Newman v. Exxon Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 October 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-17-JLL.
• Citation: 722 F. Supp. 1146
• Parties: William J. and Debra A. NEWMAN, Plaintiffs, v. EXXON CORPORATION and Francis Quinn, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

722 F. Supp. 1146

William J. and Debra A. NEWMAN, Plaintiffs, v. EXXON CORPORATION and Francis Quinn, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 88-17-JLL.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

October 5, 1989.

Bayard J. Snyder of Phillips & Snyder, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiffs.

James F. Harker and James S. Yoder of Herlihy, Harker & Kavanaugh, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LATCHUM, Senior District Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This diversity action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on December 19, 1986. Plaintiff William Newman ("William"), while at the wheel of a disabled vehicle owned by his brother, was coasting downhill in the northbound lane of Rt. 13 when the vehicle was struck in the rear by a tanker truck. The tanker truck was owned by defendant Exxon Corporation ("Exxon"), and was driven by Exxon's employee, defendant Francis Quinn ("Quinn").

William allegedly suffered injuries as a result of the collision. He brought this suit charging Quinn with negligence, and asserting that Exxon was vicariously liable for Quinn's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (See Docket Item "D.I." 1 at ¶¶ 5-12.) William's wife, Debra Newman ("Debra"), joined in the action as a party plaintiff. Debra's claim against defendants is for loss of consortium. (See D.I. 1 at ¶¶ 13-14.)

The case was tried before a jury on July 17 through July 19, 1989. The jury found that: (1) defendants Quinn and Exxon were negligent; (2) William sustained damages of $10,000 on his personal injury claim; (3) Debra suffered damages of $10,000 on her claim for loss of consortium; and (4) William was contributorily negligent, his negligence comprising 50% of the total fault for the accident. (D.I. 58 Verdict Sheet.) In accordance with the Delaware comparative negligence statute, the Court reduced the awards to William and Debra by 50%, reflecting the comparative fault attributed to William. See 10 Del.C. § 8132. Hence the Court entered judgment against defendants in favor of William for $5,000, and in favor of Debra, also for $5,000. (See D.I. 56.)

Presently before the Court is a motion filed by defendants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("judgment n.o.v."), on Debra's loss of consortium claim.¹ (D.I. 59.) For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, defendants' motion will be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.

Rule 50(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., authorizes the entry of a judgment n.o.v. in appropriate circumstances. The legal standard governing a motion for judgment n.o.v. is identical to that for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.² Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1210 n. 5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826, 91 S.Ct. 51, 27 L.Ed.2d 55 (1970); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2524 at pp. 541-52 & n. 27, § 2537 at p. 599 (1971) hereinafter Wright & Miller. It is a rather stringent standard. Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 119 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S.Ct. 348, 78 L.Ed.2d 314 (1983).

"In considering a motion for judgment n.o.v., a court is not free to weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury." Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110, 113 (3d cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853, 108 S.Ct. 156, 98 L.Ed.2d 111 (1987). Although a court in viewing the evidence of record may have reached a different conclusion from that reached by the jury, that alone is not reason to enter judgment n.o.v. Entry of judgment n.o.v. is appropriate only where the court finds, as a matter of law, that no reasonable jury could have found in favor of the nonmoving party — that is, that no reasonable jury could have found for plaintiff Debra Newman. See, e.g., National Controls Corp. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 833 F.2d 491, 495 (3d Cir.1987); Aloe Coal v. Clark Equipment Co., 816 F.2d at 113; Marsh v. Interstate and Ocean Transport Co., 521 F.Supp. 1007, 1008 (D.Del.1981).

The Court must view all evidence, and any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bhaya v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 259, 260, 262 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839-40 (3d Cir.1983); Massarsky v. General Motors, 706 F.2d at 117. The jury's verdict, however, can withstand a motion for judgment n.o.v. only if it is based upon more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir.1978); G.H. & M. Construction and Development Co. v. Municipal Sewer and Water Auth. of Cranberry Township, No. 80-657-G (W.D.Pa. March 23, 1983); 9 Wright & Miller § 2524 at pp. 542-43 & n. 30, p. 547. In this case, the Court's task is to decide whether the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief to Debra on her loss of consortium claim. See, e.g., National Controls v. National Semiconductor, 833 F.2d at 495; Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d at 846; Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1969).

