Dean v. Riser

• Decision Date: 13 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-30677,99-30677
• Citation: 240 F.3d 505
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) WILLIAM D. DEAN, JR., ET AL., Plaintiffs, JOHN MENDENHALL; GARY VALENTINE; and GEORGE K. STEWART, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LARKIN T. RISER, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Webster Parish, Louisiana, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 505

240 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2001)

WILLIAM D. DEAN, JR., ET AL., Plaintiffs, JOHN MENDENHALL; GARY VALENTINE; and GEORGE K. STEWART, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LARKIN T. RISER, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Webster Parish, Louisiana, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 99-30677

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

February 13, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before DAVIS, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Larkin T. Riser ("Riser") appeals the district court's conclusion that, notwithstanding the Plaintiffs-Appellees' voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) of their civil rights action before an adjudication on the merits, he is not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1988 (b) (" 1988") and is therefore not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. For the reasons assigned below, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Riser was elected Sheriff of Webster Parish, Louisiana, by defeating Tommy Kemp ("Kemp"), the chief deputy to Riser's predecessor, Sheriff Royce McMahen. Several of the deputies in the sheriff's office, including the plaintiffs, publically supported Kemp during the election. After assuming office, Riser terminated some of the plaintiffs and refused to renew the commissions of other plaintiffs. As a result, the plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Riser claiming political retaliation.

After a year of litigation, the plaintiffs voluntarily moved to dismiss their claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). The district court granted the motion. Subsequently, Riser filed for attorney's fees under The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988, claiming that he was a prevailing party and that the plaintiffs' civil rights action was groundless. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that pronounced the following rule of law: "Absent any ruling on the merits of the claim by summary judgment or trial, a defendant is not a 1988 prevailing party when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his claims." As such, the magistrate judge recommended that Riser's claim for attorney's fees be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in toto. Riser now appeals the district court's judgment.

DISCUSSION

I.Standard of Review

We review a denial of 1988 attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1985). The district court's underlying findings of fact are subject to review for clear error. Wilson v. Mayor of St. Francisville, 135 F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991). However, we review de novo the conclusions of law underlying a denial of attorney's fees. Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1997).

II.Attorney's Fees

A.Prevailing Party Policy Considerations

Under 1988, a court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" for proceedings in vindication of civil rights. 42 U.S.C. 1988. The purpose of this law is to ensure "'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976)).

In the specific context of 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k), the Supreme Court articulated the general policies and competing interests that prompted Congress to enact such statutes authorizing district courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978). Congress considered vigorous enforcement to vindicate civil rights a high priority and entrusted plaintiffs to effectuate this policy. Id. at 416 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263 (1968) (characterizing such plaintiffs as "private attorney[s] general")). Therefore, a prevailing plaintiff is deserving of an award of attorney's fees because they are assessed against a "violator of federal law." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418.

In the case of prevailing civil rights defendants, however, the aforementioned policy considerations, which support the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff, are inescapably absent. As such, "[a] successful defendant seeking counsel fees . . . must rely on quite different equitable considerations." Id. at 419, 98 S.Ct. 694. Namely, while Congress wanted to "'make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit,'" it also "wanted to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis." Id. at 420 (citation omitted).

B.Awarding Attorney Fees

After balancing these policy considerations inherent to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs and defendants, two respective legal standards have emerged regarding the award of attorney's fees. See White v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. 1982)("[T]he standard for awarding attorney's fees differs if a defendant rather than a plaintiff prevails."). "[A] prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 416. Thus, a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action is presumptively entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, unless a showing of "special circumstances" is made that would deem such an award unjust. See Scham v. Dist. Court Trying Criminal Cases, 148 F.3d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1998).

However, the Supreme Court has set a more rigorous standard for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants. A district court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing civil rights defendant only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421; Hensley 461 U.S. at 429 n.2. Thus, attorney's fees for prevailing defendants are presumptively unavailable unless a showing is made that the underlying civil rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit.

Consequently, it is essential that a district court begin its response to a request for attorney's fees by identifying the movant as a plaintiff or defendant. Mississippi, 921 F.2d at 609. The court must then consider whether the movant is a prevailing party. Hughes v. Unified Sch. Dist. #330, 872 F. Supp. 882, 885 (D. Kan. 1994) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S. Ct. 566, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1992)). Upon concluding that the movant is a prevailing party within the meaning of 1988, the court in its discretion may then decide whether the movant is entitled to a reasonable fee award. 42 U.S.C. 1988; Hughes, 872 F. Supp. at 885 (citing Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 573-74).

III.Analysis

The initial determination is not an issue in this case because Riser was indisputably before the district court as a defendant. The second determination, however, defies such concise treatment. Whether a defendant is a prevailing party within the meaning of 1988 when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his action with prejudice before adjudication on the merits is an issue of first impression for this court and one scantly traversed by our fellow federal courts.

In the instant case, the district court denied Riser's request for attorney's fees because the court concluded that Riser was not a prevailing party. Thus, the district court ruled that Riser failed to meet the threshold requirement of prevailing party status because the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action with prejudice before the court ruled on or adjudicated the merits of the plaintiffs' claim. The district court essentially adopted the rule of law pronounced in Marquart v. Lodge 837, 26 F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 1994), and declared that "absent any ruling on the merits of the claim by summary judgment or trial, a defendant is not a 1988 prevailing party when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his claim."

Farrar is the most recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of prevailing party status. However, the case specifically addressed the circumstances under which a plaintiff can be deemed a prevailing party. A plaintiff is a prevailing party only when he "obtains actual relief on the merits of his claim" that "materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111; see also TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Texas, 24 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A prevailing party must effect change in the legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant."). The Court, however, neither articulated a separate standard for prevailing defendants nor suggested or intimated that the standard, which it pronounced in the exclusive context of prevailing plaintiffs, is applicable to prevailing defendants.

Although Farrar offers no dispositive guidance regarding the determination of prevailing party status for defendants, this court has adjudicated a related inquiry. In Anthony v. Marion County General Hospital, 617 F.2d 1164, 1170 (5th Cir. 1980), we concluded that a defendant was a prevailing party under 1988 when a plaintiff's Title VII racial discrimination suit was involuntarily dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution. We stated that:

Although there has not been an adjudication on the merits in the sense of a weighing of facts, there remains the fact that a dismissal with prejudice is deemed an adjudication on the merits for the purposes of res judicata. As such, the [defendant] has clearly prevailed in this litigation.

Id. at 1169-70 (emphasis added).

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