Brown v. Caylor
| Citation | 87 S.E. 295,144 Ga. 302 |
| Decision Date | 13 November 1915 |
| Docket Number | (No. 78.) |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
| Parties | BROWN. v. CAYLOR. |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Murray County; A. W. Fite, Judge.
Claim case by J. N. Caylor, trustee, against S. A. Brown. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Wm. E. Mann, of Dalton, for plaintiff in error.
P. F. Akin, of Cartersville, and F. K. McCutchen, of Dalton, for defendant in error.
HILL, J. [1] 1. This is a claim case. The wife of the defendant in fi. fa., whose trustee in bankruptcy was the claimant, was permitted to testify, over objection, that the lot of land called the "home place, " on which she claimed to have borrowed money (she testifying also that her money had been used in buying the stock of goods levied on), had recently been sold by the trustee in bankruptcy. The objection was that there was better evidence of the sale. The court stated that he would let the fact that it had been sold remain in. If there were any relevancy in showing that there had been a mere negotiation or crying off of the property by the trustee in bankruptcy, without a conveyance of it to the purchaser, this ruling would be correct. If the purpose was to show that the trustee in bankruptcy had conveyed the property to a third party, the conveyance would be in writing. If any question of his authority to make the sale were involved, there would be appropriate means of showing that. The witness had asserted that the lot was hers, and that she borrowed money on it. This must have been before she became a bankrupt. How a subsequent sale of the lot by her trustee in bankruptcy, at a date which does not appear, would throw any light on the question of whether she was the bona fide owner of the lot when she claimed to have borrowed money on it, is not apparent. But, under the objection made to the evidence, it is not made to appear that its admission was erroneous.
2. The court admitted in evidence reports of R. G. Dun & Co. and the Bradstreet Mercantile Agency to the effect that Mrs. Bishop was worth from $15,000 to $20,000 in real estate, and that she was the sole proprietor of the business, over objection that the evidence was immaterial and irrelevant. We think that it was objectionable. The reports of mercantile agencies as to the amount of her property would not be admissible to prove the truth of such statements on behalf of herself or the trustee in bankruptcy. The court ruled that he would admit the evidence "so far as it showed notice, lack of notice, or motive." It is not shown how this tended to show notice or lack of notice, or notice of what or to whom, or motive on whose part The evidence should have been rejected.
3. Error was assigned upon the propounding of certain questions by the court to a witness. It was contended that the testimony elicited was hearsay in character, and should not have been elicited by questions from the court. In a note to the motion for a new trial it was stated that no objection was made to such questions. It was not contended that the court so conducted the examination as to prejudice the rights of the plaintiff, further than in eliciting by his questions certain hearsay evidence. As against this objection, in the absence of objection made at the time to the questions or answers, the ground will not...
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