryland, ... a three-story multi-dwelling apartment house, brown entrance door, # 3901 affixed to premises, security lock on door."

The affidavit supporting this search warrant set forth facts which supported a probable cause finding that an apartment in the 3901 Edgewood Road building was leased to Michelle Cherry; that Owens (referred to by her co-conspirators as "Charlie") exercised control over this apartment; and that this apartment was being used as a storage place for heroin brought to Baltimore for distribution. Prior to applying for the warrant, records of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company were reviewed to determine the exact number of "Charlie's" apartment in building 3901. The records listed the apartment number as 336. ²

Within hours after this warrant was issued but prior to its execution, Phillip Wilson, an individual identified as a participant in the drug operation, was arrested. Wilson confirmed the factual assertion in the affidavit that an apartment in the 3901 Edgewood Road building was being used as a storage house for drugs. He admitted that he had recently delivered a shipment of narcotics to "Charlie's" apartment at 3901 Edgewood, which Wilson explained was the apartment located on the third floor on the right side.

On the morning of June 26, 1986 officers began to simultaneously execute five warrants. The officers executing the warrant at 3901 Edgewood had also prepared the supporting affidavit. They forced entry through the common door of building 3901 on the ground floor and proceeded to the third floor. There they discovered that there were two apartments on that floor but neither apartment was numbered 336. The apartment on the left was vacant and as the district court found, there was "no indication that anyone had ever occupied it." The apartment on the right was numbered 324. The officers knocked on the door of this apartment, and after receiving no response, they forcibly entered. Owens, who identified herself to the officers as "Charlie," was found sitting in a bedroom. A briefcase from the bedroom closet was seized and later searched. It contained 600 bags of heroin which provided a basis for Owens' subsequent convictions.

Prior to trial, Owens sought to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment on the ground that the warrant was invalid. Following an evidentiary hearing, the suppression motion was denied by the district court. The court determined that the evidence was admissible on the basis that exigent circumstances justified the entry and search. Since the search was lawfully conducted pursuant to the warrant we need not address the validity of the search based on exigent circumstances.

II.

The fourth amendment provides that search warrants will not issue unless they particularly describe the place to be searched. Evidence seized in violation of the particularity requirement is subject to suppression pursuant to the judicially created exclusionary rule. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, 34 S.Ct. 341, 346, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

The particularity requirement prohibits general, exploratory searches. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). A warrant meets the particularity requirement "if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended." Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925). An erroneous description in the warrant, however, does not necessarily invalidate a warrant and subsequent search. United States v. Ridinger, 805 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1092 (11th Cir.1986). As the Supreme Court has recently stated, limitations on the execution of search warrants should be examined in light of "the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in [this] dangerous and difficult process." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1018, 94 L.Ed.2d 72, 82 (1987).

Moreover, the exclusionary rule has undergone significant change in recent years, exemplified by the adoption of a good faith exception to the rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The Court in Leon considered "whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." Id. at 900, 104 S.Ct. at 3409. The Court found that when an officer acts in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant, the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be furthered by suppression of relevant and probative evidence.

In Leon, police officers obtained a warrant to search for drugs based upon an informant's tip. The warrant, although facially valid, was lacking in probable cause due to the insufficiency of the informant's credibility. Both the district court and the court of appeals found the evidence seized to be inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate." Id. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 3422.

The Court also provided guidance on applying its newly-created warrant exception by listing four situations in which it would not be objectively reasonable for police officers to rely on a warrant. First, the Court stated that officers may not rely on a warrant issued on the basis of a deliberately false affidavit. Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420. Officers also cannot rely on a warrant where the magistrate has wholly abandoned his neutral and detached role. Id. Further, a warrant may not be relied upon if it is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance by police officers would be unreasonable. Id. Finally, officers will not be allowed to claim reliance on a warrant if it is "so facially deficient--i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Id. It is important to note in regard to this last situation that the Court did not state that police officers can never reasonably rely on a facially deficient warrant. Indeed, in the companion case to Leon the Court held that the officers executing a search warrant were justified in relying on it even though it was facially deficient. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984).

The search warrant in Sheppard failed to describe with particularity the items to be seized. An officer had presented a magistrate with a warrant form for controlled substances because it was the only form he had access to during the weekend. The officer received the assurance of the magistrate that the necessary changes would be made so that the warrant authorized a search for evidence of a homicide. The magistrate, however, failed to make the requisite changes and the warrant executed by the officer was therefore technically deficient for failure to particularly describe the items to be seized. The Supreme Court upheld the officer's reliance on the warrant stating that "the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid." Id. at 987-88, 104 S.Ct. at 3427.

More recently, the Court in Garrison articulated the standards by which a search pursuant to a warrant should be judged. In Garrison, the Court upheld the validity of a search conducted at the wrong apartment. The warrant described the premises to be searched as "2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment." Relying on records of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company ³ the police reasonably concluded that the third floor contained only one apartment and that it was occupied by Lawrence McWebb. Actually, there were two apartments on the third floor, the second belonging to Garrison. After Garrison's apartment had been searched and narcotics and drug paraphernalia seized, the police realized that the third floor contained two apartments and that they had searched the wrong one. The Court affirmed Garrison's conviction holding that a search warrant must...