U.S. v. Marmolejo

• Decision Date: 13 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-60812,94-60812
• Citation: 86 F.3d 404
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brigido MARMOLEJO, Jr. and Mario Salinas, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 404

86 F.3d 404

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brigido MARMOLEJO, Jr. and Mario Salinas, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 94-60812.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 13, 1996.

Gerald H. Goldstein and Cynthia Hujar Orr, Goldstein, Goldstein & Hilley, San Antonio, TX, for Marmolejo.

Francisco J. Enriquez, Gonzalez & Enriquez, McAllen, TX, for Salinas.

Paula C. Offenhauser, Asst. U.S. Atty., Gaynelle G. Jones, U.S. Atty., Houston, TX, Richard A. Friedman, and Bob Erickson, Atty., Dept. of Justice Cr. Div., Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Brigido Marmolejo, Jr. and Mario Salinas, the former Sheriff and Chief Deputy Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas were convicted of various offenses arising from a series of bribes that Marmolejo received, and Salinas aided and abetted, in exchange for permitting conjugal visits for a federal prisoner housed at the Hidalgo County Jail. Marmolejo appeals his conviction and his sentence. Salinas appeals only his conviction. We affirm both defendants' convictions, but vacate Marmolejo's sentence and remand for resentencing.

I

While Marmolejo was the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, Homero Beltran-Aguirre (Beltran) was a federal prisoner housed at the Hidalgo County Jail pursuant to an agreement between the United States Marshals Service and Hidalgo County. ¹ As Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Marmolejo was in charge of the operation of the Hidalgo County Jail. Salinas was Marmolejo's immediate subordinate as the Divisional Chief for Detention of the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office.

Beltran was housed at the Hidalgo County Jail on two separate occasions: first, from June 7, 1991 to April 14, 1992, and second, from November 6, 1992 to April 26, 1993. The series of bribes comprising the pattern of racketeering charged in the indictment against Marmolejo and Salinas occurred during these periods.

As a result of the bribery scheme between Marmolejo and Beltran, Marmolejo and Salinas were convicted of numerous offenses. A jury found Marmolejo guilty of violating RICO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), two counts of bribery in relation to a program receiving more than $10,000 in federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, aiding and abetting money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, two counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and travel in interstate commerce to promote bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). A jury found Salinas guilty of RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and two counts of bribery in relation to a program receiving more than $10,000 in federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Both defendants filed timely appeals.

II

Marmolejo and Salinas argue several points of error concerning their convictions for bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), which prohibits theft and bribery by officials of state and local agencies that receive federal funds. ² We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820, 109 S.Ct. 62, 102 L.Ed.2d 39 (1988). "Courts in applying criminal laws generally must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language. '[O]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions' in the legislative history will justify departure from that language." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2902, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985) (citations omitted) (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 105 S.Ct. 479, 482, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984)).

A

Section 666(b) restricts the statute to agencies that receive "in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance." 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The defendants contend that the district court did not have jurisdiction to try the bribery counts under 18 U.S.C. § 666 because Hidalgo County did not receive "benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program" or any "other form of Federal assistance." Id.

The parties dispute whether it is proper, in determining whether Hidalgo County Jail received Federal assistance, to focus on (1) a Cooperative Agreement Plan (CAP), which provided a $850,000 grant for construction at the Hidalgo County Jail, and an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGA), which provided that Hidalgo County Jail would house federal prisoners in exchange for their costs, or (2) just IGA. ³ This issue is relevant not only to determine whether the arrangement constituted a Federal program or Federal assistance, but also to determine whether Hidalgo County satisfies the requirement that it received the benefit within a one year period. ⁴

The plain language of § 666(b) is ambiguous in defining "Federal program" and "Federal assistance." Although it is clear that the assistance can consist of a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, or insurance, the other defining qualities of "Federal assistance" are still unclear. The legislative history, however, provides that the term "Federal program involving a grant, a contract, a subsidy, a loan, a guarantee, insurance, or another form of Federal assistance" should be construed broadly. S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 1, 369 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511 [hereinafter S.Rep. No. 225]. We must determine, therefore, whether under a broad interpretation of "Federal assistance," it is proper to analyze IGA and CAP collectively as a single agreement because they are so interrelated.

IGA and CAP were entered into in 1984 to establish and govern relations between the U.S. Marshals Service and Hidalgo County. CAP was the first agreement; it provided for "Federal participation in the funding of local governmental jail construction, renovation or improvement programs" and was "predicated upon the Federal government's requirement for detention space and services and the local government's provision of such services." As a condition to the receipt of this grant, Hidalgo County Jail had to guarantee that it would provide detention space for federal prisoners. The second agreement, IGA, established the actual formal relationship between the U.S. Marshals Service and other federal user agencies and Hidalgo County for the detention of federal prisoners. Although Hidalgo County had already guaranteed that it would provide such space, IGA established the specific provisions and requirements of the agreement including the compensation that Hidalgo County would receive.

These agreements are so interrelated that they must be viewed collectively as one agreement, especially given the fact that the grant issued pursuant to CAP was conditioned on the agreement in IGA. Having reviewed the nature and purposes of CAP and IGA, we conclude that together they constituted "Federal assistance" or a "Federal program" under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b), consisting of a grant, CAP, and a contract, IGA. Our holding is supported by the broad construction of § 666(b) mandated in the legislative history. S.Rep. No. 225 at 3511.

Focusing exclusively on IGA, the defendants argue that the arrangement between Hidalgo County and the U.S. Marshals Service was a commercial transaction. In urging that this is a commercial transaction, the defendants emphasize the fact that the U.S. Marshals Service received something in return for the funds it provided to Hidalgo County. ⁵

The legislative history again demonstrates why the defendants' argument must fail. The Senate Report states that the goal in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 666 was to protect the integrity of federal funds by punishing theft and bribery involving Federal programs for which there is "a specific statutory scheme authorizing the Federal assistance in order to promote or achieve certain policy objectives." S.Rep. No. 225 at 3510. Focusing on this legislative history, the Second Circuit in United States v. Rooney, 986 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.1993) rejected a quid pro quo argument similar to that argued by Marmolejo and Salinas. The Rooney court stated that the proper focus in determining whether federal funds constitute "Federal assistance" under § 666(b) is "whether the funds disbursed can be considered Federal assistance within a specific statutory scheme intended to promote public policy objectives and not payments by the government as a commercial entity." Rooney, 986 F.2d at 35. Finding that the statute equated "benefit" with "Federal assistance," the Second Circuit held that an Farmers Home Administration loan could constitute Federal assistance under § 666(b), despite the fact that the defendant was obligated to repay the loan plus interest, because the money the defendant received was authorized by a specific statute to accomplish specific policy goals established by Congress. Id. at 34-35.

Likewise, in this case, the funds that the federal government provided for Hidalgo County were authorized by a specific statute and were intended to further public policy goals. The fact that Hidalgo County housed federal prisoners in return for the money it received from the United States Marshals Service does not preclude the arrangement from being a Federal program under § 666(b). The federal funds were authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4002 to fulfill the federal government's policy of providing "suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress," 18 U.S.C. § 4002, and as stated in CAP, to provide for "[f]ederal participation in the funding of local governmental jail construction, renovation or...