Parker v. Williams
| Decision Date | 11 January 1989 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 86-7233,86-7369,s. 86-7233 |
| Citation | 862 F.2d 1471 |
| Parties | Lolita PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Michael WILLIAMS, individually and as Chief Jailer, Macon County, Alabama, et al., Defendants, Lucius Amerson, individually and as Sheriff, Macon County, Alabama and Macon County, Alabama, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Baxley, Beck, Dillard & Dauphin, William J. Baxley, Joel E. Dillard, Charles Dauphin, Birmingham, Ala., for Amerson in both cases.
Gray, Langford, Sapp, Davis & McGowan, Edwin L. Davis, Tuskegee, Ala., for Macon County in No. 86-7233.
Charles S. Conley, Montgomery, Ala., for Macon County in both cases.
Jerry B. Kurz, Hall & Kurz, Chicago, Ill., James J. Friedman, Waukegan, Ill., for Lolita Parker in both cases.
Griffin Sikes, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for Lolita Parker in No. 86-7369.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Before HILL and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH *, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a jury award of compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees on claims brought under state tort laws and 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 against Macon County, Alabama; Lucius Amerson, the former sheriff of the county; and James Williams, the chief jailer of the county jail. The county and the sheriff appealed. We withdraw our initial opinion, 855 F.2d 763 (1988), and substitute this opinion. We reverse the judgments against the county and the sheriff.
Lolita Parker spent the night of June 30, 1984, in the Macon County jail after she hit a woman on the head with a glass during a bar scuffle. The following morning the chief jailer, James Williams, offered to help Parker get home. Williams agreed to arrange for Parker's bond if she would pose nude for sexually explicit photographs. Parker undressed for Williams in the cell so he could check for any scars or marks on her body.
Williams arranged for Parker's bond. Although Williams had instructed Parker to meet him at a nearby store, she took a cab to a friend's house instead. Not long thereafter Williams, having learned Parker's location from the cab driver, knocked on the friend's door. Williams was still in uniform. He persisted when told that Parker was not there and eventually found her in the bedroom. Williams informed Parker that her bond had been revoked and that she would have to return with him to the jail. They entered the cab, but Williams directed the driver to take them to his house. Once inside the house, Parker alleges Williams raped her.
In 1984, Williams was convicted of first degree rape and kidnapping in Alabama state court after a jury trial. On June 28, 1985, Parker filed suit against Williams, Macon County sheriff Lucius Amerson, Macon County itself, and the individual Macon County commissioners. The complaint alleged violations under Alabama tort law and 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. The individual commissioners were dismissed as defendants, and a jury trial was held February 3-6, 1986. The jury found the chief jailer, the sheriff, and the county all liable on both the state and the federal claims, and awarded compensatory damages of $100,000. The jury additionally awarded punitive damages of $100,000 against the sheriff and the county.
Sheriff Amerson and Macon County appealed the jury verdict and the damages award. This panel heard oral argument in December 1986 and withheld judgment pending certification of the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Whether the sheriff of a county may be considered an 'employee' of the county for purposes of imposing liability on the county under a theory of respondeat superior?" The Alabama Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala.1987).
Appellants raise several issues, including claims that the district court erred in applying collateral estoppel to preclude them from litigating the fact of the rape, that the county and the sheriff are immune to state tort liability under state law, that the sheriff is immune to suit against him in his official capacity under section 1983, that the sheriff can assert qualified immunity as a defense to suit against him in his individual capacity under section 1983, and that the county is not liable under section 1983 because no action was taken pursuant to a county policy or custom which resulted in Parker's injuries. We address each of these claims in turn.
Sheriff Amerson attempted to introduce evidence at trial showing that there was no physical violence during the rape and that there was voluntary foreplay leading up to the rape. These facts are relevant to a jury's finding that Williams actually committed rape. The district court denied admission of this evidence based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The district court held that Williams' criminal conviction in Alabama state court in 1984 for kidnapping and rape collaterally estopped all defendants from challenging the fact of the rape in the civil action.
