Doe v. Briley

• Decision Date: 28 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 3:73-6971.,3:73-6971.
• Citation: 511 F.Supp.2d 904
• Parties: John DOE, Plaintiff, v. Beverly BRILEY, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

511 F.Supp.2d 904

John DOE, Plaintiff, v. Beverly BRILEY, et al., Defendant.

No. 3:73-6971.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

September 28, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Franklin Blumstein, Vanderbilt School of Law, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Lyndsay Fuller, Michael Alan Meyer, Tennessee Attorney General's Office, Allison L. Bussell, Rita M. Roberts-Turner, Metropolitan Legal `Department, Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

Alan Dale Johnson, Alfred H. Knight, Willis & Knight, Nashville, TN, for Intervenor, Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.

MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER, District Judge.

This case comes before the court on the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Docket. No. 29) to grant in part and deny in part the Motion to Assure Compliance filed by the plaintiff (Docket No. 2), to which defendant Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County have responded (Docket Nos. 10, 11), and the plaintiff has replied (Docket Nos. 26; 28). In addition, the court will consider the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to deny the Motion to Dissolve filed by defendant Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (,Docket No. 8), and the Motion to Dissolve filed by defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (Docket No. 11), to which the plaintiff responded (Docket Nos. 18; 19), and the defendants replied (Docket Nos. 26; 28). The court will also consider Motions to Dissolve filed by intervenors The Tennessean (Docket No. 5, Ex. 1) and NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P. ("NewsChannel 5") (Docket No. 36, Ex. 2). For the reasons cited herein, the plaintiff's Motion to Assure Compliance will be denied, the defendants' Motions to Dissolve will be granted, and the Motions to Dissolve filed by the, intervenors will be granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from a consent decree originally entered into by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro"), the state of Tennessee, and plaintiff John Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, on March 22, 1974.¹ The 1974 consent decree settled a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, limiting the public's access to arrest records. The 1974 consent decree provides, in relevant part:

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville defendants, their successors, their agents, their employees and others acting under their supervision or control shall hereinafter limit access to the records of arrest under their control as follows: the arrest records maintained by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville of persons arrested by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville but who are not convicted of the charges upon which the arrest was predicated will be revealed only to law enforcement agencies and only for official law enforcement purposes;.... The Metropolitan Government of Nashville defendants and the State of Tennessee defendant, his successors, agents, employees and those under his supervision and control are hereby enjoined from disseminating such arrest records as above described except to such law enforcement agencies for official law enforcement purposes.

(Docket No. 19, Ex. B at ¶ 1) In addition, the 1974 consent decree provides that "[t]his court reserves jurisdiction over this matter to assure compliance with this and any subsequent Order." (Id. at ¶ 6)

The case also involves, tangentially, an earlier consent decree entered in 1973 in the same litigation as the 1974 consent decree, The 1973 consent decree barred the Metropolitan Government of Nashville "from inquiring about, obtaining, or using any information regarding any arrests which have not resulted in a criminal trial or conviction for criminal activities, when considering applicants for employment with the Metropolitan Government or the Metropolitan Board of Education." (Docket No. 19, Ex. A) That is, the 1973 consent decree related specifically to employment decisions, Whereas the 1974 consent decree bars all dissemination of arrest records except "for official law enforcement purposes." (Docket No. 19, Ex. B at ¶ 1)

In 1957, the Tennessee legislature enacted the Tennessee Public Records Act, the current version of which states that, except as provided, "all state, county and municipal records ... shall at all times, during business hours, be open for personal inspection by any citizen of Tennessee, and those in charge of such records shall not refuse such right of inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law." T.C.A. § 10-7-503(a).

In 2004, the Tennessee legislature enacted T.C.A. § 38-6-120, pursuant to which the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation was to make criminal arrest histories publicly available for the first time for a fee of $29 per name submitted. From 2004 until the present date, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation has provided criminal arrest histories in this manner.

Starting in July 2005, the Nashville Metro Police Department began posting pictures of alleged patrons of prostitution ("johns"), and other individuals arrested in prostitution stings, on the internet. (Docket No. 3, Ex. 1) On July 17, 2006, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Assure Compliance (Docket No. 2), in light of the Metro Police Department's publication of this information. In the Motion to Assure Compliance, the plaintiffs request the court to (1) restore this case to its active docket; (2) order Metro and the State of Tennessee to refrain from disseminating and providing general access to arrest records unless and until the arrested persons are convicted of the crime for which they were arrested; and (3) order Metro to dismantle its "john" website "root and branch," cease and desist posting the arrest records and/or photographs of arrested persons who have not been convicted, and limit the dissemination of those records to law enforcement agents for law enforcement purposes. (Docket No. 2 at p. 2-3) In addition, the plaintiff requests that the court issue an order requiring the defendants to perform a "detailed and comprehensive self-study" regarding relevant practices and procedures, determining, specifically, what information is shared with whom under the current practice. (Docket No. 3 at p. 6)

On July 21, 2006, this action was referred to Magistrate Judge Juliet Griffin for case management, for ruling on all nondispositive motions and for recommendation on all dispositive motions. (Docket No. 4) On August 2, 2006, The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation moved to dissolve the 1974 consent decree (Docket No. 8) and on August 3, 2006, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County filed a joint motion to dissolve the 1974 consent decree, concurrent with a response brief (Docket No. 11).

On August 8, 2006, The Tennessean moved to intervene for the purpose of opposing the plaintiffs motion to enforce the 1974 consent decree. (Docket No. 5) On August 14, 2006, Magistrate Judge Griffin transferred the case to Magistrate Judge John Bryant. (Docket No. 15) On February 20, 2007, Judge Bryant issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the plaintiffs Motion to Assure Compliance be granted in part and denied in part and that The Tennessean's Motion to Intervene be denied. (Docket No. 29) On March 2, 2007, The Tennessean filed its objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Docket No. 30) On March 8, 2007, NewsChannel 5 Network moved to intervene to protect its alleged First Amendment constitutional rights and statutory rights to access public records. (Docket No. 36) On May 7, 2007, this court entered an order rejecting the Report and Recommendation insofar as it recommended the denial of the Motion to Intervene filed by The Tennessean and granting the Motions to Intervene filed by both The Tennessean and NewsChannel 5 Network. (Docket No 41). Oral argument was heard on the remaining pending motions on July 11, 2007, and post-argument briefs were filed on August 13, 2007 (Docket No. 59) and September 17, 2007 (Docket No. 60).

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

In 28 U.S.C. § 636, Congress "relieve[d] some of the burden on the federal courts by permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrates." United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir.2001). Section 636(b) creates two different standards of review for magistrates' findings that are challenged in district court. District courts "apply a `clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard of review for ... `nondispositive' preliminary measures," while, "[c]onversely, `dispositive motions' ... such as motions for summary judgment or for the suppression of evidence are governed by the de novo standard." Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)).

Likewise, Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that district courts should set aside a Magistrate Judge's order regarding non-dispositive matters, to which objection has been timely made, if the order "is clearly erroneous or contrary to law," Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), while the district courts should review de novo any recommendation regarding a dispositive motion to which timely objection is made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(3).

Defendant Metro challenges Magistrate Judge Bryant's recommendation to grant in part the plaintiffs motion to assure compliance and to deny its motion to dissolve the consent decree. In accordance with Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reviews those recommendations de novo.

II. Plaintiffs Standing to Enforce the Consent Decree

Because "the core component of standing is an essential element and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III," standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In fact, "[n]o...