SPRINGHILL HOSPITALS, INC. v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 27 June 2003
• Citation: 883 So.2d 159
• Parties: SPRINGHILL HOSPITALS, INC., and Randall Quinley v. Teresa DIXON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

883 So.2d 159

SPRINGHILL HOSPITALS, INC., and Randall Quinley v. Teresa DIXON.

1011120.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 27, 2003.

D. Scott Wright, Philip H. Partridge, and Thomas H. Nolan, Jr., of Brown, Hudgens, P.C., Mobile, for appellants.

J. Patrick Courtney III, Mobile; and Sidney W. Jackson III, Mobile, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R.App. P. MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.

SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., dissent.

SEE, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the majority's affirmance of the trial court's judgment against Springhill Hospitals, Inc., and Randall Quinley (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Springhill") under the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the AMLA"). The trial court entered its judgment after finding, in part, that the two expert witnesses who testified on Teresa Dixon's behalf were "similarly situated health care providers" as that term is defined in the AMLA and, therefore, were qualified to provide expert-opinion testimony. Based on the standard of care allegedly breached in this case and the work experience of the two expert witnesses, I disagree.

I.

On June 11, 1998, Teresa Dixon was admitted to Springhill Memorial Hospital, a hospital owned by Springhill Hospitals, Inc., for a lumbar laminectomy—the removal of a herniated disk. Dixon underwent surgery based on the recommendation of her orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Suanne White-Spunner. Dixon had injured her back while working as a registered nurse, and she had been unable to work. Dixon testified that Dr. White-Spunner told her there was a 90-percent probability that the surgery would allow her to return to her nursing job.

During Dixon's surgery, Dr. White-Spunner encountered excessive bleeding at the incision site and, in response, asked Quinley, the circulating surgical nurse, to obtain some epinephrine to help to control the bleeding. Dr. White-Spunner told Quinley that she did not know the proper dose and directed him to find out what the proper dose would be. Quinley never checked with any of the hospital resources available to him. He simply returned with a bottle of epinephrine in a 1:1,000 concentration and asked Dr. White-Spunner whether that dose was what she wanted. Quinley then diluted the concentration containing epinephrine with an equal amount of saline solution.

Dr. White-Spunner injected the epinephrine solution near the incision site. Upon receiving the dose of epinephrine, Dixon went into cardiac arrest; the operating-room staff then used a defibrillator to return Dixon's heart to a normal rhythm. As a result of those complications, Dr. White-Spunner could not complete the surgery; she had to perform an emergency closure of Dixon's back. Dixon has not undergone back surgery or returned to her nursing job since this incident.

Dixon brought a medical-malpractice action against Springhill Hospitals and Quinley, alleging that Quinley had negligently and/or wantonly administered an overdose of epinephrine. The AMLA required that Dixon present expert-opinion evidence regarding the standard of care Quinley allegedly breached in administering the epinephrine during the June 11, 1998, surgery. Dixon, in her capacity as a registered nurse, and Dick Navarro, R.N., served as Dixon's expert witnesses during the jury trial. Dixon and Navarro each testified that a nurse, no matter what the hospital setting, must administer drugs to patients in accordance with what is known in the practice of nursing as the "five Rs"—right patient, right drug, right dose, right time, and right route.

The jury returned a verdict for Dixon, awarding her $175,000 in past compensatory damages, $62,000 in future compensatory damages, and $345,000 in punitive damages. Subsequently, Springhill moved for a judgment as a matter of law, or, alternatively, for a new trial or a remittitur, arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in permitting the expert testimony of Dixon and Navarro because, it said, they were not "similarly situated health care providers" within the meaning of the AMLA. The trial court denied the motion.

II.

On appeal, Springhill argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dixon and Navarro to provide expert testimony as to the standard of care allegedly breached by Quinley. Springhill argues that Dixon and Navarro were not qualified to provide expert testimony because, it says, they are not "similarly situated health care providers."¹ "[W]hether a witness is qualified to render expert testimony is a question traditionally left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Bell v. Hart, 516 So.2d 562, 569 (Ala.1987). The trial court's determination regarding the qualifications of a proffered expert witness will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court has exceeded its discretion. Id.

"A health care provider may testify as an expert witness in any action for injury or damages against another health care provider based on a breach of the standard of care only if he is a `similarly situated health care provider ....'" § 6-5-548(e), Ala.Code 1975. In determining whether an expert is a "similarly situated health care provider," the trial court must answer the following three questions:

"(1) What is the standard of care alleged to have been breached? (2) Is the defendant `health care provider' a specialist in the discipline or school of practice of the standard of care that the court has previously determined is alleged to have been breached? (3) Does the proffered expert qualify as a `similarly situated health care provider' under the subsection determined in the second step to apply?"

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