Heath v. DeCourcy

• Decision Date: 03 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-4167,88-4167
• Citation: 888 F.2d 1105
• Parties: James HEATH, Harold Lancy, Harold Keith, Johnny Edwards, Kenneth Thompson, Edward Ackerson, Michael R. Blum, Herbert Hayes, David F. Burke, Gary W.J. Bevins, Bailey J. Hayes, and Gene H. Gregg, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Joseph M. DE COURCY, Norman A. Murdock, Robert E. Taft II, as Commissioners of Hamilton County, Defendants, Simon L. Leis, Jr., as Sheriff of Hamilton County, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1105

888 F.2d 1105

James HEATH, Harold Lancy, Harold Keith, Johnny Edwards,

Kenneth Thompson, Edward Ackerson, Michael R. Blum, Herbert

Hayes, David F. Burke, Gary W.J. Bevins, Bailey J. Hayes, and Gene H. Gregg, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Joseph M. DE COURCY, Norman A. Murdock, Robert E. Taft II, as Commissioners of Hamilton County, Defendants, Simon L. Leis, Jr., as Sheriff of Hamilton County, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-4167.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Sept. 25, 1989.

Decided Nov. 3, 1989.

Stephen H. Olden (argued), Edward S. Stokan, Legal Aid Soc. of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert E. Taylor, Asst. Pros. Atty. (argued), Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.

Before KENNEDY and NELSON, Circuit Judges; and WISEMAN, Chief District Judge. ^*

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal forces us to consider the appropriate standard for modifying a consent decree entered on the agreement of the parties in the context of institutional reform litigation. Appellee urges that we apply a somewhat relaxed standard for modifying such decrees, while appellants contend that we adopt a more rigid standard and allow modification only upon the showing of a "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). ¹ Because of the problems unique to consent decrees in the context of institutional reform, we adopt the former standard and AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

Appellants are all inmates of a metropolitan county jail in Hamilton County, Ohio. They appeal the District Court's order which granted in part appellee's motion to modify an Agreed Modification of Agreed Final Judgment. 704 F.Supp. 799. Appellants claim that in granting the motion, the District Court applied the incorrect legal standard, abused its discretion, and granted the motion absent sufficient evidence of record.

Appellants originally sued appellee under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, challenging the conditions of their confinement in the Hamilton County jail. They contended that the jail's policy of triple-celling inmates violated their eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. In 1980, the court granted appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction which prohibited triple-celling and required a phased-in reduction of the jail population. The parties subsequently settled all claims raised in the suit. The court entered an Agreed Final Judgment in September 1985, but appellants appealed that judgment because the judge modified it sua sponte so as to limit its duration. This Court remanded for clarification by the District Court, and the appeal was voluntarily dismissed in September 1987.

A little over a month after the Agreed Final Judgment was entered, the jail population began to exceed the design capacity of the facility. In response, appellants filed a motion for contempt against the county officials because of the overcrowding and use of cots. Following studies and negotiations, the county formulated an overcrowding reduction plan, which it submitted to the court, along with a motion to modify the consent decree. A settlement was reached which prohibited the use of cots, set inmate population caps, and limited double-celling to a specific category of low-risk inmates. It also empowered the sheriff to refuse admission of new inmates and to authorize the release of some inmates to ensure compliance with the population caps. When appellee refused to execute the settlement decree, appellants filed a motion to enforce it in September 1987. Pending a ruling on that motion, appellee Leis, sheriff of Hamilton County, sought and was given an order limiting the prison population to 1,050 and authorizing him to release misdemeanant inmates as necessary. In mid October, the Hamilton County Municipal Court judges intervened as a group, claiming that their state law sentencing powers were being eroded. Their intervention was limited to being heard on the questions of inmate release procedures and the order of inmate release.

Appellants' motion to enforce the amended decree was granted in November. Appellee, joined by the Hamilton County Municipal Court judges, appealed claiming that the settlement agreement could not be enforced. Both appeals were dismissed as premature. The parties then agreed on changes to the settlement agreement, although the sheriff was probably aware or should have been aware that the agreement would not effectively meet the population limits placed on the jail. ² The agreement was approved by the lower court on November 10, 1987. Entitled the Agreed Modification of Agreed Final Judgment, it became effective June 1, 1988, by an order dated May 20, 1988.

On June 6, 1988, appellee Sheriff Leis filed a motion to modify the Agreed Modification of Agreed Final Judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The appellant inmates filed a response and, following a hearing, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, Sheriff Leis moved to change the category of those capable of being double-celled from those who were "classified as minimum security and who are male misdemeanants" to those who are "classified as minimum security." He also sought to include female inmates in the class capable of being double-celled. The District Court granted the motion insofar as it modified the class to include all minimum security prisoners, including felons. It denied the motion insofar as it sought to include female prisoners in the class. Appellant inmates appeal.

The general standard for modifying consent decrees was set out by the Supreme Court in Swift. Swift involved modification of a "commercial" consent decree--i.e., a decree entered into by the parties which regulated business practices as between them. In determining whether to modify a consent decree which prohibited defendants from dealing in certain businesses and commodities, Justice Cardozo stated the test as follows: "Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464. Appellants contend that under the Swift standard, the District Court erred in modifying the consent decree because there was no "grievous wrong" resulting from changed circumstances.

In granting appellee's motion to modify the consent decree, the District Court relied on Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). In Stotts, the Court stated that a consent decree can be modified (1) when done in accordance with basic principles of contract law, (2) when the decree is void or no longer equitable, or (3) when the circumstances of the case change. Id. at 560-61. In addition, it was stated that "[a] consent decree may also be modified 'where a better appreciation of the facts in the light of experience indicates that the decree is not properly adapted to accomplishing its purposes.' Chance v. Board of Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.1977), quoting King-Seeley Thermos Co., 418 F.2d at 35 [2nd Cir.1969]." Id. at 562. ³ Although Stotts apparently approved of a standard less rigid than Swift for modifying an "institutional" consent decree--i.e., a consent decree which affects the operation of a governmental institution or organization--it is not entirely clear which standard the court relied on in reaching its decision. ⁴ The District Court in the instant appeal based its decision on the latter rule in Stotts. It concluded that in order to carry out the judgment it entered in the case, it would modify the classification criteria for double-celling as proposed by Sheriff Leis. The court found that there would be no increased risk by double-celling minimum security inmates being held pre-trial on misdemeanor charges, pre-trial on felony charges, or serving split sentences on felony charges. The modification was "mandated by common sense as it does not increase the risk to inmates, and permits more effective utilization of the government's resources in the safe, orderly and humane administration of the jail, thereby promoting the public interest of having reasonable and lawful sentences served." We hold that the District Court did not err in applying this flexible standard in modifying the consent decree.

Several courts of appeals have carved out an exception to the rigid Swift standard to permit modification of consent decrees in the context of institutional reform litigation. We agree with those courts that consent decrees which regulate institutional conduct are fundamentally different from consent decrees between private parties. The latter are born by agreement of the parties and only their rights and liabilities are affected. Presumably, the parties have carefully considered the effects of the agreement and have entered into it with open eyes, aware and capable of anticipating its consequences. While institutional consent decrees are similarly born by agreement between the parties, they affect more than the rights of the immediate litigants. The decrees reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public's right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions. Broader judicial discretion to modify the parties' agreement is required so that the agreed upon solution to the problem giving rise to the litigation may be fine-tuned to accomplish its goal. The efficacy and consequences of a decree directing institutional reform cannot be seen clearly from the courtroom. Time and experience may yield new knowledge that compels modification of the original agreement if its end,...