In re Petition of Blades, 6661
| Decision Date | 11 January 1939 |
| Docket Number | 6661 |
| Citation | 59 Idaho 682,86 P.2d 737 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Petition of WILLIAM BLADES for Writ of Habeas Corpus |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
HABEAS CORPUS - REVIEW BY SUPREME COURT - WHO MAY APPEAL - GROUNDS FOR RELIEF-COLLATERAL ATTACK.
1. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings brought originally in district court. (I. C. A sec. 11-201.)
2. "Party aggrieved," as used in statute permitting "party aggrieved" to appeal in prescribed cases, is person injuriously affected by judgment, whether named as plaintiff, defendant, or intervenor, and whether or not named in caption, pleadings, or judgment. (I. C. A., sec. 11-103.)
3. Generally, the state itself may appeal from a judgment discharging a petitioner from custody on habeas corpus, as a "party aggrieved." (I. C. A., sec. 11-103.)
4. The warden of state penitentiary from whose custody accused had been discharged on habeas corpus was entitled to appeal under statute as a "party aggrieved." (I. C. A., sec 11-103.)
5. "Habeas corpus" is a collateral remedy and an assault on a judgment of conviction.
6. In habeas corpus proceedings, where nothing to contrary appears in record of conviction, it is conclusively presumed that court had full jurisdiction and that all proceedings were regular.
7. Entries in record of a court of general jurisdiction import verity, and cannot be questioned on habeas corpus.
8. Generally, manner and method of selecting trial jury cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceeding.
9. Where record of conviction disclosed that accused was tried by jury of 12 men, alleged disqualification of juror which did not appear on voir dire consisting of fact that juror was an unpardoned felon could not be questioned on habeas corpus.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Charles F. Koelsch, Judge.
Application for writ of habeas corpus. Writ granted and petitioner ordered discharged and released. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
J. W Taylor, Attorney General, and R. W. Beckwith, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant.
A petition for the writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction. (In re Allen, 31 Idaho 295, 170 P. 921.)
All presumptions are in favor of a judgment of a court of record and every reasonable intendment must be indulged to sustain such a judgment, and petitioner in habeas corpus proceeding has burden of proof. (State v. Miller, 52 Idaho 33, 10 P.2d 955; Pedersen v. Moore, 32 Idaho 420, 184 P. 475; Ex parte Murray, 39 Nev. 351, 157 P. 647; Ex parte Loundagin, 129 Ore. 652, 278 P. 950.)
State may appeal in habeas corpus proceedings. (Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364; In re Jennings, 46 Idaho 142, 267 P. 227.)
Ariel L. Crowley, for Respondent.
The warden is without statutory or any right to appeal from a judgment discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus. He is a mere ministerial officer, obliged to obey process, not to question it. (Chap. 3, Title 20, I. C. A., sec. 11-103; Rural High School Dist. v. School Dist., 32 Idaho 325, 182 P. 859; Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Idaho County, 34 Idaho 191, 200 P. 128; Oatman v. Hampton, 43 Idaho 675, 256 P. 529; Kootenai County v. White, 53 Idaho 804, 805, 27 P.2d 977; see 10 A. L. R. 386 and cases in note II; Knowlton v. Baker, 72 Me. 202; In re Bishop, 172 Mass. 35, 51 N.E. 191; Burr v. Foster, 132 Ala. 41, 31 So. 495.)
The presence of a person under constitutional disqualification on a jury, vitiates the verdict, which being void, is open to attack by habeas corpus. (Ex parte Cox, 3 Idaho 530, 32 P. 197, 95 Am. St. 29; State v. Kelley, 39 Idaho 668, 229 P. 659; Johnson v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. 162, 84 S.W.2d 240; Amaya v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. 160, 220 S.W. 98.)
William Blades was charged with, tried and convicted of the crime of burglary and sentenced to serve a term of years in the state penitentiary. Thereafter he petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, attacking the judgment upon the ground that one of the jurors, Carl W. Reamer, was at the time he acted as a juror an unpardoned felon, having been convicted of a felony in the state of Washington. The district court entered judgment releasing William Blades from custody of the warden of the state penitentiary and the state upon relation of the warden instituted this appeal.
Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of authority on the part of the warden to take the appeal, it being urged the warden cannot question the validity of process regular on its face, by which he is commanded to discharge the prisoner, the warden not being an aggrieved party entitled to appeal within the contemplation of section 11-103, I. C. A.
