Quinn v. Swift & Co.

• Decision Date: 06 August 1937
• Docket Number: No. 3896.,3896.
• Citation: 20 F. Supp. 234
• Parties: QUINN et al. v. SWIFT & CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

20 F. Supp. 234

QUINN et al. v. SWIFT & CO.

No. 3896.

District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

August 6, 1937.

Carlon M. O'Malley and John W. Bour, both of Scranton, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Welles, Munford, Stark & McGrath, of Scranton, Pa., for defendant.

JOHNSON, District Judge.

This is an action in trespass by Virginia Quinn and her husband to recover damages resulting from defendant's alleged negligence in manufacturing country sausage containing particles of metal. The case was tried before the court and a jury and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs; $360 for Virginia Quinn and $200 for her husband, Edgar Quinn. The case is now before the court on a motion for a new trial and on a point reserved upon a motion for binding instructions in favor of the defendant.

At the trial plaintiffs introduced evidence to show that the plaintiff Virginia Quinn became ill as a result of eating sausage containing pieces of sharp metal; that the sausage was manufactured by the defendant and encased in unbroken skins; and that the pieces of metal did not get into the sausage while it was in possession of the plaintiffs. The defendant then introduced evidence to show the care with which it manufactured sausage; that the machinery used was in good condition and constantly inspected; that of the ingredients used to manufacture the sausage, the meat alone was prepared by the defendant and the remaining ingredients, consisting of salt, sugar, pepper, and nutmeg were purchased from reputable dealers; that these ingredients were inspected by the defendant, but that no pieces of metal were found therein.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the defendant moved for binding instructions on the ground that plaintiffs did not rebut defendant's evidence and therefore did not show that the sole cause from which the foreign substances arose was attributable exclusively to the defendant. The court reserved decision on this motion and submitted the case to the jury under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, following the cases of Swift & Company v. Blackwell (C.C.A.) 84 F.(2d) 130, and Linker v. Quaker Oats Co. (D.C.) 11 F.Supp. 794.

The defendant relies on two decisions of this circuit in support of its position that binding instructions should have been given. In the first case, Horn & Hardart Baking Co. v. Lieber (C.C.A.1928) 25 F.(2d) 449, 450, where plaintiff was injured by a tack which was in strawberries served her by defendant's restaurant, it was held that the injury itself was not evidence of defendant's negligence. In the second case, Nichols v. Continental Baking Co. (C.C.A.1929) 34 F. (2d) 141, the plaintiff showed she was injured as a result of biting into a piece of bread containing a cockroach. The defendant's evidence showed that the ingredients used in making the bread were bought from reputable firms and were inspected by defendant. The court, citing the Horn & Hardart Case, held that binding instructions were proper because to hold the defendant guilty of negligence would have been "to base a verdict on speculation instead of the solid basis of proven negligence."

In the Horn & Hardart Case, the following cases were cited to support the rule that the injury itself was not evidence of defendant's negligence: Ash v. Childs Co. (1918) 231 Mass. 86, 120 N.E. 396, 4 A.L.R. 1556; Crocker v. Baltimore Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 177, 100 N.E. 1078, Ann.Cas.1914B, 884; Valeri v. Pullman Co. (D.C.1914) 218 F. 519, 522; Roseberry v. Wachter, 3 W.W. Harr.(Del.) 253, 138 A. 273; Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896) 163 Ill. 518, 45 N.E. 253, 34 L.R.A. 464, 54 Am.St.Rep. 483. However, later cases in some of the jurisdictions cited applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In Tonsman v. Greenglass, 248 Mass. 275, 142 N.E. 756, where a piece of iron was imbedded in a loaf of bread it was held that the jury could infer that it got into the bread during the process of manufacture. In Sullivan v. Manhattan Co., 251 Mass. 395, 146 N.E. 673, where a mouse was found in filling between the crusts of raisin pie, it was held that the jury could have found that the mouse was in the filling when the crust was placed in the pie. In Rost v. Kee & C. Dairy Co., 216 Ill.App. 497, it was held that evidence that a bottle of milk contained bits of broken glass was sufficient to show that somewhere between cleaning and final delivery defendant was guilty of negligence. The cited case of Valeri v. Pullman Co., supra, did not involve the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The question there was whether a restaurant keeper was an absolute insurer of food.

The great weight of authority is to the effect that a presumption of negligence arises, or the jury may infer negligence, from the presence of a foreign substance in food. The question is annotated in 4 A.L.R. 1559; 47 A.L.R. 148; 105 A.L.R. 1039. From the annotation it appears that eighteen state courts and three federal courts apply the doctrine of the presumption of negligence; that two state courts and one federal do not; and that in Massachusetts, Georgia, New York, and Tennessee there are cases on both sides of the question.

