G&H Dev., LLC v. Penwell, CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0272

• Decision Date: 27 September 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0272
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
• Parties: G&H DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. NANCY PENWELL, ET AL.

G&H DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. NANCY PENWELL, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0272

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SHREVEPORT DIVISION

September 27, 2016

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court are two Motions for Attorney's Fees filed by Defendants:

1. Motion for Attorney's Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 filed on Behalf of Nancy Penwell; and

2. Motion for Attorney's Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 filed on Behalf of Doyle Adams, Jim Morris, & Fred Rankin.

Record Documents 160 & 162. Plaintiff G&H Development, LLC ("G&H") opposed both motions. See Record Documents 177 & 179.

This case centered around G&H's attempt to rezone land within the jurisdiction of the Benton-Parish Metropolitan Planning Commission ("Benton-Parish MPC").¹ G&H submitted two subdivision plat applications. G&H's first Rezoning Application and Subdivision Plat Application 1 went before the Benton-Parish MPC. The Rezoning Application was denied and the Subdivision Plat Application 1 was declared moot. G&H appealed to the Bossier Parish Police Jury ("the Police Jury") and the Police Jury upheld the Benton-Parish MPC's decision. G&H did not seek state judicial review of the adverse decision.

Approximately one month later, G&H attempted to submit Subdivision Plat Application 2 to the Office of the Benton-Parish MPC ("the Office"). Because Subdivision Plat Application 2 was not accompanied by an application for rezoning, Ms. Nancy Penwell ("Penwell"), the Zoning Administrator of the Office, did not submit Subdivision Plat Application 2 to the Benton-Parish MPC. She forwarded Subdivision Plat Application 2 to the Parish Attorney, Mr. Patrick Jackson ("Jackson"). Pursuant to a letter dated December 4, 2012, Jackson returned Subdivision Plat Application 2 to G&H based on Penwell's administrative interpretation of the applicable zoning ordinances. Jackson informed G&H that it could file an appeal with the Benton-Parish Metropolitan Board of Adjustment ("the Board of Adjustment") if it disagreed with the administrative interpretation of Penwell.

G&H then filed an appeal to the Board of Adjustment. Doyle Adams ("Adams"), Jim Morris ("Morris"), and Fred Rankin ("Rankin") were members of the Board of Adjustment. After a public hearing, the Board of Adjustment denied the appeal, upholding Penwell's administrative interpretation of the zoning ordinances. G&H subsequently requested an appeal of the matter to the Police Jury. The Police Jury held a public hearing and declined jurisdiction to decide the appeal. It advised G&H that its appeal of the decision of the Board of Adjustment was to state district court, not the Police Jury. G&H did not seek judicial review in the state court system, but rather filed the instant federal lawsuit.

In this lawsuit, G&H sought: (1) declaratory judgment for violation of its rights to due process and equal protection under the United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution; (2) declaratory judgment that the Benton-Parish MPC and Bossier Parish ("the Parish") had not lawfully established any zoning affecting land in the metropolitan planning area, including the subject property; (3) declaratory judgment that it was entitled to the issuance of a certificate by the Benton-Parish MPC to the effect that Subdivision Plat 2 was approved; (4) injunctive relief; (5) damages; and (6) attorney's fees.

After extensive motion practice which took almost two years to complete, all of G&H's claims were dismissed. All federal and state constitutional claims were dismissed with prejudice. The state law claims were dismissed without prejudice, as this Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over purely state and local land use issues. Penwell, Adams, Morris, and Rankin have now moved for attorney's fees as the prevailing parties pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1988.² Penwell seeks $28,054.25 in fees and Adams, Morris, and Rankin seek $136,097.45 in fees. The claims against these Defendants were resolved as follows:

Penwell: Penwell's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to dismiss was granted. All claims against Penwell in her individual capacity were dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity. This Court held that Penwell's conduct fell within the scope of her discretionary authority as Zoning Administrator of the Benton-Parish MPC. Additionally, her actions were objectively reasonable. See Record Documents 50 & 51.

Adams, Morris, and Rankin: Adams, Morris, and Rankin's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal on the grounds of judicial immunity was denied. See Record Document 52 & 53. Their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of G&H's federal and state claims for violation of equal protection and procedural due process was granted. See Record Documents 54 & 55. Their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of ripeness was denied. See Record Documents 56 & 57. Their Rule 12© Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings raising qualified immunity and their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment) seeking dismissal of G&H's substantive due process claims relating to the Subdivision Plat Application 2 were granted. See Record Document 150. G&H did not oppose these two motions in relation to Adams, Morris, and Rankin. See id. In fact, G&H conceded that it did not have any claims against Adams, Morris, and Rankin in their personal capacities. See id.

Section 1988 provides that a court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs for proceedings in vindication of civil rights. See Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2001), citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988. "The purpose of this law is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Dean, 240 F.3d at 507, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983). Congress was prompted to enact such statutes authorizing district courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation because vigorous enforcement to vindicate civil rights is a high priority. See Dean, 240 F.3d at 507 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, "a prevailing plaintiff is deserving of an award of attorney's fees because they are assessed against a violator of federal law." Id.

"In the case of prevailing civil rights defendants, however, the aforementioned policy considerations, which support the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff, are inescapably absent." Id. A prevailing defendant seeking attorney's fees must rely on quite different equitable considerations, that is, protection "from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis." Id. at 508. Moreover, a prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 n. 2; Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178-179 (1980); Jones v. Texas Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir.1981).

In determining whether a suit is frivolous, a district court must focus on the question of whether or not the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful. See Jones, 656 F.2d at 1145. Factors to be considered in making such determination include: "(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, (2) whether the defendant offered to settle, and (3) whether the court held a full trial." Myers v. City of W. Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir.2000). These factors are "guideposts," and frivolousness must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 Fed.Appx. 421, 425 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam ).

Here, there is no dispute that these Defendants were the prevailing parties, as all claims against them were dismissed with prejudice.³ The question thus becomes whether G&H's lawsuit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass these Defendants.

I. Penwell.

Factors two and three of the frivolous determination weigh heavily in favor of awarding attorney's fees as to Penwell. Penwell never offered to settle and G&H's claims against Penwell were dismissed early in the litigation on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Moreover, this Court is not persuaded by G&H's chief argument that "there can be no doubt that plaintiff made a prima facie case against Ms. Penwell, because this Court reached the merits of Ms. Penwell's qualified immunity defense." Record Document 177 at 9. Even a cursory review of this Court's March 25, 2014 ruling defeats this argument. See Record Document 50. In its ruling, this Court clearly held that all of Penwell's actions fell within the scope of her discretionary authority as Zoning Administrator. Moreover, the Court noted:

G&H did not argue that Penwell's conduct was not within the scope of the authority delegated to the zoning administrator by the aforementioned ordinances. Rather, G&H argued that Penwell's proof as to the scope of her authority was "utterly lacking" because she failed to attach or introduce the ordinances.

Id. at 9. The Court further held that G&H's arguments that Penwell's conduct violated federal law and was not objectively reasonable were based on bare allegations and conclusory statements. See id. at 11-12. G&H failed to allege any facts countering Penwell's reliance upon local zoning ordinances and her years of experience in making administrative determinations regarding such ordinances. Thus, this Court holds that G&H's claims against Penwell were frivolous for purposes of Section 1988.

II. Adams, Morris, and Rankin.

Factors two and three of the frivolous determination also weigh heavily in favor of awarding attorney's fees as to Adams, Morris and Rankin. None of these defendants offered to settle and G&H's claims against these defendants were dismissed in motion practice....