Soto-Cintrón ex rel. A.S.M. v. United States, 17-1180

• Decision Date: 20 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-1180,17-1180
• Citation: 901 F.3d 29
• Parties: Eduardo SOTO-CINTRÓN, on his own behalf and ON BEHALF OF his minor son A.S.M.; A.S.M., Minor, Plaintiffs, Appellants, Windy Marrero-Colón, solely on behalf of her minor son A.S.M., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

901 F.3d 29

Eduardo SOTO-CINTRÓN, on his own behalf and ON BEHALF OF his minor son A.S.M.; A.S.M., Minor, Plaintiffs, Appellants,Windy Marrero-Colón, solely on behalf of her minor son A.S.M., Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 17-1180

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

August 20, 2018

Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Emil Rodríguez-Escudero was on brief, Ponce, PR, for appellants.

Mainon A. Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Acting Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Lipez and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Eduardo Soto-Cintrón and his 17-year-old son went to a post office in Coto Laurel, Puerto Rico to pick up some mail. While Soto-Cintrón waited in his red Ford F-150 truck, his son retrieved some envelopes from the post office and returned to his father's vehicle. As the two pulled out of the parking lot, they were stopped by a number of federal law enforcement agents with guns drawn. Soto-Cintrón was removed from his vehicle and handcuffed, and he and his son were detained for up to twenty minutes.

The agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") had stopped the wrong people. Once they realized their mistake, the agents arrested the person who had received the illegal shipment of firearms, and released Soto-Cintrón and his son. Soto-Cintrón later filed a claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, and Soto-Cintrón appealed. Though our analysis of Soto-Cintrón's FTCA claim differs from the district court's, we ultimately reach the same conclusion, and affirm.

I.

In May 2013, the United States Postal Inspection Service ("USPIS") intercepted a package sent from Orlando, Florida to Puerto Rico. Suspecting that the package contained six illegal Glock semi-automatic pistols, USPIS personnel requested the assistance of the ATF to set up a controlled delivery. The agencies devised a plan to leave a notice at the addressee's residence informing him that he could claim the package at the U.S. Post Office in Coto Laurel. Pursuant to the plan, USPIS personnel would assume the primary surveillance positions inside the post office and in the parking lot, while ATF agents would be posted around the perimeter of the parking lot. Whoever showed up to collect the package would be arrested, as would anyone else linked to the receipt of the package.

During the operation, a USPIS inspector used radio communication to announce the separate arrival of two vehicles to the post office parking lot. First, the inspector identified a red Ford F-150 which turned out to be Soto-Cintrón's. The inspector stated that the occupants of the vehicle remained seated for some amount of time before the younger occupant went into the post office. Second, the inspector announced the arrival of a white Ford F-150 which, as it turned out, was driven by the suspect.

While both vehicles were still in the parking lot, the USPIS inspector broadcasted that the package had been delivered to the suspect. Then, without identifying which vehicle the suspect placed the package in, the radio operator stated that the red Ford F-150 -- belonging to Soto-Cintrón -- was leaving the parking lot.

One of the ATF agents on the receiving end of these radio communications was Special Agent Vladimir González. He was stationed on an access road at the perimeter of the parking lot in a vehicle driven by ATF Task Force Officer Jose Fajardo, and also occupied by Special Agent Raul Peña-López. When Special Agent González heard the radio transmissions he could not discern which truck contained the suspicious package. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain clarification from a USPIS inspector, he made the decision to stop the red truck driven by Soto-Cintrón before it could leave the parking lot. Special Agent González instructed Officer Fajardo to block the parking lot exit with his vehicle, and the three agents approached Soto-Cintrón's truck with guns drawn, identifying themselves as police and ordering Soto-Cintrón and his son to put their hands up.

