Longoria ex rel. All Statutory Beneficiaries Longoria v. Pinal Cnty.

• Citation: 873 F.3d 699
• Decision Date: 10 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-15606.,16-15606.
• Parties: Christian LONGORIA, a single man, on behalf of himself as son of decedent Manuel O. Longoria, on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries of decedent Manuel O. Longoria; Joshua R. Wallace, as the personal representative of the Estate of Manuel O. Longoria; Manuel Longoria, Jr., a single man; Lynnette Longoria, a single woman; P.C.L., a minor, T.A.L., a minor; K.R.L., a minor; Sanisya Lott, a single woman; T.L., a minor; and A.L., a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PINAL COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Paul R. Babeu, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona; and Heath Rankin, in his individual capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

873 F.3d 699

Christian LONGORIA, a single man, on behalf of himself as son of decedent Manuel O. Longoria, on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries of decedent Manuel O. Longoria; Joshua R. Wallace, as the personal representative of the Estate of Manuel O. Longoria; Manuel Longoria, Jr., a single man; Lynnette Longoria, a single woman; P.C.L., a minor, T.A.L., a minor; K.R.L., a minor; Sanisya Lott, a single woman; T.L., a minor; and A.L., a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.PINAL COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Paul R. Babeu, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona; and Heath Rankin, in his individual capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of Pinal County, Arizona, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15606.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 6, 2017, Pasadena, California

Filed October 10, 2017

Joel B. Robbins (argued), Robbins & Curtin PLLC, Phoenix, Arizona; Joseph M. Leal III, Cole & Leal, Casa Grande, Arizona; Darius Bursh, McCain & Bursh PLC, Scottsdale, Arizona; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Nicholas D. Acedo (argued) and Kathleen L. Wieneke, Struck Wieneke & Love P.L.C., Chandler, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judges, and Terrence Berg,^* District Judge.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Pinal County Deputy Sheriff Heath Rankin fired two shots into Manuel Longoria's back and killed him just as he was raising his hands above his head. Rankin's shots followed the use of non-lethal force by police officers from the City of Eloy who were charged with arresting Longoria.

When Longoria's estate (hereinafter "Longoria") sued Rankin under § 1983, the district court held that Rankin was entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in his favor. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.¹

BACKGROUND

Distraught over his relationship with the mother of three of his children, Manuel Longoria stole his brother-in-law's car and began driving around the city of Eloy, Arizona. Eloy police officers saw him and initiated a traffic stop, but Longoria fled and led officers on a chase that lasted for more than 70 minutes.

The Eloy Police Department ("EPD") asked the Pinal County Sheriff's Office ("PCSO") to be on "standby" in case Longoria left Eloy's jurisdiction. PCSO informed its officers that Longoria was driving a stolen vehicle and (mistakenly) that he was armed. PCSO Deputy Heath Rankin and his partner, Deputy J. Rice, joined the pursuit and participated for more than 40 minutes.

During the chase, Longoria stopped his vehicle and spoke with the pursuing officers several times, but continued to ignore commands to surrender. During one of these stops, Longoria got out of the car and was seen holding and kissing purple or dark-colored rosary beads which he held in his hand. During another, he got out of the car for a brief period and held his wallet behind his back. EPD Detective Salazar saw that Longoria was holding a wallet, not a gun, behind his back and shouted this out to the other officers on the scene. That information was also dispatched on an EPD radio frequency that Rankin was monitoring. Rankin maintains that he did not hear that part of the broadcast.

Longoria exhibited other erratic behavior. He threw money and various objects out of the vehicle while driving and told officers that he had nothing to live for and wanted to die. Longoria asked officers to give his money to his family members, and at times even joked with officers pursuing him that they would scratch their vehicles if they kept pulling so close to him. While driving, he waved his hand out of the car, sometimes making a gun with his fingers and pointing his fingers at his head as though gesturing for officers to shoot him. EPD Officer Dean reported over the radio that Longoria was simulating a gun with his fingers. As Longoria continued to drive, onlookers gathered and he laughed, pointed, waved, and even flashed a peace sign at civilians on the streets.

Shortly before the chase ended, Pinal County Lieutenant Villegas ordered Rankin and other Pinal County deputies to stand down from the pursuit. Rankin heard this command and initially followed it. Rankin's Sergeant then directed him to form a perimeter at the intersection of Main and Battaglia Streets, which he did.

A few minutes later, Eloy police officers halted the chase by disabling Longoria's car with a PIT maneuver.² Rankin was standing around the corner about a half-block away. After hearing the crash, he abandoned the perimeter, grabbed his assault rifle, and ran towards the scene, followed by his partner Rice.³

While Rankin was sprinting to the scene, Longoria got out of his vehicle and stood facing the Eloy officers with one hand behind his back near the car. Eight officers surrounded him and drew their guns. Longoria initially did not comply with police commands to show his hands. Eloy Sergeant Tarrango shouted for officers to use "less lethal," or less than lethal, force at least twice. Other Eloy officers shouted that Longoria had only a wallet behind his back. Still more shouted to tase Longoria.

Rankin ran behind Longoria—across what would have been the line of fire had the Eloy officers needed to shoot—and joined the other officers near the point of collision. Rankin asserts that he did not hear the commands to use less than lethal force while he was running towards the collision.

Rankin stopped running and took up a position between 25 to 45 feet to Longoria's right, to the side and further away from Longoria than all of the other officers who had their weapons drawn. Longoria was facing the other officers, and continued to stand with one hand behind his back near his disabled car. Shortly after Rankin stopped sprinting, some of the other officers fired beanbag rounds at Longoria, striking him. An officer tased him, hitting him with one dart. Longoria flinched and moved erratically. He then turned halfway around to his right—towards and past Rankin—to face his car and put his empty hands up above his head, his back to the officers and Rankin. Rankin fired two rounds from his assault rifle into Longoria's back, killing him.

The § 1983 suit ensued, as did the district court's grant of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment and qualified immunity de novo . Hughes v. Kisela , 862 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2016).

DISCUSSION

I. Qualified Immunity

Longoria challenges the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Rankin on the ground of qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity exists to shield an officer from liability for "mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law." Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 507, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). The doctrine's purpose is to strike a balance between the competing "need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808. "In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we consider (1) whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer's alleged misconduct." Lal v. California , 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014).

"Consequently, at summary judgment, an officer may be denied qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action ‘only if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood [his] conduct to be unlawful in that situation.’ " Hughes , 862 F.3d at 783 (quoting Torres v. City of Madera , 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) ). Our analysis must be from the perspective of a "reasonable officer on the scene" and "allo[w] for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Plumhoff v. Rickard , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2020, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ).

We acknowledge at the outset that in the last five years, the Supreme Court has reversed a number of federal courts, including ours, in qualified immunity cases because we failed to abide by the longstanding principle that " ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined at a high level of generality." White v. Pauly , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551–552, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (per curiam). This has been a particular problem in cases presenting novel factual circumstances involving car chases. Here, although preceded by a car chase, the shooting occurred after the pursuit ended and Longoria's vehicle was disabled, as described above. This is not one of those cases occurring mid-pursuit against a "hazy legal backdrop." See Mullenix v. Luna , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (discussing the factual circumstances in Plumhoff , 134 S.Ct. at 2012 ; Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ; Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam)). Nor is this like other recent cases the Court has reversed. We do not rely on a...