Robinson v. State, No. 75244
| Decision Date | 25 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 75244 |
| Citation | 854 S.W.2d 393 |
| Parties | Steven Terrell ROBINSON, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Dave Hemingway, St. Louis, for appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Spillane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Mr. Robinson appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his Rule 24.035 motion under the escape rule. The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Upon Mr. Robinson's application, we granted transfer to examine the issue of whether the escape rule may properly be used to dismiss a post-conviction motion that alleges error occurring after the movant's return to custody. Because we conclude that the escape rule does not apply in that situation, we reverse.
In exchange for the State's promise to recommend a sentence of five years for each count, Mr. Robinson pleaded guilty to burglary in the second degree and stealing over $150, both class C felonies. A sentencing date was set and Mr. Robinson was released on his own recognizance. Mr. Robinson did not appear for the sentencing hearing; a capias warrant issued about a week later; and Mr. Robinson was eventually arrested less than one month after the date of the sentencing hearing. 1 After his capture, Mr. Robinson was sentenced to serve two, concurrent, ten-year terms of imprisonment rather than the two, five-year terms he had been promised. Mr. Robinson personally complained about this variation at sentencing, and the court noted his objection.
Mr. Robinson filed a pro se 24.035 motion challenging the variation between the sentences recommended in the plea arrangement and the sentences actually imposed. The court then appointed counsel, who filed an amended motion reiterating Mr. Robinson's pro se claims and adding the argument that Mr. Robinson should either be resentenced in accordance with the plea agreement or be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. Robinson's complaint is much like that faced by this Court in Schellert v. State, 569 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. banc 1978) (deciding case on grounds of "substantial fairness" before adoption of Rule 24.02(d)(4) mandating such a procedure). See also Rule 24.02(d)(4); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); State v. Simpson, 836 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo.App.1992) (); Proctor v. State, 809 S.W.2d 32, 34-35 (Mo.App.1991) ().
The State moved to dismiss Mr. Robinson's Rule 24.035 motion because of his escape. Following a brief hearing at which no evidence was adduced by either party, the trial court dismissed Mr. Robinson's Rule 24.035 motion for the reason that, by absconding, Mr. Robinson had waived all right to post-conviction relief.
As a preliminary matter, we must examine what issues are properly before us. As we read Mr. Robinson's brief in this Court, it asserts that the escape rule does not apply to his case because none of the rationales supporting the escape rule apply. Also included in the points relied on and argument is the proposition that it is unconstitutional to apply the escape rule to someone in Mr. Robinson's position. The State argues that the constitutional claims have not been preserved because they were not raised at the earliest opportunity, i.e., the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss. Because we conclude that the escape rule does not apply in this situation, we need not reach the issue of whether, if it applied, Mr. Robinson's constitutionally protected rights would be violated. Thus, the issue of whether these constitutional arguments have been preserved is moot. Mr. Robinson's attorney objected to dismissal and argued that the rule should not apply to anyone in his situation; the objection and argument at the hearing preserved the non-constitutional argument asserted in this Court.
As an appellate court reviewing the disposition of a Rule 24.035 motion, our inquiry is "limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous." Rule 24.035(j). In this case, we are not reviewing Mr. Robinson's 24.035 motion. Rather, we are reviewing the decision of the trial court to dismiss the motion under the escape rule. Because the court's decision was clearly erroneous, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Our analysis begins with an examination of the escape rule.
The first Missouri case applying the escape rule is typical of the early use of the rule and exemplifies the original rationale for the rule. State v. Carter, 98 Mo. 431, 11 S.W. 979 (1889). In Carter, this Court explained:
That a party appealing, who breaks jail pending such appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law, and places himself in a position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile, keeping out of the reach of justice, and prepared to render the judgment of reversal nugatory or not, at his option. To permit such a course of conduct to be successful would be trifling with justice, and will not be tolerated; ....
Id. at 432-33, 11 S.W. at 980.
Strictly viewed, the rationale of Carter does not apply except when the defendant remains at large when the time comes to decide the case on appeal; if the defendant has been recaptured, the court is entirely capable of enforcing its judgment and need not fear that its order might be rendered worthless by the absence of the defendant. However, courts have found additional underpinnings to justify the use of the rule in cases where the defendant has been recaptured before the appellate court could rule on the case. In State v. Wright, 763 S.W.2d 167 (Mo.App.1988), the Court of Appeals, Western District, reviewed the rule and explained that the rule was justified because long absences cause administrative problems. Wright, 763 S.W.2d at 168. The court also noted that the rule discourages escape and promotes the dignified operation of the appellate court. Id.
For a time, some circuits of the United States Court of Appeals extended the rule to persons who escaped and were recaptured during trial or who escaped after trial but before sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir.1982). Relying on the federal cases, the court of appeals has used the escape rule to dismiss appeals challenging errors occurring before the defendant's escape and recapture even when the defendant remained in custody during the entire appellate process. See, e.g., State v. Kearns, 743 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.App.1987) (citing Holmes ). 2
Apparently this case presents an issue of first impression in this state; the parties have been unable to unearth a Missouri case in which the escape rule was used to dismiss an appeal or post-conviction motion alleging error occurring after the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McElroy v. Eagle Star Group, Inc.
... ... whose counsel in an abundance of caution or by mistake file premature notices of appeal ... " State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Tate, 576 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. banc 1979). Therefore, Eagle Star's ... ...
-
Branch v. Turner
...unlawful flight, promotes the dignity of appellate court proceedings, and preserves respect for the legal system. Robinson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo.1993) (en banc); Wright, 763 S.W.2d at Without suggesting that Branch's failure to appear interfered with the appellate process, threa......
-
Wartenbe v. State
...a less than diligent manner secure in the knowledge that any errors resulting from procedural short cuts would not result in reversal." 854 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Mo. banc 1993). Importantly, Robinson dealt with allegations of court error that occurred after the defendant was returned to custody.......
-
State v. Troupe
...application of the escape rule discourages escape and encourages voluntary surrender. Kearns, 743 S.W.2d at 555. Recently, in Robinson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Mo. banc 1993), this Court recognized that the escape rule should not be applied to dismiss challenges to post-capture errors......