Having outlined the legal standard for entry of judgment n.o.v., the Court will now review the elements of a loss of consortium claim, prior to determining whether the jury's verdict thereon was patently unreasonable.

III. ELEMENTS OF A CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

As the plaintiff in this action, Debra bore the burden of proving at trial, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the elements of a loss of consortium claim. Under Delaware law, a claim for loss of consortium consists of three elements: (1) the party asserting the claim i.e. Debra must have been married to the person who suffered the physical injury i.e. William at the time the injury occurred; (2) as a result of the physical injury, the spouse asserting the loss of consortium claim i.e. Debra must have been deprived of some benefit which formerly existed in the marriage; and (3) the physically injured spouse i.e. William must have had a valid cause of action for recovery against the tortfeasors i.e. Quinn and Exxon. Jones v. Elliott, 551 A.2d 62, 63-64 (Del.1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 484 A.2d 527, 532 (Del.Super. 1984).

At the present stage of this litigation, the defendants do not dispute that the first and third of the above-named elements are satisfied. The key to this motion for judgment n.o.v. is the second element: namely, whether William's physical injuries deprived Debra of some benefit which formerly existed in the plaintiffs' marital relationship. With respect to this second element of the loss of consortium claim, the Court instructed the jury as follows:

You, the jury, ... should consider the factors of the relationship of the husband and wife prior to this accident, their respective ages, their previous social and marital conduct together, their conditions of health, and, of course, the effect of these injuries on their relationship.

(Charge to Jury at p. 26; D.I. 62A at p. A-37 emphasis added.)

The defendants assert that there is insufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that William's injuries deprived Debra of some previously existing benefit in their marriage. The Court will now undertake to scour the record in search of evidence supporting the second element of Debra's loss of consortium claim.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency Of The Evidence

A diligent examination of the record reveals just three morsels of evidence that could even remotely support a claim by Debra.

The first evidentiary nugget is the following testimony by Debra concerning medical treatment received by her husband some time after the accident:

The first thing that Dr. Arm did was put William on soft blenderized food for a couple of weeks to see how his headaches, the neck pain, and the jaw pain ... would react to non-stressful eating. William wasn't too thrilled with blenderized food, so we had a real difficult time through that period trying to feed him.

(D.I. 61 at p. 40; D.I. 62A at p. A-20 emphasis added.)

The second of three kernels of evidence likewise consists of testimony by Debra. She testified that "it is very difficult to see somebody in pain all the time, as William was before the accident, and as he is even more so now.... If there is anything I could do to change that, I would." (D.I. 61 at pp. 54-55; D.I. 62A at pp. A-34 to A-35.)

While the foregoing evidence might tend to support a claim by Debra for negligent infliction of emotional distress or mental anguish, it in no way supports the second element of a loss of consortium claim — that William's injuries deprived Debra of some preexisting benefit in their marital relationship.

It is important to recognize the distinction between a claim for loss of consortium as opposed to a claim for infliction of emotional distress. Whereas a wife's loss of consortium claim is derivative of her husband's personal injury claim, a claim for mental anguish can be asserted directly by the wife in her own right. Nutt v. A.C. & S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18, 23-24 (Del.Super. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of America, 480 A.2d 647 (Del.1984). Loss of consortium and infliction of emotional distress are distinct claims, and each, of course, is comprised of different elements.

Plaintiffs' complaint obscures this distinction somewhat, by interspersing language of emotional distress in the very same count containing the loss of consortium allegations. (See D.I. 1 at ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs' apparent confusion is perhaps understandable in light of the language used by the court in Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 484 A.2d 527 (Del.Super.1984). In that case the Superior Court stated that "distress resulting from observing the suffering of the injured spouse" is one "facet of the disruption of the harmonious coexistence which may have existed before the...