Reid v. MEDICAL & PROF. MGMT. CONSULTANTS

• Decision Date: 12 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-3092.,98-3092.
• Citation: 744 So.2d 1116
• Parties: Aldona Lynn REID and Jerry Reid, her husband, Appellants, v. MEDICAL & PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC., a Florida corporation, and Marilyn Lynett Clayton, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

744 So.2d 1116

Aldona Lynn REID and Jerry Reid, her husband, Appellants, v. MEDICAL & PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC., a Florida corporation, and Marilyn Lynett Clayton, Appellees.

No. 98-3092.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

October 12, 1999.

Milton H. Baxley II, Gainesville, for appellants.

Robert E. Bonner of Meier, Lengauer, Bonner, Muszynski & Doyle, P.A., Orlando, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants challenge an adverse final judgment entered in accordance with a jury verdict that found Aldona Reid had sustained no damages or permanent injuries as a result of an automobile accident with a vehicle owned by Medical & Professional Management Consultants, Inc. ("MPMC") and operated by Marilyn Lynett Clayton. Appellants maintain that the trial court should have granted their motion for new trial because the jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.¹ Because our review of the evidence presented at trial convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial, we affirm.

"[T]he trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S397, S400, ___ So.2d ___, ___, 1999 WL 669205 (Fla. Aug. 26, 1999). "The role of the trial judge is not to substitute his or her own verdict for that of the jury, but to avoid what, in the judge's trained and experienced judgment, is an unjust verdict." Id. at S399, ___ So.2d at ___. Upon review of a trial judge's order on a motion for new trial, "an appellate court must recognize the broad discretionary authority of the trial judge and apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion." Id. at S400, ___ So.2d at ___.

We now turn to the facts of this case as disclosed by the portions of the record submitted to us for our review.² On July 14, 1995, an automobile owned by MPMC and operated by Ms. Clayton rear-ended an automobile operated by Mrs. Reid. Prior to this accident, Mrs. Reid had an extensive history of back and cervical problems dating back to 1983. Mrs. Reid had three back surgeries between 1989 and 1993. She also had surgery for a herniated cervical disc in 1992. The record also reveals that prior to the automobile accident, Mrs. Reid suffered numerous physical ailments and disabilities, had other accidents from falling, and developed a psychiatric condition requiring treatment, none of which we find it necessary to discuss in detail. It is significant that two of her doctors found her totally and permanently disabled in 1994.

Mrs. Reid's principal complaint immediately following the accident was of neck pain, diagnosed as cervical strain, which resolved without residual effects. In December 1995, some five months after the automobile accident, Mrs. Reid had additional surgery on her back to address a pre-accident problem of a partial union at the L4-5 vertebral level.

There was little, if any, medical testimony presented at trial which tended to link, with certainty, any specific new permanent condition to the trauma of the accident. Mrs. Reid's physicians opined during their testimony that a causal connection existed between the accident and Mrs. Reid's post-accident physical and psychological conditions; however, these opinions were severely challenged and eroded by the errors, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the medical testimony, and by the inability of the physicians to clearly delineate any permanent condition that appellant did not already have, or would not have had but for the accident. In addition, at least one of the physicians clearly relied upon inaccurate statements made to him by Mrs. Reid as to the pre-accident existence of certain of her medical complaints. Given this record, we find that the evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that the automobile accident did not cause any loosening of Mrs. Reid's metallic implants at the L4-5 fusion level, and that the need for the post-accident surgery of December 1995 was produced by the non-union of the...