United States v. Mathurin, 14–12239

• Citation: 868 F.3d 921
• Decision Date: 18 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 14–12239,14–12239
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. James MATHURIN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

868 F.3d 921

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.James MATHURIN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14–12239

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 18, 2017

Amit Agarwal, Andrea G. Hoffman, Kathleen Mary Salyer, Stephen Schlessinger, Wifredo A. Ferre, Juan Antonio Gonzalez, Jr., Cristina V. Maxwell, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Israel Jose Encinosa, Israel Jose Encinosa, Esq., Miami, FL, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before WILSON and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HALL,^* District Judge.

JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Defendant James Mathurin appeals his conviction and 685–month sentence for multiple armed robbery and carjacking crimes committed while he was a juvenile. After careful review of the record, and having heard oral argument, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2007, just four months shy of his eighteenth birthday, Defendant was arrested for a robbery and carjacking he had committed that day. Defendant later confessed to the carjacking and, over the course of the next several months, he provided additional information about a string of other violent crimes he recently had committed.

Because both sides hoped to negotiate a plea agreement, federal prosecutors did not immediately indict Defendant. When the negotiations eventually fell apart, the Government indicted Defendant and the parties proceeded to trial. The jury convicted Defendant on a number of armed robbery and weapons charges, and the district court imposed a 492–month term of imprisonment.

Defendant appealed his conviction to this Court, successfully arguing that the Government did not indict him within the time required by the Speedy Trial Act. We vacated Defendant's conviction and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to determine whether the indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. See United States v. Mathurin , 690 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2012). The district judge concluded that the indictment should be dismissed without prejudice, and the Government re-indicted Defendant on charges of conspiracy, two counts of carjacking, twelve Hobbs Act robberies, one attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and twelve counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district judge then recused herself, and the case proceeded to a second trial before a new judge.

At trial, the Government introduced evidence that Defendant had committed a spree of violent crimes beginning on July 26, 2007. The evidence showed that on that date, Defendant and five other men broke into a home and awakened a teenaged girl who was napping in an adjoining bedroom. One of the men fired a gunshot at the girl, missing her by only four inches.

A little over a week later, on August 7, 2007, Defendant entered a Cellular Hut store, pointed a gun at the clerk, and demanded money while his accomplices posed as customers and urged the clerk to comply. Immediately after this robbery, Defendant went to another Cellular Hut store and demanded money from the store clerk. When the clerk laughed at him, Defendant fired a round from his gun to show he was serious.

On August 16, Defendant and an accomplice, armed with a gun, entered a Subway restaurant and demanded money from the cashier. Two days later, on August 18, Defendant entered a Max Communications store with a gun and demanded money from the clerk. Less than a month after that, on September 10, Defendant fired gunshots at the back wall of another Cellular Hut as he entered the store. He then demanded money from the clerk and a patron of the store.

During the above robberies, Defendant was aided by a group of young men who performed various roles, such as transporting Defendant to the store or pretending to be customers. After the September 10 robbery, Defendant had a falling out with these individuals and recruited a different set of accomplices. On September 21, Defendant, accompanied by a friend who was armed with a gun, robbed an Electronics Direct Telephone store. On that same day, Defendant and his friends also robbed a Hello Cellular store, this time with Defendant carrying a gun.

On October 2, Defendant shot his gun into the air as he entered a Boston Market with an accomplice. His accomplice ordered everyone to get on the floor as Defendant demanded money from an employee. On October 6, Defendant and an accomplice walked into the LaPavillion Restaurant where Defendant shot a round into the ceiling, shattering the glass in the ceiling. Defendant then opened the cash register and took money, in addition to robbing a patron of his cell phone. On October 13, Defendant fired a gunshot as he and an accomplice entered a 7–Eleven and took money from the cash register.

Defendant subsequently committed a robbery and two carjackings without any assistance. On December 11, while armed with a gun, Defendant approached the driver of a vehicle and demanded the keys to the car and the driver's money. The victim acquiesced and Defendant took his car. The next day, December 12, Defendant robbed a 7–Eleven at gunpoint and fired his gun at the wall directly behind the clerk. On that same day, Defendant carjacked a second victim outside a check-cashing store and fled in the victim's car. After the second carjacking, Defendant finally was apprehended by the police.

The jury in Defendant's second trial convicted him of all but one count in the indictment.¹ At sentencing, the district judge acknowledged that the first judge had imposed a 492–month sentence. Nevertheless, having heard the evidence against Defendant in the second trial, this second judge thought that a higher sentence was necessary to safeguard the public. The judge explained his thinking in some detail:

I have to tell you, Mr. Mathurin, when I was assigned this case, my first reaction was, wow, the last thing I want to do is sentence somebody or think about sentencing somebody to 40–something years when they were a juvenile at the time, and I take sentencing defendants very seriously.

I know every human being is entitled to individual consideration and probably much to the chagrin of the prosecutors here, I'm one of the most lenient sentencers here and vary below the guidelines probably more than I should because I really do, on every single case, it is my goal to give the defendant the least possible sentence that I can, also understanding that I have an obligation to follow the law and to protect our community.

I was a prosecutor, a criminal defense attorney, a judge in state court for a long time, and I have been here not too long, and I always try and see the best in people. I think the vast majority of people who stand before me to get sentenced are good people who just did a bad thing, and I really seriously tried to look at you to find that in you.

I also know that my colleague, whom I greatly respect and whom I know gave very serious consideration to the case, thought a sentence of 40–something years was appropriate after her consideration of the case.

I really tried as best I can to convince myself to go along with that and I just can't do it. You know, I've sentenced people to death, I've sentenced people to life, and there's not many people that scare me , okay, and you scare me, Mr. Mathurin .

You know, you're a very bright person, okay, but you get things 95 percent correct, and it's always that extra five percent that something in your brain twists it around to change everything around and manipulate facts to make yourself always the victim, to blame everybody else other than yourself and that goes way beyond just saying, "I'm exercising my constitutional rights to make the Government prove the case."

I was hoping, you know, that in the last several years you would have shown some maturity and some hope, okay, and the thought of yougetting a 40–something–year sentence and being my age and gettingout scares me to death .

I just don't think our society can put up with you at that age. Honestly, if I sentenced you to all consecutive 25–year minimum mandatories, I would sleep like a baby for the rest of my life and not worry about it for one second because I am absolutely convinced that is what should be done with you, but I have to follow what the U.S. Supreme Court tells me to do, and I have to impose a sentence that is not the equivalent of a mandatory life sentence.

As the prosecutor said, these are very, very serious cases. There was not one case, one incident, that anybody did anything that would justify firing a weapon. Okay. You just were firing a weapon multiple times for no reason whatsoever. You are just an incredibly dangerous person.

(emphasis added). Given his concerns about the safety of the public, the judge sentenced Defendant to 685 months in prison.

On appeal, Defendant asserts various evidentiary grounds for vacating his conviction. He also argues that the district court erred by dismissing his former indictment without prejudice, which thereby allowed the Government to re-indict Defendant. Assuming the conviction stands, Defendant argues that his sentence must be vacated under the Supreme Court's holding in Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses. Defendant also argues that the sentence was imposed as punishment for his prior appeal, in violation of the Supreme Court's holding in North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm both the conviction and the sentence.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant does not assert any valid ground for vacating his conviction .

In support of the appeal of his conviction, Defendant argues that the district court erred by (1) denying various motions to suppress evidence, (2) admitting improper and prejudicial evidence, and (3) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the initial indictment against him with prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act. Defendant also argues...