Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co.

• Citation: 887 F.2d 124
• Decision Date: 05 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-3019,88-3019
• Parties: 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1846, 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,378 Jean SCHNELLBAECHER and Marcia Brandt, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BASKIN CLOTHING COMPANY and Hartmarx Specialty Stores, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 124

887 F.2d 124

50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1846,

51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,378

Jean SCHNELLBAECHER and Marcia Brandt, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BASKIN CLOTHING COMPANY and Hartmarx Specialty Stores, Inc. Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-3019.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 6, 1989.

Decided Oct. 5, 1989.

Lynn A. Williams, Michael K. Havrilesko, Williams & McCarthy, Rockford, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Gary D. Ashman, Grace A. Newton, Carey M. Stein, Cynthia N. Burman, Hartmarx Corp., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

The individual plaintiffs-appellants in this case, Jean Schnellbaecher and Marcia Brandt, were employees of the Baskin Clothing Store in Rockford, Illinois. In 1986, both plaintiffs, who are women, were denied a promotion to a sales position offering increased salary and commissions.

On July 22, 1986, plaintiffs filed pro se charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Baskin. They asserted violations by Baskin of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Brandt and Schnellbaecher claim that a less-qualified male was hired for the position in question and the reason they were given was "that a woman is to make less than a man because a woman does not have to support a family." This charge named only Baskin, and not its parent corporation, Hartmarx Specialty Stores, Inc. ("HSSI"). HSSI, however, determines Baskin's personnel policies and both entities have the same attorneys, and thus HSSI had notice of the charges against Baskin. On January 29, 1987, the EEOC sent a questionnaire to Baskin, which sought payroll records for all sales persons and an explanation for the differences between the salaries of male and female sales persons. Counsel for HSSI had notice of this questionnaire. On the following day, however, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for each charge to plaintiffs. In March of 1987, the plaintiffs filed an Equal Pay Act lawsuit, which is separate from this suit, in the Northern District of Illinois.

By letter dated April 24, 1987, the plaintiffs' lawyer transmitted to the EEOC revised versions of the plaintiffs' original charges. In these revised charges, which plaintiff asked the EEOC to treat either as amended charges or as new charges, HSSI was added as a respondent, and plaintiffs alleged class-wide discrimination by the defendants against women. Five days later, plaintiffs filed this Title VII lawsuit against Baskin and HSSI, alleging both individual and class-wide discrimination in a three-count complaint.

The district court first dismissed the individual charges against both HSSI and Baskin. It observed that because HSSI had common corporate offices, corporate counsel and managerial staffs with Baskin, it had adequate notice of the original charges, and that with respect to the original charges, HSSI "may well have been provided with an opportunity to participate in conciliation." The court observed, however, that the charges alleging individual discrimination "are covered by the [Equal Pay Act] suit concurrently pending in this court."

The district court also dismissed plaintiffs' class-wide claim on the ground that neither HSSI nor Baskin had any opportunity to participate in conciliation regarding these claims. The court opined that the class-wide allegations were not properly before it because charges which contained explicit class allegations were not "filed at all or recognized by the EEOC." Thus, the district court dismissed the class-wide allegations in their entirety as to both defendants. The plaintiffs appeal.

Discussion

First, we will consider whether the district court properly dismissed the class-wide suit and the suit against HSSI under the EEOC's original charges. Cf. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 n. 29 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982). Because we conclude that under the original charges the district court properly dismissed HSSI and the class-wide allegations, we will address whether dismissal was proper under the "amended charges," or rather, whether the charge properly was amended before the filing of the complaint.

Dismissal of HSSI

Ordinarily, a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5; LeBeau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir.1973). Although this requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather is like a statute of limitations, in that it is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), none of these considerations apply here. See also Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 864 (7th Cir.1985) ("the requirement that the scope of the EEOC charge limit the scope of the subsequent complaint is in the nature of a condition precedent with which litigants must comply rather than constituting a component of subject matter jurisdiction").

The purpose of the requirement of filing a charge before the EEOC is twofold. First, it serves to notify the charged party of the alleged violation. Second, it gives the EEOC an opportunity for conciliation, which effectuates Title VII's primary goal of securing voluntary compliance with its mandates. Eggleston, 657 F.2d at 905. In Eggleston, we noted that an exception to the general rule that a party named in a Title VII suit must have been named in a previous EEOC charge exists where "an unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance." Id. Plaintiffs argue that HSSI, as Baskin's parent corporation, falls within this exception. ¹

We agree with defendants, however, that the district court properly dismissed the suit against HSSI. Although HSSI had notice of the charges against Baskin, it did not thereby have any notice of any charges against it, nor did it have any opportunity to conciliate on its own behalf. Bernstein v. National Liberty Int'l Corp., 407 F.Supp. 709, 714-16 & n. 6 (E.D.Pa.1976); see also Medina v. Spotnail, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 190 (N.D.Ill.1984); but see Evans v. Meadow Steel Prods., Inc., 572 F.Supp. 250, 254-55 (N.D.Ga.1983). Thus, we believe that the district court properly dismissed the charges against HSSI.

Dismissal of Class-Wide Allegations

Plaintiffs next argue that the district court improperly dismissed the class-wide allegations in their complaint because the EEOC charge contained no specific class-wide allegations. We agree with the defendants, however, that the district court properly dismissed these allegations.

In Babrocky, we observed that "allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge." 773 F.2d at 863. In other words, the reason behind the requirement that allegations not contained in an EEOC charge cannot be contained in the complaint is that the defendant must have notice of the charge, and the EEOC must have the opportunity to investigate and conciliate the charge, in order to attempt to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII. Id.

As we noted above, "the requirement that the scope of the EEOC charge limit the scope of the subsequent complaint is in the nature of a condition precedent with which litigants must comply rather than constituting a component of subject matter jurisdiction," Id. at 864. Nonetheless, the only claims of discrimination which are cognizable are those that are " 'like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.' " Id. at 864 (quoting Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). Other circuits are in accord with this analysis. See, e.g., Fellows v. Universal Restaurants, Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828, 104 S.Ct. 102, 78 L.Ed.2d 106 (1983); Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 928 (11th Cir.1983); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir.1981); Kirkland v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 622 F.2d 1066, 1068 (2d Cir.1980); Satz v. ITT Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir.1980).

However, a limited EEOC investigation will not necessarily defeat a complaint where the complaint contains allegations like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge, but which the EEOC failed to investigate. In such a case, "the proper inquiry would be into what EEOC investigation could reasonably be expected to grow from the original complaint." Id. at 864 n. 2; accord Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir.1978); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398-99 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 741, 50 L.Ed.2d 753 (1977); Gamble v. Birmingham S.R.R., 514 F.2d 678, 688-89 (5th Cir.1975). In other words, although the investigation may help define the scope of the charge, it is primarily the charge to which we look in determining whether the scope requirement is satisfied. Compare Vermett v. Hough, 606 F.Supp. 732, 740 (W.D.Mich.1984).

Under this standard, we believe that the district court properly dismissed the class-wide allegations in the complaint. Neither the charge nor the ensuing investigation put Baskin (or HSSI, for that matter, although we believe that all claims against it properly were dismissed) on notice of the plaintiffs' intention to file a lawsuit containing allegations of class-wide discrimination.

First, the allegations in the EEOC charge do not indicate class-wide discrimination....