Simpson v. Rowan

• Decision Date: 29 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-3250,93-3250
• Citation: 73 F.3d 134
• Parties: Robert SIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tim ROWAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 134

73 F.3d 134

Robert SIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tim ROWAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-3250.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued July 6, 1995.

Decided Dec. 29, 1995.

Jerold S. Solovy, Richard P. Steinken, Christopher C. Dickinson (argued), Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for Robert Simpson.

Jeffrey D. Greenspan, Michael W. Tootooian, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, Chicago, IL, for Alexander Dimare, Sergeant DiCarlo.

James J. Jozefowicz (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago, IL, Terry L. McDonald, Jeremy C. Schwartz, Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County Charles E. Hervas, James G. Sotos, Michael W. Condon (argued), Michael D. Bersani, Hervas, Sotos & Condon, Itasca, IL, for D. Shilling, Joyce Thillman, Mark Alvarado, Rich Sommer, Martin O'Connell, Pete Satriano.

Federal Litigation Division, Chicago, IL, for Mary D. Mallo, Ken Goff, Mike Baumel.

Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Robert Simpson, an Illinois prisoner whose conviction for felony murder is on appeal before the state supreme court, appeals from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 damage action against several police officers and assistant state's attorneys. Simpson alleged that he was falsely arrested, that his apartment was improperly searched without a warrant, and that defendants conspired to deprive him of various constitutional rights. The principal issue on appeal is whether the district court properly dismissed Simpson's action on the basis of Younger abstention. We hold that Younger does apply, but that the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed those claims that are not foreclosed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Heck bars Simpson's claims that do not allege violations under the Fourth Amendment.

BACKGROUND

In May 1992, Simpson was arrested in connection with the robbery of a grocery store and the shooting death of one of its patrons. He was charged with felony murder. While awaiting trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Simpson filed an eleven-count, civil rights complaint in February 1993 against several Riverdale and Glenwood police officers, as well as certain assistant state's attorneys. Simpson's pro se complaint essentially alleged that he was falsely arrested on the felony murder charge and that his apartment was wrongfully searched without a warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Simpson also charged defendants with malicious prosecution and conspiracy to obstruct justice, deprive him of his right to equal protection, and deny him his right to counsel. Simpson did not, however, seek injunctive or declaratory relief; rather, he sought $6.1 million in compensatory and punitive damages based on defendants' alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

In June 1993, Simpson was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County of felony murder. He was sentenced to death. ¹

In August 1993, the district court abstained from granting any relief under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), holding that the issues raised in Simpson's Sec. 1983 action "will necessarily involve the very issues to be considered on appeal in the state court proceeding." Simpson v. Rowan, No. 93 C 534, 1993 WL 311783, at * 1 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 12, 1993). Rather than staying the case, however, the district court dismissed the action in its entirety. In January 1994, Simpson appealed the district court's judgment. ²

DISCUSSION

I. Heck v. Humphrey

Simpson's suit to recover damages attributable to an allegedly unconstitutional conspiracy, search, and arrest implicates issues recently addressed in Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), decided during the pendency of this appeal. In Heck, the Sec. 1983 plaintiff sued county prosecutors and a state police investigator for engaging in unlawful acts in an effort to secure the plaintiff's state court conviction. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2368. Affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's action, the Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a Sec. 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. The Court added that because of doctrines like independent source, inevitable discovery, and harmless error, a successful Sec. 1983 action challenging the legality of a search "would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful." Id. at n. 7.

Simpson contends that Heck does not bar his federal suit because his unlawful search and arrest claims ³ do not challenge his outstanding conviction or sentence. He acknowledges that these claims are "connected with" and "related to" his arrest and conviction on the felony murder charge, but contends that Heck requires "much more ... before claims may be dismissed." We agree.

Simpson's claims relating to an illegal search and an improper arrest are not barred by Heck because neither claim, if successful, would necessarily undermine the validity of his conviction for felony murder. Perez v. Sifel, 57 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Heck, --- U.S. at ---- n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 n. 7 and Smith v. Springer, 859 F.2d 31 (7th Cir.1988)); see also Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir.1995) ("It is well established that a claim of unlawful arrest, standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the validity of a criminal prosecution following the arrest."); but cf. Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir.1995) ("The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation may not necessarily cause an illegal conviction does not lessen the requirement [under Heck ] that a plaintiff show that a conviction was invalid as an element of constitutional injury."). Simpson does not challenge his conviction or his sentence. Because an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid conviction, a conviction generally need not be set aside in order for a plaintiff to pursue a Sec. 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 322, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 2377, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983). Heck does not preclude Simpson from raising Fourth Amendment claims in his federal action. Until the ongoing criminal case has run its course, it will be difficult to ascertain the relationship, if any, that exists between the two cases.

We note that Simpson's complaint lumped many of his constitutional claims together--the same alleged conspiracy, for instance, led to his malicious prosecution, the deprivation of his equal protection rights, the denial of his right to counsel, and obstruction of justice. Unlike Simpson's Fourth Amendment claims, these constitutional claims, if proven, would necessarily invalidate Simpson's conviction. Because Simpson has not yet successfully challenged his conviction, these claims are barred by Heck and should be dismissed without prejudice. ⁴

II. Younger Abstention

Having concluded that Simpson's Fourth Amendment claims survive Heck, we next We review de novo a district court's decision to abstain under Younger. Trust & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 293-94 (7th Cir.1994); but cf. Storment v. O'Malley, 938 F.2d 86, 88 (7th Cir.1991) (applying abuse of discretion standard). In addition, we liberally construe Simpson's pro se complaint, which he filed before counsel was appointed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1100, 130 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1995).

turn to Simpson's argument that the district court improperly decided to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Simpson challenges that decision on the ground that his Sec. 1983 action sought monetary damages for injury caused by an illegal arrest and search--claims which he asserts "in no way" impeach the validity of his conviction for felony murder. Because adjudication of his Fourth Amendment claims would not invalidate his conviction, Simpson argues, the district court need not have abstained to avoid "interference" with the state court.

In Younger, the Supreme Court held that absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings. 401 U.S. at 53, 91 S.Ct. at 754. That holding rested partly on traditional principles of equity, but was based primarily on the "even more vital consideration" of comity. Id. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750. Comity refers to "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. The Court has extended the holding in Younger to cases in which the relief requested was something other than an injunction in state court. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (abstention appropriate when relief sought is a declaratory judgment, which would have same disruptive effect on state proceedings as an injunction).

One of the primary issues in the present case is whether the Younger doctrine can properly be extended to this type of suit. Neither the Supreme...