Soto-Cintrón and his son had the windows rolled up and the air conditioning and radio turned on, so they could not hear the agents' commands. One of the officers pulled Soto-Cintrón out of his vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed him face down on the pavement. His son was also handcuffed and placed next to him, but was soon uncuffed and allowed to sit on the ground away from the vehicle. The agents questioned Soto-Cintrón about the package and performed a visual inspection of his truck. Soto-Cintrón, of course, denied any knowledge of the illegal firearms, and the agents' visual inspection did not reveal the suspicious package.

At some point during Soto-Cintrón's detention, the agents learned that the actual suspect -- the person in the white truck -- had been apprehended, and that Soto-Cintrón and his son were not involved in the illegal firearms delivery. The agents accordingly released Soto-Cintrón and his son. Their detention lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.

Based on this incident, Soto-Cintrón sued the United States in February 2015.¹ The complaint alleges that the ATF agents committed false imprisonment under Puerto Rico law and that the United States is liable for the tort under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680(h).² Following a period of discovery in which Soto-Cintrón chose not to conduct any depositions, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing primarily that Soto-Cintrón's detention constituted a Terry stop based on the ATF agents' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The district court granted the government's motion, explaining that Puerto Rico would not impose tort liability for false imprisonment where an officer conducts a stop based on his reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

On appeal, Soto-Cintrón contends that the court erred by importing Terry's reasonable suspicion standard into Puerto Rico tort law. He argues that Puerto Rico requires officers to meet a more demanding "reasonable cause" standard, which both parties treat as interchangeable with the familiar probable cause standard. Abandoning its Terry argument,³ the government counters that the ATF agents satisfied Puerto Rico's reasonable (or probable) cause standard. Alternatively, it argues that even if the agents did not have probable cause to arrest, Puerto Rico would not impose liability for false imprisonment because they would be entitled to qualified immunity if plaintiffs had filed a Bivens claim. We agree with the government's alternative argument, and affirm.

II.

A. The FTCA and Puerto Rico False Imprisonment Legal Standards

The FTCA provides "a limited congressional waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for tortious acts and omissions committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment." Díaz-Nieves v. United States, 858 F.3d 678, 683 (1st Cir. 2017). In an amendment to the FTCA, Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity for false imprisonment when the tort is committed by a "law enforcement officer[ ] of the United States Government." Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) ); see also Solis-Alarcón v. United States, 662 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2011). The government's liability under the FTCA is coextensive with that of "a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. We look to local law to determine whether the government is liable for its agents' allegedly tortious conduct. See Díaz-Nieves, 858 F.3d at 683 ; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). "In this case, then, we must extract the substantive rules of decision from Puerto Rico law." Calderón-Ortega v. United States, 753 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014).

Puerto Rico imposes liability for false imprisonment when "[a] person, whether or not a law enforcement officer," tortiously or negligently "detain[s] or cause[s] the unlawful detention of another person." Ayala v. San Juan Racing Corp., 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1012, 1021 (P.R. 1982) ; see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (imposing liability for fault or negligence that causes injury). To prevail on a false imprisonment claim, "it is essential that the individual performing the arrest lack reasonable cause for believing that the arrestee committed a felony." Díaz-Nieves, 858 F.3d at 684. This is so because Puerto Rico Criminal Procedure Rule 11 authorizes law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests where they have "reasonable cause" to suspect that a person committed a felony. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34a, Ap. II, § 11(c).

"[A]side from the requirements of legality contained in [Rule 11]," the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has explained that "we should resort to the concept of the reasonable man" to assess liability for false imprisonment. Ayala, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 1024.

The reasonableness of the actions of a person sued in a civil action for damages for an alleged unlawful detention of the plaintiff, and his liability for them, should be weighed together with the following factors: the defendant's person, age, schooling, moral condition, and prior experience; the person, age, appearance and conduct of the detained person; knowledge that defendant had, on the day of the events, about the detained person and those people that had relations with him, suspicious conduct, including the seriousness of the crime it could imply, the place, occasion, and frequency of said conduct. This is in no way intended as an exhaustive list. Each case has its own characteristics, which must be taken into account when determining whether or not there was a false arrest.

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