Gartrell v. Gaylor

• Citation: 866 F. Supp. 325
• Decision Date: 26 September 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H-92-1892.
• Parties: William Hamilton GARTRELL, Plaintiff, v. R.S. GAYLOR, S.C. Webster, M.W. Countz, D. Doughty, Kent Ramsey, James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, and John Doe #1, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

866 F. Supp. 325

William Hamilton GARTRELL, Plaintiff, v. R.S. GAYLOR, S.C. Webster, M.W. Countz, D. Doughty, Kent Ramsey, James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, and John Doe #1, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. H-92-1892.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

September 26, 1994.

Robert Scott Williams, Williams & Tinkham, Houston, TX, for plaintiff.

Ridgely C. Bennett, April L. Smith, Asst. Attys. Gen., Nancy K. Juren, Office of the Texas Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAKE, District Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendants R.S. Gaylor, George C. Webster, M.W. Countz, James A. Collins, David Doughty, and Kent Ramsey's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 36). For the reasons explained below the motion will be granted.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

Plaintiff, William Hamilton Gartrell, alleges that on April 27, 1990, while he was in his cell at the Ellis Unit II of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, two correctional officers working under the supervision of defendant Gaylor were performing a seasonal, routine collection of inmate blankets. According to plaintiff, one of the officers yanked plaintiff's blanket from him. Plaintiff began shouting that he had a "Ruiz right"¹ to keep his blanket, and he shouted to other inmates that they had a "Ruiz right" to their blankets. Gaylor heard shouting and went to plaintiff's cell. One of the other officers on the scene began "blowing kisses" at plaintiff, and plaintiff stated "I would like to get permission from the Warden to take the officers to the gym and whip their asses." (Affidavit of William Hamilton Gartrell, Docket Entry No. 40) Gaylor then ordered that plaintiff be placed in prehearing detention for causing a disturbance and threatening an officer.

On April 30, 1990, plaintiff was notified of a disciplinary hearing regarding the events of April 27 and was assigned a substitute counsel to assist him. The disciplinary hearing was conducted on May 1, 1990, by defendant Webster. Gaylor did not testify at the hearing, but another officer who witnessed the events of April 27 did testify. An inmate witness testified on behalf of plaintiff. After hearing the evidence Webster found plaintiff guilty of creating a disturbance and threatening an officer. He assessed plaintiff a reduction in good time credits and sentenced plaintiff to solitary confinement for up to 15 days. Defendants Countz and John Doe² signed the disciplinary hearing report. Plaintiff appealed the decision by filing a first-level administrative grievance appeal. The appeal was denied on May 4, 1990, by defendant Doughty. Plaintiff filed a second-level grievance appeal, which was denied on May 21, 1990, by defendant Ramsey. Plaintiff filed a third-level grievance appeal, which was denied on June 29, 1990, by defendant Collins.

On June 26, 1992, plaintiff filed this civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that certain officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) violated his constitutional rights. In his original complaint plaintiff alleged that:

(1) On April 27, 1990, TDCJ-ID officials manufactured disciplinary charges against him on the basis of a trivial incident;

(2) The charges against him were not filed to comport with TDCJ-ID procedures;

(3) He was improperly taken to prehearing detention as a result of the charges;

(4) The resulting disciplinary hearing that occurred on May 1, 1990, was not conducted in the manner required by TDCJ-ID procedures and resulted in his temporary placement in solitary confinement and loss of good time; and

(5) The subsequent administrative reviews of the hearing were not conducted impartially.

Plaintiff sought monetary damages for these claims.

