Marsh v. INTERSTATE & OCEAN TRANSPORT CO.

• Decision Date: 11 September 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 77-398.
• Citation: 521 F. Supp. 1007
• Parties: Walter MARSH, Plaintiff, v. INTERSTATE AND OCEAN TRANSPORT COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

521 F. Supp. 1007

Walter MARSH, Plaintiff, v. INTERSTATE AND OCEAN TRANSPORT COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 77-398.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

September 11, 1981.

Richard A. Zappa of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

John E. Babiarz, Jr., of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., for defendant.

OPINION

CALEB M. WRIGHT, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, a seaman, initiated this suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained on April 18, 1975 on board a barge named "Tide 119" and owned and operated by defendant Interstate and Ocean Transport Company ("Interstate"). The case was tried before a jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded damages totalling $100,000. In response to special interrogatories, the Jury found that defendant Interstate was negligent and that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. The Jury's award of damages was apportioned as follows: $15,000 for future medical expenses, $10,000 for future lost earnings and $75,000 for general damages.

Defendant has now moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.), or, alternatively, for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 50 and 59. In its motion, Interstate raises three claims of error and argues: (1) that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law¹; (2) that the award for future medical expenses and anticipated lost earnings was not supported by the evidence; and (3) that the Jury's award of general damages was excessive and unjustified by the evidence presented at trial.

In considering the motion for judgment n. o. v., the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. The Court "must expose the evidence to the strongest light favorable to the party against whom the motion is made and give him the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1978), citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962). It is not sufficient that the facts be undisputed; there must also be no sufficient ground for inconsistent inferences to be drawn therefrom. Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 427 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1970). See Turner v. "The Cabins", Tanker Inc., 327 F.Supp. 515 (D.Del.1971), 5A Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 50.072. To grant defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v., the Court must conclude that no reasonable juror could find for plaintiff on the evidence presented at trial.

A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court which may order such new trial if it is convinced by movant's arguments that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence or awards excessive or inadequate damages. Montgomery Ward v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940); Lewin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 394 F.2d 608 (3d Cir. 1968); Silverii v. Kramer, 314 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1963).

It is within the framework of these standards that the Court will consider defendant's alternative motions.

I. Contributory Negligence

Contributory negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care for one's own safety that a reasonably prudent man would have exercised under similar circumstances. Wenninger v. U. S., 234 F.Supp. 499 (D.Del.1964). See also Restatement (2d) of Torts § 463, comment b (1965). To be of legal significance, a plaintiff's negligence must be a significant contributing cause of his injury. Barrett v. Robinson, 65 F.R.D. 652 (E.D.Pa.1975); Guerrero v. American President Lines, 394 F.Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.1975); Restatement (2d) of Torts, supra, § 463. Where causation is an issue with regard to which reasonable persons might differ, it is one for the jury. "Ordinarily, the questions of whether a plaintiff exercised the degree of care required under the circumstances surrounding his injury and whether any negligence on a plaintiff's part contributed to his injury are questions of fact which, in a trial, by jury, must be decided by the jury." Logullo v. Joannides, 301 F.Supp. 722, 725 (D.Del.1969). In the majority of cases in which the issue of contributory negligence is disputed at all, one would expect that reasonable jurors could differ. Prosser, Torts § 45.

In this case, causation is an issue of fact. Whether Marsh's assistance in tying the stopper line was a factor contributing to his injury is a matter for the Jury, not the Court. There is evidence in the case tending to establish Marsh's freedom from contributory negligence. The Court cannot say that reasonable jurors could not have returned a verdict that Marsh's behavior met the standards of a prudent seaman attending to his own safety in the circumstances described at trial.

Marsh was under the direction of John Jumbo ("Jumbo"), the maintenance supervisor, when the accident occurred on the starboard deck of "Tide 119." Jumbo and Marsh were involved in tying off a stopper line. Marsh testified that the accident occurred 1½ to 2 seconds after he and Jumbo had finished tying the stopper line by fastening it to two deck bits (T-23-24). He further testified that he had started to move back away from the line when he noticed that a shackle, attached to another cable, was improperly positioned relative to the newly tied stopper line. He was in the process of warning Jumbo of the situation at the instant he was struck. (T-33, 99). Marsh was struck when another seaman aboard "Tide 119," Roy Kelly ("Kelly"), set in motion an anchor windlass.² As the windlass retracted its line, it caused a shackle attached to another cable to slide into the stopper line which Marsh and Jumbo had just finished tying off. The impact of the shackle caused the stopper line to strike plaintiff sharply on the leg. (T-22).

Marsh testified that the proper operation of the anchor windlass required the person in charge, in this case Jumbo, to give verbal or hand signals to the person operating the windlass. (T-36). Jumbo and Kelly were responsible for the operation of the windlass and hence for assuring that the lines were not in a position of danger to persons on deck before setting the windlass in motion. (T-37, Lynn Dep. 19). Marsh's testimony that no hand or vocal signals were given prior to Kelly's starting the windlass was undisputed at trial. Marsh further testified that he did not believe he was in a position of danger at any time before Kelly retracted the line. (T-37-38).

Defendant's reply brief in support of its motion for judgment n. o. v. argues that Marsh must have been contributorily negligent because he realized that the shackle and stopper line were improperly positioned relative to one another. (Defendant's Reply Brief at 2). While it is a plausible interpretation that, in noticing the mispositioned shackle, plaintiff, who was also aware of how an anchor windlass operates, must or ought to have become aware of the danger of his position, it is certainly not the only interpretation to which reasonable persons might subscribe. Given plaintiff's testimony that he did not fear for his personal safety and his further statement that it was his expectation that the way to correct the relative mispositioning of the shackle and stopper line was to move the shackle, (T-85), it was not unreasonable for the Jury to find that Marsh did not contribute to his injury. The Jury might reasonably have found that Marsh expected that the shackle would be moved and hand or verbal signals given before the anchor windlass was set in motion.

On the issue of contributory negligence, there is evidence in the record with regard to which reasonable persons could differ. It is established in this Circuit that "it is enough to take the case to the jury on the issue of contributory negligence if the sum of the evidence leaves the issue in doubt, for it is the jury's province to resolve the doubt." Mroz v. Dravo Corp., 429 F.2d 1156, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1970). The Jury was properly entrusted with deciding the issue of causation and, in response to a special interrogatory, found Marsh not to have been negligent in any way that contributed to his injury. The Court, in light of the law and facts, finds that the Jury's finding was neither patently unreasonable nor against the weight of the evidence. With regard to the issue of contributory negligence, defendant's motion is denied.

II. Future Medical Expenses and Future Lost Wages

Defendant has moved that the Jury's award with respect both to future medical expenses and future lost wages be struck down or, at the least, reduced from $15,000 to $3,000 and from $10,000 to $4,488.12 respectively. Defendant contends that the Jury's awards are against the weight of the evidence presented at trial.

A. Future Medical Expenses

The motion to reduce the Jury's award with regard to an item of damages is addressed to the trial Court's sound discretion. 6A Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 59.08. It is not the province of the Court arbitrarily to substitute its judgment of appropriate compensation for that of the Jury. "As this Circuit has frequently reiterated, while an award may be high, it should stand if there is ample evidence to justify it." Van Voorhis v. U.S....