Smith v. Springer

• Decision Date: 31 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-2452,87-2452
• Citation: 859 F.2d 31
• Parties: Theodore SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry SPRINGER, Richard O'Connell, and Daniel Chilla, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 31

859 F.2d 31

Theodore SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry SPRINGER, Richard O'Connell, and Daniel Chilla,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-2452.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 7, 1988.

Decided Aug. 31, 1988.

Kenneth N. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

L. Anita Richardson, Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and MANION, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Chief Judge.

On May 12, 1968, Theodore Smith was arrested and charged with the rape of Shirley Johnson. Ms. Johnson had reported a rape to the Chicago Police Department on April 25, 1968. Chicago police officers escorted her to Billings Hospital at the University of Chicago where a doctor examined her. The doctor took a vaginal smear which failed to show the presence of sperm. According to a police report introduced at Smith's trial, Officer Daniel Chilla, picked up a second swab from a hospital clerk, R. Brown, and took it to the police crime laboratory where tests uncovered evidence of sperm. Subsequently, Smith was arrested and convicted for rape. The Illinois Appellate Court upheld Smith's conviction and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Smith leave to appeal. Smith served three years and five months at the state penitentiary before his release on July 30, 1976.

Upon release from prison, Smith began to investigate the factual circumstances leading up to his conviction. Smith went to Billings Hospital and spoke to an administrator who informed him that the hospital had never employed a clerk named "R. Brown." On the basis of this disclosure, Smith filed this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 lawsuit alleging that the defendants, three Chicago police officers, fabricated evidence against him to secure his conviction. ¹ Two years later, during discovery in this action, Smith learned that Billings Hospital had in fact employed a clerk named R. Brown. When Smith finally located and spoke with Brown, however, Brown denied that he ever gave police any lab samples relating to Smith's rape prosecution. Smith then withdrew his claim that Brown did not exist and argued instead that Brown never furnished lab samples to the defendants.

This new allegation did not alter Smith's claim that the defendants fabricated evidence which led to his conviction. Smith also alleged that the defendants Springer and O'Connell chose to pursue Smith because he refused to bribe them. Smith claimed that earlier in 1968 he paid these two officers $220.00 to avoid battery charges and that when he refused to bribe them again to avoid the rape charge, he was arrested on the next day.

The district court granted the motion for summary judgment of the three remaining defendants on the grounds that Smith's lawsuit was a collateral attack on a state court conviction in federal court and was therefore barred. The district court concluded that

the plaintiff already has received the only remedy which a prisoner attacking a State court conviction can attain--his freedom. Providing a free person with a damages remedy unavailable to one in prison when the claims involved are essentially the same would mean creating a distinction without a difference in the law.

Because we find that Smith's claim is not a collateral attack on his wrongful state court conviction, we reverse.

I.

The district court rested its decision on two Seventh Circuit cases which held that section 1983 does not create a cause of action in federal courts for plaintiffs who attack the validity of their state court criminal convictions. See Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.1980); and Hanson v. Circuit Court of First Judicial Circuit, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.1979). Hanson involved a claim filed by a prisoner who was convicted and fined in Illinois and later convicted and imprisoned in California on another unrelated charge. The plaintiff sought "declaratory relief invalidating the Illinois judgment of conviction." Id. at 409. Initially, the plaintiff asked for relief through a habeas corpus petition. We held that the plaintiff was not entitled to habeas relief because his "fine-only conviction" did not place him in custody within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Id. at 405-07. Anticipating this result, the plaintiff argued alternatively that his habeas petition alleged a valid cause of action under section 1983. In other words, the plaintiff, a prisoner in California, sought to use the federal courts via section 1983 to declare his Illinois conviction invalid. We viewed this as a collateral attack on the state court's judgment of conviction and followed the Supreme Court's holding in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), that "habeas corpus provides the exclusive federal remedy for prisoners attacking the fact or duration of their confinement." Id. at 410.

We reaffirmed this holding in Waste Management, where a corporation filed a suit under section 1983 to seek "a declaration of the constitutional invalidity of the state court conviction" as well as other equitable relief. Waste Management, 614 F.2d at 139 n. 3. The corporation chose this avenue because corporations can never satisfy the custody requirement of section 2254. Relying on Hanson, we found this use of section 1983 improper and reiterated our view that Congress intended "section 2254 [to] be the sole avenue of collateral attack of state court convictions." Id. at 141.

These two cases, however, bear little resemblance to the facts before us. Unlike the section 1983 plaintiffs in Hanson and Waste Management, Smith does not seek a declaration from a federal court that his conviction was invalid; nor does Smith seek any other form of equitable relief. Smith does not directly challenge the validity of his conviction. He does not attack the fact nor the length of his confinement--nor could he, since he has already served his time. Smith filed his section 1983 action after he was already released from custody. Rather, Smith's lawsuit seeks monetary damages from the police officers who allegedly fabricated evidence which led to his conviction. His section 1983 claim challenges the legality of the conduct of the officers and does not impugn the integrity of the state judicial system. Although the correctness of Smith's conviction may be seriously undermined if he succeeds on his claim, he does not seek this result directly. His lawsuit challenges the conduct of the police officers and not the actions or procedures of the Illinois courts. ² Thus, Smith's section 1983 claim is not a collateral attack on his state court conviction and Waste Management and Hanson are therefore inapposite.

This characterization of Smith's claim is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Preiser, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827. There the Court held that when a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and seeks a determination that he is entitled to an immediate or speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. The Court, however, explicitly excepted from its holding a damages action by prisoners.

If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release--the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy.

Id. at 494, 93 S.Ct. at 1838 (emphasis in original). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2973-74, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (holding that, although a state prisoner may not sue under section 1983 to restore good time credits, he may sue for damages stemming from unconstitutional prison conditions). Moreover, a state prisoner may bring his damages action in federal court without exhausting his state remedies. Id. Thus, under Preiser and Wolff, even a prisoner may bring a section 1983 action for damages in certain circumstances.

The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983), further elaborated the distinction between damages actions under section 1983 and habeas corpus attacks on state court convictions. The Haring Court held that a prisoner who pled guilty and was convicted and sentenced may nevertheless bring a section 1983 damages action against police officers whose allegedly unlawful conduct contributed to his conviction. The unanimous Court reasoned that the prisoner was not collaterally estopped on the basis of his prior state court judgment from litigating his claim that the officers conducted an illegal search because the legality of the search was never actually litigated, the state court proceedings did not decide against the prisoner on any element of his section 1983 claim and, finally, a determination of the legality of the police officers' conduct "would not have been essential to the trial court's acceptance of [the prisoner's] guilty plea." Id. at 316, 103 S.Ct. at 2374. The Court noted that the prisoner's section 1983 action did not challenge his conviction because his Fourth Amendment claim was "irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the conviction." Id. at 321, 103 S.Ct. at 2377.

Smith's section 1983 claim challenging the legality of the police conduct is distinct from the issue whether Smith committed a rape. Whether the defendants fabricated evidence against Smith does not directly determine Smith's guilt or innocence. The defendants, relying primarily on Smith's pro se complaint, go to some lengths to characterize his claim as a collateral attack on his conviction. They note that his complaint alleges that

[T]he above described conduct of the defendant[s] ... deprived plaintiff, Theodore Smith, of his liberty for 3 years and 6 months. And deprived him of his rights under the...