On July 21, 1992, the court dismissed the action after concluding that all but one of plaintiff's claims were barred by the Texas two-year statute of limitations and that the only timely claim, the claim against defendant Collins arising out of Collins' June 29, 1990, denial of plaintiff's request to overturn the disciplinary charges against him, lacked an arguable basis in law and fact as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). (Order of Dismissal of July 21, 1992, Docket Entry No. 4)

On January 21, 1993, the Fifth Circuit vacated this court's judgment and held that:

(1) the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims that accrued before June 26, 1990, because plaintiff had a colorable claim that the limitations period should have been tolled while he exhausted his administrative remedies; and

(2) the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim against Collins because that claim, although supported by "few facts," was not "clearly baseless" as required for a § 1915(d) dismissal.

Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 258-259 (5th Cir.1993). The Fifth Circuit remanded the action with directions that this court consider (1) the tolling issue, (2) the claim against Collins on its merits, and (3) whether plaintiffs claims are cognizable in habeas corpus.³ Id. at 258 n. 3, 259. The Fifth Circuit also suggested that counsel be appointed for plaintiff "because of the importance of the tolling issue." Id. at 259.⁴

II. Analysis

Defendants seek dismissal or, alternatively, summary judgment⁵ on all of plaintiff's claims for the following reasons:

(1) All but one of plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations;

(2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Countz, Doughty, Ramsey, and Collins;

(3) To the extent plaintiff challenges his length of confinement he should be required to first exhaust his habeas corpus remedies; and

(4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all of plaintiff's claims.

The court will first address the statute of limitations issue because its resolution disposes of all but one of plaintiff's claims.

A. Were plaintiff's claims tolled while he exhausted his administrative remedies?

All but one of the plaintiff's claims accrued more than two years before plaintiff filed this action and thus, absent tolling, are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257. Because there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, courts apply the forum state's general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). When considering the timeliness of a prisoner's § 1983 action federal courts must also apply the state's tolling provisions to the statutory limitations period unless that provision is inconsistent with federal law. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989); Board of Regents of University of State of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980).⁶ If the forum state's tolling provisions are inconsistent with federal law, federal courts may use equitable principles to fashion their own tolling provisions. Slack v. Carpenter, 7 F.3d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1993); Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 805 (5th Cir.1992). Plaintiff argues that under Texas law the limitations period for asserting his § 1983 claims was tolled while he exhausted his administrative remedies because under § 7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j, the court could have required him to exhaust his administrative remedies before considering those claims. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that for reasons of equity and public policy, the statute of limitations should be tolled in this case.

1. Tolling Under Texas Law

Texas courts apply a common law tolling rule that provides:

Where a `person is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by the pendency of legal proceedings, the time during which he is thus prevented should not be counted against him in determining whether limitations have barred his right.'

Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1991), quoting Walker v. Hanes, 570 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added). See also Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257. Because the Texas tolling rule applies only to instances in which the pendency of legal proceedings prevent plaintiffs from pursuing legal remedies, plaintiff's claims cannot be tolled by the Texas rule unless the pendency of his grievance appeals prevented him from asserting his § 1983 claims.

In Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to filing a § 1983 action. The Patsy Court recognized § 1997e as a narrow exception to the "no exhaustion" rule applicable solely to suits by state and local prisoners. Section 1997e(a)(1) provides that adult prisoner plaintiffs may be required to exhaust state administrative remedies before proceeding with § 1983 actions, but only if a court finds that administrative exhaustion would be appropriate and in the interests of justice.⁷ In addition, § 1997e(a)(1) mandates that courts ordering the exhaustion of state administrative remedies continue the prisoner's § 1983 action for up to 90 days to allow completion of the administrative process. Should a plaintiff fail to exhaust the administrative process during the 90-day continuance, the court may dismiss the action with prejudice. Pedraza v. Ryan, 18 F.3d 288, 289-290 (5th Cir.1990); Rocky v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir.1987). The Court is not persuaded that the exception to the "no exhaustion" rule contained in § 1997e justifies application of the Texas tolling rule to this action for two reasons.

First, § 1997e's statutory mandate directing courts to determine whether exhaustion is appropriate and, if so, to continue actions in which exhaustion is...