It has heretofore been determined that this court has jurisdiction under C. S., sec. 7152, now sec. 11-201, I. C. A., in habeas corpus proceedings brought originally in the district court. (In re Jennings, 46 Idaho 142, 267 P. 227.) It is provided by section 11-103, I. C. A., that:
The notice of the appeal herein recited that:
"the State of Idaho on relation of Pearl C. Meredith, Warden of the Idaho State Penitentiary, hereby appeals. . . ."
"Party aggrieved" as used in section 11-103, I. C. A., has been defined by this court as any person injuriously affected by judgment, irrespective of whether he be named as plaintiff, defendant or intervenor. He has to be named neither in the caption, pleadings nor judgment. (State v. Eves, 6 Idaho 144, 53 P. 543; Washington County Abstract Co. v. Stewart, 9 Idaho 376, 74 P. 955; Oatman v. Hampton (on rehearing), 43 Idaho 675, 256 P. 529; Adams v. Woods, 8 Cal. 306; Schino v. Cinquini, 7 Cal.App. 244, 94 P. 83; Estate of Colton, 164 Cal. 1, 127 P. 643.)
The general rule appears to be that the state itself is a "party aggrieved" under statutes permitting such a party to appeal from a judgment, so that on habeas corpus it may appeal from a judgment discharging a petitioner from custody. (Burr v. Foster, 132 Ala. 41, 31 So. 495; State v. Berkstresser, 137 Ala. 109, 34 So. 686; Barriere v. State, 142 Ala. 72, 39 So. 55; State v. Davis, 156 Ala. 181, 47 So. 182; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Livingston, 170 Ala. 147, 54 So. 109; State v. Chancey, 14 Ala. App. 119, 72 So. 213; State ex rel. Keyes v. Buckham, 29 Minn. 462, 13 N.W. 902; State ex rel. Shattuck v. French, 82 Wash. 330, 144 P. 28; State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046, 62 L. R. A. 700; State v. Gordon, 105 Miss. 454, 62 So. 431.) While there is authority to the contrary it has been held in numerous cases that the officer from whose custody a person has been discharged on habeas corpus is a "party aggrieved" and has such an interest as will authorize him to appeal from, or sue out a writ of error to review, the judgment of discharge. ( Yudkin v. Gates, 60 Conn. 426, 22 A. 776; State ex rel. Berry v. Merrill, 83 Minn. 252, 86 N.W. 89; State ex rel. Bond v. Langum, 135 Minn. 320, 160 N.W. 858; Miller v. Gordon, 93 Kan. 382, 144 P. 274, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 502; State v. Decker, 77 Neb. 33, 108 N.W. 157; State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046, 62 L. R. A. 700; Garfinkle v. Sullivan, 37 Wash. 650, 80 P. 188; Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 45 S.Ct. 522, 69 L.Ed. 1036; Application of Gillard, 105 Neb. 84, 179 N.W. 396; Ex parte Murray, 112 S.C. 342, 99 S.E. 798, 5 A. L. R. 1152; Davis v. Smith, 7 Ga.App. 192, 66 S.E. 401; Edmonson v. Ramsey, 122 Miss. 450, 84 So. 455, 10 A. L. R. 380, and note thereto.) The principle espoused by the latter cases appears to be supported, in principle at least, by this court in Kootenai County v. Hope Lumber Company, 13 Idaho 262, 89 P. 1054, wherein it was held that there was nothing in the contention that an appeal taken by the county should be dismissed since not taken by or in the name of the attorney general of the state. The motion to dismiss the appeal should be and is denied.
Petitioner was charged with the commission of the crime of burglary and was convicted thereof by a jury of twelve men. The record of the proceedings is in all respects regular upon its face. In his petition in the habeas corpus proceeding petitioner sets out that one of the jurors was disqualified, he being in fact an unpardoned felon released on a "floaters" parole from the Washington state penitentiary at the time he sat as a juror in the trial of petitioner. Such disqualification was not made to appear on the voir dire examination. It is urged that the jury thus consisted of but eleven men and that petitioner was therefore deprived of his constitutional right of trial by jury. As heretofore stated, in so far as the record discloses petitioner was tried by a jury of twelve men, the alleged disqualification of the one juror was attempted to be proved by independent evidence in the habeas corpus proceeding. The general doctrine has been announced in this state that habeas corpus is a collateral remedy, and an assault upon the judgment, and where nothing to the contrary appears in the record it will be conclusively presumed that the court had full jurisdiction, and that all proceedings were regular. Entries in the record of a court of general jurisdiction import verity, and cannot be questioned on habeas corpus. ...
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