B & J MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. Solar Industries, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 August 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 73-1022.,73-1022. |
Citation | 483 F.2d 594 |
Parties | B & J MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Appellant, v. SOLAR INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Edward A. Craig, Detroit, Mich. for appellant.
Robert T. Edell, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.*
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 11, 1973.
Solar Industries, Inc., sought a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that a patent owned by the defendant for a "tire bead seater" was invalid and/or was not infringed by the plaintiff. Service of process on the defendant was obtained pursuant to Minnesota's "longarm" statutes, M.S.A. §§ 303.131 and 543.19,2 as permitted by Rule 4(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. The defendant, appearing specially, moved to dismiss the action or, alternatively, to quash the return of service on the ground, inter alia, that the court was without personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The District Court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and certified the issue for an interlocutory appeal to this Court.
The pertinent facts, for the most part, are the following which were found by the trial court:3
The District Court found personal jurisdiction under both of the cited statutes. Initially, it indicated that the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted these statutes to extend the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts to its maximum reach consistent with the constitutional limitations of due process. Next, it reviewed Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and concluded that the defendant had sufficient contacts with Minnesota in the instant case so that personal jurisdiction could be obtained over it without offending "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The plaintiff makes alternative arguments for jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff contends that service of process was made consistent with due process and that it is not necessary to tie the grounds of jurisdiction to specific provisions in the "long-arm" statutes.4 See, Japan Gas Lighter Association v. Ronson Corp., 257 F.Supp. 219, 231-232 (D.N.J.1966). Plaintiff maintains this approach is proper because the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically stated that the legislature by enacting the "long-arm" statutes intended "to extend jurisdiction of the state's courts to the maximum limits consistent with constitutional limitations." Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292, 304 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970). See also, Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 203 N.W.2d 403 (1972); Mid-Continent Freight L. v. Highway Trailer Indus., 291 Minn. 251, 190 N.W.2d 670, 673 (1971). Defendant, in turn, strenuously argues that the language of statutes must be closely adhered to and that in every instance where the Minnesota court has found personal jurisdiction, one of the statutory elements relating to the acts enumerated in the statute has been found to exist by the court.
Plaintiff, in the alternative, argues that the defendant performed acts in Minnesota which make jurisdiction proper under two of the instances enumerated in M.S.A. § 543.19. First, relying on an unpublished opinion of Judge Larson, the plaintiff contends that the threat of enforcement of a United States patent against a Minnesota resident was the use of personal property within Minnesota and, thus, satisfied M.S.A. § 543.19, subd. 1(a). See, Imperial Products Inc. v. Zuro, et al., No. 4-70-Civ. 471 (D.Minn. July 1, 1971). The defendant, on the other hand, reasons that the situs of a patent is limited to the residence of its holder—here, Illinois—and that, therefore, there was no ownership, use or possession of the patent in Minnesota. Second, the plaintiff contends that the defendant transacted business in Minnesota by charging the plaintiff with patent infringement and demanding that it cease manufacturing its product. This act, of course, is that enumerated in M.S.A. § 543.19, subd. 1(b). See, n. 2, supra. The defendant, however, without further reasoning, maintains that this did not constitute the transaction of business in the forum.
We do not find it necessary here to rule on each of the possible grounds for jurisdiction which are asserted by the plaintiff. Rather, we are convinced the plaintiff's cause of action arose from the defendant's transaction of business in Minnesota and, therefore, personal jurisdiction was properly obtained in accordance with M.S.A. § 543.19, subd. 1(b). Our review is accordingly limited, and we express no opinion as to the validity of the other grounds asserted by the plaintiff.
In view of the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated that M.S.A. § 543.19 should be interpreted broadly to "afford maximum protection to the state's residents injured by acts of nonresidents," Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, supra, 172 N.W.2d at 304, it is proper to employ a liberal construction in determining whether the cause of action has arisen from the transaction of business in Minnesota.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff's action arose directly from the fact that through their attorneys, the defendant and the assignor of its patent advised the plaintiff, by letters received in Minnesota, to refrain from infringing on the "tire bead seater" patent and, further, threatened that a suit for infringement would be brought against the plaintiff if it refused to discontinue the manufacture and sale of its competing product. Regardless of the validity of the defendant's patent, there is no doubt but that the requests and threats were designed to reduce competition and thereby improve defendant's marketing and economic position. As such, we are convinced that the sending of these...
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