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 1 require precluded parties to have at least one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue before being bound by a prior determination of that issue. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 7, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1443, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (). Unfortunately, neither Sheriff Amerson nor the county had the opportunity to litigate this issue in the original proceeding. That was a state criminal action in which Williams was the lone defendant. Not only did the sheriff and county not join that action, it is clear that they would not have been able to join it. Neither Sheriff Amerson nor Macon County has had an opportunity to litigate the fact of the rape. We hold therefore that the district court erred in collaterally estopping defendants Amerson and Macon County on the issue of the commission of the rape. 2 Because this is the single factual event upon which all liability is based in this case, we must vacate the judgment as to defendants Sheriff Amerson and Macon County and remand the case for a new trial. We address the remaining issues on appeal to determine the scope of the issues to be addressed at the new trial.
The district court instructed the jury that both Macon County and Sheriff Amerson could be liable on the state law claims if the jury found that Amerson had been grossly negligent or wanton in hiring and retaining Williams and that the gross negligence or wantonness was a proximate cause of Parker's injury. The jury found for Parker and against Sheriff Amerson and Macon County on the state law claims. Macon County asserts that it could not be vicariously liable for Sheriff Amerson's acts. Sheriff Amerson argues that he was immune from liability as an agent of the state.
In answering the question certified to it, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with Macon County and Sheriff Amerson. In pertinent part, the court stated:
A sheriff is not an employee of a county for purposes of imposing liability on the county under a theory of respondeat superior. A sheriff is an executive officer of the State of Alabama, who is immune from suit under Article I, Sec. 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the duties of his office.... That portion of Sec. 14-1-6[sic], Code of Alabama 1975, which purports to make a sheriff civilly liable for the acts of his jailer is unconstitutional under Article I, Sec. 14, and Article III, Sec. 42 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
Parker, 519 So.2d at 442-43. The Alabama Supreme Court's answer disposes of the state law claims raised in this case. Those claims based on section 14-6-1 are eliminated to the extent that Parker's interpretation of section 14-6-1 has been expressly deemed to violate the Alabama constitution. Amerson is immune under state law from liability as Williams' employer. Macon County cannot be vicariously liable as Amerson's employer because they shared no employer-employee relationship. Consequently, we hold that Amerson and the county cannot be liable on Parker's state law claims.
Parker sued Sheriff Amerson in both his official and individual capacities. In general, an action against an official acting in his official capacity imposes liability on the entity that official represents, provided the entity received notice and an opportunity to be heard. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877-78, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). The Alabama Supreme Court stated that Amerson was a state rather than county official. The Eleventh Amendment insulates a state from suit in federal court unless the state either consents to suit or waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 906-907, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). 3 Although the Eleventh Amendment does not insulate from suit state officials acting in their official capacities, at least for prospective injunctive relief, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), regardless of the entity named as defendant, the Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive damage awards which must be paid by the state. Quern v. Jordan 40 U.S. 332, 338, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143-44, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979).
In this case, Amerson is a state official being sued in his official...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wallace v. City of Montgomery
... ... is well established that "suits against an official in his or her official capacity are suits against the entity the individual represents." Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1476 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989); see also Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n ... ...
-
Gillman v. School Bd. for Holmes Cnty., Fl
... ... at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926). See also Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th Cir.1989). Finally, the School Board may be held liable if it acted with "deliberate indifference." Sherrod ... ...
-
Arrington v. Dickerson
... ... In other words, there must be a causal connection between the City of Montgomery's responsibility and Mr. Arrington's purported injuries. Parker, 862 F.2d at 1477 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36) ... The court recognizes that one way to establish the ... Suits against an individual in his official capacity are actions against the entity the individual represents. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1476 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989). Official capacity suits is but another way of ... ...
-
Miles v. Kilgore
... ... See Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1476 (11th Cir. 1989); Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1989); see also, Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d ... ...
-
Constitutional Civil Law - Albert Sidney Johnson
...(1991), law enforcement authority is assigned to sheriffs, but not to counties. Thus, McMillian is distinguished from Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989), in which the court found that the sheriff was a final county policymaker in the area of hiring, firing, and jail administ......