The cases applying the doctrine are: Bellingrath v. Anderson (1919) 203 Ala. 62, 82 So. 22; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Barksdale (1920) 17 Ala.App. 606, 88 So. 36; Whistle Bottling Co. v. Searson (1922) 207 Ala. 387, 92 So. 657; Franklin v. Argyro (1924) 211 Ala. 506, 100 So. 811; Collins Baking Co. v. Savage (1933) 227 Ala. 408, 150 So. 336; Reichert Mill. Co. v. George (1934) 230 Ala. 3, 162 So. 393; Eisenbeiss v. Payne (1933) 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.(2d) 162; Heinemann v. Barfield (1918) 136 Ark. 456, 207 S.W. 58; Drury v. Armour & Co. (1919) 140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McBride (1929) 180 Ark. 193, 20 S.W.(2d) 862; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Bennett (1931) 184 Ark. 329, 42 S.W.(2d) 213; Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co. (Cal.App. 1935) 49 P.(2d) 877; Gross v. Loft, Inc. (1936) 121 Conn. 394, 185 A. 80; Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co. (1905) 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1178, 110 Am.St. Rep. 157; Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1916) 18 Ga.App. 226, 89 S. E. 495; Bradfield v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1920) 24 Ga.App. 657, 101 S. E. 776; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp (1930) 41 Ga.App. 705, 154 S.E. 385; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dean (1931) 43 Ga.App. 682, 160 S.E. 105; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sinyard (1932) 45 Ga.App. 272, 164 S.E. 231; Coleman v. Dublin Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1933) 47 Ga.App. 369, 170 S.E. 549; Gainesville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Stewart (1935) 51 Ga.App. 102, 179 S.E. 734; Rost v. Kee & C. Dairy Co. (1920) 216 Ill.App. 497; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co. (1920) 189 Iowa, 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649; Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas (1930) 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W. (2d) 701; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin (1932) 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W.(2d) 612; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Schneider (1933) 249 Ky. 261, 60 S.W.(2d) 594; Goldman & F. Bottling Co. v. Sindell (1922) 140 Md. 488, 117 A. 866; Ward v. Great A. & P. Co. (1918) 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225, 5 A.L.R. 242; Tonsman v. Greenglass (1924) 248 Mass. 275, 142 N.E. 756; Richenbacher v. California Packing Corporation (1924) 250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281; Sullivan v. Manhattan Market Co. (1925) 251 Mass. 395, 146 N.E. 673; Doyle v. Continental Baking Co. (1928) 262 Mass. 516, 160 N.E. 325; Hertzler v. Manshum (1924) 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155; Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman (1914) 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791; Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1918) 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365; Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Renna (Miss.1923) 97 So. 674; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loftin (Miss.1924) 99 So. 13; Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Grubbs (1926) 143 Miss. 590, 108 So. 732; Kenney v. Wong Len (1925) 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343; DeGroat v. Ward Baking Co. (1925) 102 N.J. Law, 188, 130 A. 540; Rudolph v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1926) 132 A. 508, 4 N.J.Misc. 318; Sheehan v. Menkes (1930) 152 A. 326, 8 N.J.Misc. 867; Corin v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1933) 110 N.J.Law, 378, 166 A. 291; Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co. (1916) 100 Misc. 528, 163 N.Y.S. 396; Rosenswaike v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (Sup.1919) 175 N.Y.S. 828; Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co. (1920) 192 App.Div. 186, 182 N.Y.S. 459; Carroll v. N. Y. Pie Baking Co. (1926) 215 App.Div. 240, 213 N.Y.S. 553; Cohen v. Dugan Bros. (1928) 132 Misc. 896, 230 N.Y.S. 743; Miller v. National Bread Co. (1936) 247 App.Div. 88, 286 N.Y.S. 908; Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino (1928) 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557; Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1929) 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700; Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works (1931) 102 Pa.Super. 515, 156 A. 537; Madden v. Great A. & P. Tea Co. (1932) 106 Pa.Super. 474, 162 A. 687; Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co. (1935) 119 Pa. Super. 529, 181 A. 381; Campbell v. G. C. Murphy Co. (1936) 122 Pa.Super. 342, 186 A. 269; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co. (1929) 50 R.I. 43, 144 A. 884, 63 A.L. R. 334; Chisholm v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1935) 55 R.I. 422, 182 A. 4; Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works (1915) 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80; Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1915) 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155, L.R.A. 1916B, 877, Ann.Cas.1917B, 572; Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Tex.Civ. App.1935) 84 S.W.(2d) 545; Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis (1934) 163 Va. 89, 175 S.E. 743; Linker v. Quaker Oats Co. et al. (D. C.N.D.Okl.1935) 11 F.Supp. 794; Picard v. Smith (1930) 59 App.D.C. 291, 40 F.(2d) 803; Chevy Chase Dairy, Inc., v. Mullineaux (1934) 63 App.D.C. 259, 71 F.(2d) 982; Swift & Co. v. Blackwell (C.C.A. 4, 1936) 84 F.(2d) 130; Fisher v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. (1936) 66 App.D. C. 7, 84 F.(2d) 261, 105 A.L.R. 1034.

The Pennsylvania cases above cited, decided after the two cases relied upon by the defendant, all apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The case of Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. supra, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, answers defend...